forked from amazingfate/loongoffice
074fd0fed1
This was added in commit ebd1b95bb5f9235d1dba1b840fd746c9b53320d2 (INTEGRATION: CWS xmlsec08 (1.1.2); FILE ADDED, 2005-03-10). According to CWS history it was introduced in the 1.1.2.1 part, without any further comments. Before the gbuild conversion in commit ec6af4194e80f5f0b2e46ca59802ff397a2a4a24 (convert libxmlsec to gbuild, 2012-11-29) the makefile.mk had a comment for this patch: "Dubious, do we still need this ?". My best guess is that this was added as part of some effort to do ODF encryption (not just signing) in xmlsecurity, but code for that on the xmlsecurity part is already removed. Change-Id: I3a5f1fedd7ce10b8b874bb8a3c9e6260213fbd8f Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.libreoffice.org/37261 Tested-by: Jenkins <ci@libreoffice.org> Reviewed-by: Miklos Vajna <vmiklos@collabora.co.uk>
XML signing, etc. From [http://www.aleksey.com/xmlsec/]. Heavily patched. The XML Security library has been modified, so that there is NO verification of the certificate during sign or verification operation. On Windows this was done in the function xmlSecMSCryptoX509StoreVerify (file src/mscrypto/x509vfy.c) and on UNIX in xmlSecNssX509StoreVerify (file src/nss/x509vfy.c). The implementation creates certificates from all of the X509Data children, such as X509IssuerSerial and X509Certificate and stores them in a certificate store (see xmlsec/src/mscrypto/x509.c:xmlSecMSCryptoX509DataNodeRead). It must then find the certificate containing the public key which is used for validation within that store. This is done in xmlSecMSCryptoX509StoreVerify. This function however only takes those certificates into account which can be validated. This was changed by the patch xmlsec1-noverify.patch, which prevents this certificate validation. xmlSecMSCryptoX509StoreVerify iterates over all certificates contained or referenced in the X509Data elements and selects one which is no issuer of any of the other certificates. This certificate is not necessarily the one which was used for signing but it must contain the proper validation key, which is sufficient to validate the signature. See http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/#sec-X509Data for details. There is a flag XMLSEC_KEYINFO_FLAGS_X509DATA_DONT_VERIFY_CERTS that can be set in a xmlSecKeyInfoCtx (see function xmlSecNssKeyDataX509XmlRead, in file src/nss/x509.c), which indicates that one can turn off the validation. However, setting it will cause that the validation key is not found. If the flag is set, then the key is not extracted from the certificate store which contains all the certificates of the X509Data elements. In other words, the certificates which are delivered within the XML signature are not used when looking for suitable validation key.