Don't use client SHA1 for fake responses
When a fake handshake response is generated for a connection that hasn't received the server's handshake, the client's SHA1 would be used with a static scramble. This, in theory, would weaken the authentication to some extend so to completely prevent this, a null password is used. This removes any possibility of the password being exposed.
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@ -1416,6 +1416,10 @@ static int gw_backend_close(DCB* dcb)
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{
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MYSQL_session client;
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gw_get_shared_session_auth_info(dcb, &client);
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// Don't use the actual client SHA1. This prevents the password from being used with the constant
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// null scramble we use in these cases.
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memset(client.client_sha1, 0, sizeof(client.client_sha1));
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memset(proto->scramble, 0, sizeof(proto->scramble));
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dcb_write(dcb, gw_generate_auth_response(&client, proto, false, false, 0));
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}
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