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ccae190b91
This commit fixes a couple of issues related to the way password verifiers hashed with MD5 or SCRAM-SHA-256 are detected, leading to being able to store in catalogs passwords which do not follow the supported hash formats: - A MD5-hashed entry was checked based on if its header uses "md5" and if the string length matches what is expected. Unfortunately the code never checked if the hash only used hexadecimal characters, as reported by Tom Lane. - A SCRAM-hashed entry was checked based on only its header, which should be "SCRAM-SHA-256$", but it never checked for any fields afterwards, as reported by Jonathan Katz. Backpatch down to v10, which is where SCRAM has been introduced, and where password verifiers in plain format have been removed. Author: Jonathan Katz Reviewed-by: Tom Lane, Michael Paquier Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/016deb6b-1f0a-8e9f-1833-a8675b170aa9@postgresql.org Backpatch-through: 10
src/backend/libpq/README.SSL
SSL
===
>From the servers perspective:
Receives StartupPacket
|
|
(Is SSL_NEGOTIATE_CODE?) ----------- Normal startup
| No
|
| Yes
|
|
(Server compiled with USE_SSL?) ------- Send 'N'
| No |
| |
| Yes Normal startup
|
|
Send 'S'
|
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Establish SSL
|
|
Normal startup
>From the clients perspective (v6.6 client _with_ SSL):
Connect
|
|
Send packet with SSL_NEGOTIATE_CODE
|
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Receive single char ------- 'S' -------- Establish SSL
| |
| '<else>' |
| Normal startup
|
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Is it 'E' for error ------------------- Retry connection
| Yes without SSL
| No
|
Is it 'N' for normal ------------------- Normal startup
| Yes
|
Fail with unknown
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ephemeral DH
============
Since the server static private key ($DataDir/server.key) will
normally be stored unencrypted so that the database backend can
restart automatically, it is important that we select an algorithm
that continues to provide confidentiality even if the attacker has the
server's private key. Ephemeral DH (EDH) keys provide this and more
(Perfect Forward Secrecy aka PFS).
N.B., the static private key should still be protected to the largest
extent possible, to minimize the risk of impersonations.
Another benefit of EDH is that it allows the backend and clients to
use DSA keys. DSA keys can only provide digital signatures, not
encryption, and are often acceptable in jurisdictions where RSA keys
are unacceptable.
The downside to EDH is that it makes it impossible to use ssldump(1)
if there's a problem establishing an SSL session. In this case you'll
need to temporarily disable EDH (see initialize_dh()).