Files
postgresql/src/common/scram-common.c
Michael Paquier 5513dc6a30 Improve error handling of HMAC computations
This is similar to b69aba7, except that this completes the work for
HMAC with a new routine called pg_hmac_error() that would provide more
context about the type of error that happened during a HMAC computation:
- The fallback HMAC implementation in hmac.c relies on cryptohashes, so
in some code paths it is necessary to return back the error generated by
cryptohashes.
- For the OpenSSL implementation (hmac_openssl.c), the logic is very
similar to cryptohash_openssl.c, where the error context comes from
OpenSSL if one of its internal routines failed, with different error
codes if something internal to hmac_openssl.c failed or was incorrect.

Any in-core code paths that use the centralized HMAC interface are
related to SCRAM, for errors that are unlikely going to happen, with
only SHA-256.  It would be possible to see errors when computing some
HMACs with MD5 for example and OpenSSL FIPS enabled, and this commit
would help in reporting the correct errors but nothing in core uses
that.  So, at the end, no backpatch to v14 is done, at least for now.

Errors in SCRAM related to the computation of the server key, stored
key, etc. need to pass down the potential error context string across
more layers of their respective call stacks for the frontend and the
backend, so each surrounding routine is adapted for this purpose.

Reviewed-by: Sergey Shinderuk
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Yd0N9tSAIIkFd+qi@paquier.xyz
2022-01-13 16:17:21 +09:00

