(in particular, causing the ReadyForQuery message to be eaten) before
returning from do_copy. The only known consequence of failing to do so is
that get_prompt might show a wrong result for the %x transaction status
escape, as reported by Bernd Helmle; but it's possible there are other issues.
Back-patch as far as 7.4, the oldest version supporting %x.
cause any serious harm in normal cases, but if you have gcc buffer overrun
checking turned on, that will notice. Found by Jack Orenstein. Problem
was already fixed in CVS HEAD.
Formerly they'd emit '^foo|bar$' which is wrong because the anchors are
parsed as part of the alternatives; must emit '^(foo|bar)$' to get expected
behavior. Same as bug found previously in similar_escape(). Already fixed
in HEAD, this is just back-porting the part of that patch that was a bug fix.
quote chars inside quote marks, should emit one quote *and stay in inquotes
mode*. No doubt the lack of reports of this have something to do with the
poor documentation of the feature ...
parser will allow "\'" to be used to represent a literal quote mark. The
"\'" representation has been deprecated for some time in favor of the
SQL-standard representation "''" (two single quote marks), but it has been
used often enough that just disallowing it immediately won't do. Hence
backslash_quote allows the settings "on", "off", and "safe_encoding",
the last meaning to allow "\'" only if client_encoding is a valid server
encoding. That is now the default, and the reason is that in encodings
such as SJIS that allow 0x5c (ASCII backslash) to be the last byte of a
multibyte character, accepting "\'" allows SQL-injection attacks as per
CVE-2006-2314 (further details will be published after release). The
"on" setting is available for backward compatibility, but it must not be
used with clients that are exposed to untrusted input.
Thanks to Akio Ishida and Yasuo Ohgaki for identifying this security issue.
operator names. This is needed when dumping operator definitions that have
COMMUTATOR (or similar) links to operators in other schemas.
Apparently Daniel Whitter is the first person ever to try this :-(
(1) The code doesn't initialize `sum', so the initial "does the checksum
match?" test is wrong.
(2) The loop that is intended to check for a "null block" just checks
the first byte of the tar block 512 times, rather than each of the
512 bytes one time (!), which I'm guessing was the intent.
It was only through sheer luck that this worked in the first place.
Per Coverity static analysis performed by EnterpriseDB.
a warning when a variable is used as a format string for printf()
and similar functions (if the variable is derived from untrusted
data, it could include unexpected formatting sequences). This
emits too many warnings to be enabled by default, but it does
flag a few dubious constructs in the Postgres tree. This patch
fixes up the obvious variants: functions that are passed a variable
format string but no additional arguments.
Most of these are harmless (e.g. the ruleutils stuff), but there
is at least one actual bug here: if you create a trigger named
"%sfoo", pg_dump will read uninitialized memory and fail to dump
the trigger correctly.
owned by postgres, doing "pg_ctl start" as root could allow a privilege
escalation attack, as pointed out by iDEFENSE. Of course the postmaster would
fail, but we ought to fail a little sooner to protect sysadmins unfamiliar
with Postgres. The chosen fix is to disable root use of pg_ctl in all cases,
just to be confident there are no other holes.
any restore operation, thereby ensuring that dumped data is interpreted
the same way it was dumped even if the target database has a different
encoding. Per suggestions from Pavel Stehule and others. Also,
simplify scheme for handling check_function_bodies ... we may as well
just set that at the head of the script.