309 lines
7.3 KiB
C

/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
* scram-common.c
* Shared frontend/backend code for SCRAM authentication
*
* This contains the common low-level functions needed in both frontend and
* backend, for implement the Salted Challenge Response Authentication
* Mechanism (SCRAM), per IETF's RFC 5802.
*
* Portions Copyright (c) 2017-2022, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
*
* IDENTIFICATION
* src/common/scram-common.c
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#ifndef FRONTEND
#include "postgres.h"
#else
#include "postgres_fe.h"
#endif
#include "common/base64.h"
#include "common/hmac.h"
#include "common/scram-common.h"
#include "port/pg_bswap.h"
/*
* Calculate SaltedPassword.
*
* The password should already be normalized by SASLprep. Returns 0 on
* success, -1 on failure with *errstr pointing to a message about the
* error details.
*/
int
scram_SaltedPassword(const char *password,
const char *salt, int saltlen, int iterations,
uint8 *result, const char **errstr)
{
int password_len = strlen(password);
uint32 one = pg_hton32(1);
int i,
j;
uint8 Ui[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
uint8 Ui_prev[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
pg_hmac_ctx *hmac_ctx = pg_hmac_create(PG_SHA256);
if (hmac_ctx == NULL)
{
*errstr = pg_hmac_error(NULL); /* returns OOM */
return -1;
}
/*
* Iterate hash calculation of HMAC entry using given salt. This is
* essentially PBKDF2 (see RFC2898) with HMAC() as the pseudorandom
* function.
*/
/* First iteration */
if (pg_hmac_init(hmac_ctx, (uint8 *) password, password_len) < 0 ||
pg_hmac_update(hmac_ctx, (uint8 *) salt, saltlen) < 0 ||
pg_hmac_update(hmac_ctx, (uint8 *) &one, sizeof(uint32)) < 0 ||
pg_hmac_final(hmac_ctx, Ui_prev, sizeof(Ui_prev)) < 0)
{
*errstr = pg_hmac_error(hmac_ctx);
pg_hmac_free(hmac_ctx);
return -1;
}
memcpy(result, Ui_prev, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
/* Subsequent iterations */
for (i = 2; i <= iterations; i++)
{
if (pg_hmac_init(hmac_ctx, (uint8 *) password, password_len) < 0 ||
pg_hmac_update(hmac_ctx, (uint8 *) Ui_prev, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) < 0 ||
pg_hmac_final(hmac_ctx, Ui, sizeof(Ui)) < 0)
{
*errstr = pg_hmac_error(hmac_ctx);
pg_hmac_free(hmac_ctx);
return -1;
}
for (j = 0; j < SCRAM_KEY_LEN; j++)
result[j] ^= Ui[j];
memcpy(Ui_prev, Ui, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
}
pg_hmac_free(hmac_ctx);
return 0;
}
/*
* Calculate SHA-256 hash for a NULL-terminated string. (The NULL terminator is
* not included in the hash). Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure with *errstr
* pointing to a message about the error details.
*/
int
scram_H(const uint8 *input, int len, uint8 *result, const char **errstr)
{
pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx;
ctx = pg_cryptohash_create(PG_SHA256);
if (ctx == NULL)
{
*errstr = pg_cryptohash_error(NULL); /* returns OOM */
return -1;
}
if (pg_cryptohash_init(ctx) < 0 ||
pg_cryptohash_update(ctx, input, len) < 0 ||
pg_cryptohash_final(ctx, result, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) < 0)
{
*errstr = pg_cryptohash_error(ctx);
pg_cryptohash_free(ctx);
return -1;
}
pg_cryptohash_free(ctx);
return 0;
}
/*
* Calculate ClientKey. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure with *errstr
* pointing to a message about the error details.
*/
int
scram_ClientKey(const uint8 *salted_password, uint8 *result,
const char **errstr)
{
pg_hmac_ctx *ctx = pg_hmac_create(PG_SHA256);
if (ctx == NULL)
{
*errstr = pg_hmac_error(NULL); /* returns OOM */
return -1;
}
if (pg_hmac_init(ctx, salted_password, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) < 0 ||
pg_hmac_update(ctx, (uint8 *) "Client Key", strlen("Client Key")) < 0 ||
pg_hmac_final(ctx, result, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) < 0)
{
*errstr = pg_hmac_error(ctx);
pg_hmac_free(ctx);
return -1;
}
pg_hmac_free(ctx);
return 0;
}
/*
* Calculate ServerKey. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure with *errstr
* pointing to a message about the error details.
*/
int
scram_ServerKey(const uint8 *salted_password, uint8 *result,
const char **errstr)
{
pg_hmac_ctx *ctx = pg_hmac_create(PG_SHA256);
if (ctx == NULL)
{
*errstr = pg_hmac_error(NULL); /* returns OOM */
return -1;
}
if (pg_hmac_init(ctx, salted_password, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) < 0 ||
pg_hmac_update(ctx, (uint8 *) "Server Key", strlen("Server Key")) < 0 ||
pg_hmac_final(ctx, result, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) < 0)
{
*errstr = pg_hmac_error(ctx);
pg_hmac_free(ctx);
return -1;
}
pg_hmac_free(ctx);
return 0;
}
/*
* Construct a SCRAM secret, for storing in pg_authid.rolpassword.
*
* The password should already have been processed with SASLprep, if necessary!
*
* If iterations is 0, default number of iterations is used. The result is
* palloc'd or malloc'd, so caller is responsible for freeing it.
*
* On error, returns NULL and sets *errstr to point to a message about the
* error details.
*/
char *
scram_build_secret(const char *salt, int saltlen, int iterations,
const char *password, const char **errstr)
{
uint8 salted_password[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
uint8 stored_key[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
uint8 server_key[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
char *result;
char *p;
int maxlen;
int encoded_salt_len;
int encoded_stored_len;
int encoded_server_len;
int encoded_result;
if (iterations <= 0)
iterations = SCRAM_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS;
/* Calculate StoredKey and ServerKey */
if (scram_SaltedPassword(password, salt, saltlen, iterations,
salted_password, errstr) < 0 ||
scram_ClientKey(salted_password, stored_key, errstr) < 0 ||
scram_H(stored_key, SCRAM_KEY_LEN, stored_key, errstr) < 0 ||
scram_ServerKey(salted_password, server_key, errstr) < 0)
{
/* errstr is filled already here */
#ifdef FRONTEND
return NULL;
#else
elog(ERROR, "could not calculate stored key and server key: %s",
*errstr);
#endif
}
/*----------
* The format is:
* SCRAM-SHA-256$<iteration count>:<salt>$<StoredKey>:<ServerKey>
*----------
*/
encoded_salt_len = pg_b64_enc_len(saltlen);
encoded_stored_len = pg_b64_enc_len(SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
encoded_server_len = pg_b64_enc_len(SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
maxlen = strlen("SCRAM-SHA-256") + 1
+ 10 + 1 /* iteration count */
+ encoded_salt_len + 1 /* Base64-encoded salt */
+ encoded_stored_len + 1 /* Base64-encoded StoredKey */
+ encoded_server_len + 1; /* Base64-encoded ServerKey */
#ifdef FRONTEND
result = malloc(maxlen);
if (!result)
{
*errstr = _("out of memory");
return NULL;
}
#else
result = palloc(maxlen);
#endif
p = result + sprintf(result, "SCRAM-SHA-256$%d:", iterations);
/* salt */
encoded_result = pg_b64_encode(salt, saltlen, p, encoded_salt_len);
if (encoded_result < 0)
{
*errstr = _("could not encode salt");
#ifdef FRONTEND
free(result);
return NULL;
#else
elog(ERROR, "%s", *errstr);
#endif
}
p += encoded_result;
*(p++) = '$';
/* stored key */
encoded_result = pg_b64_encode((char *) stored_key, SCRAM_KEY_LEN, p,
encoded_stored_len);
if (encoded_result < 0)
{
*errstr = _("could not encode stored key");
#ifdef FRONTEND
free(result);
return NULL;
#else
elog(ERROR, "%s", *errstr);
#endif
}
p += encoded_result;
*(p++) = ':';
/* server key */
encoded_result = pg_b64_encode((char *) server_key, SCRAM_KEY_LEN, p,
encoded_server_len);
if (encoded_result < 0)
{
*errstr = _("could not encode server key");
#ifdef FRONTEND
free(result);
return NULL;
#else
elog(ERROR, "%s", *errstr);
#endif
}
p += encoded_result;
*(p++) = '\0';
Assert(p - result <= maxlen);
return result;
}