!279 修改cmake推荐版本

Merge pull request !279 from zzh/fix3

.gitattributes

@@ -1,3 +1,2 @@
-dependency/mysql_fdw/mysql_fdw-REL-2_5_5.tar.gz filter=lfs diff=lfs merge=lfs -text
 dependency/oracle_fdw/ORACLE_FDW_2_1_0.zip filter=lfs diff=lfs merge=lfs -text
 buildtools/python3/Python-3.7.4.tar.xz filter=lfs diff=lfs merge=lfs -text

OpenSource.yml

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ opengauss:
     name: "bottle"
     pkg_name: "bottle-0.12.17.tar.gz"
     down_load_type: "wget"
-    sha256: "7df26ca1789aa0693277c4a86d564524bff03e5d3132d9405946c58739190928"
+    sha256: "9638e15337dfb37f7eee1010851b88bf1d8b292115924754f3f46a4934db6cc5"
   - github:
     repo: "https://github.com/cffi/cffi.git"
     branch: "1.15.0"
@@ -92,13 +92,13 @@ opengauss:
     sha256: "305647377527a2827223065582dd8a9269e69866426b341699d55bb4e4d3cc71"
   - github:
     repo: "https://github.com/kjd/idna.git"
-    url: "https://github.com/kjd/idna/archive/refs/tags/v2.10.tar.gz"
-    branch: "v2.10"
+    url: "https://github.com/kjd/idna/archive/refs/tags/v3.7.tar.gz"
+    branch: "v3.7"
     path: "dependency/idna"
     name: "idna"
-    pkg_name: "idna-2.10.tar.gz"
+    pkg_name: "idna-3.7.tar.gz"
     down_load_type: "wget"
-    sha256: "c4b68473823affb02120ad1b199f1d8dd94f1ffa1595ff6fbeb70b1d5fa535bb"
+    sha256: "07017f753632624abaa31aa2c1b243aea6409367256de4183671d95e019f7d70"
   - github:
     repo: "https://pypi.org/project/ipaddress/1.0.22/"
     branch: "1.0.22"
@@ -126,15 +126,6 @@ opengauss:
     pkg_name: "jemalloc-5.2.1.tar.gz"
     down_load_type: "wget"
     sha256: "ed51b0b37098af4ca6ed31c22324635263f8ad6471889e0592a9c0dba9136aea"
-  - github:
-    repo: "https://github.com/jemalloc/jemalloc.git"
-    url: "https://github.com/jemalloc/jemalloc/archive/refs/tags/5.3.0.tar.gz"
-    branch: "5.3.0"
-    path: "dependency/jemalloc"
-    name: "jemalloc"
-    pkg_name: "jemalloc-5.3.0.tar.gz"
-    down_load_type: "wget"
-    sha256: "ef6f74fd45e95ee4ef7f9e19ebe5b075ca6b7fbe0140612b2a161abafb7ee179"
   - github:
     repo: "https://github.com/krb5/krb5.git"
     url: "https://github.com/krb5/krb5/archive/refs/tags/krb5-1.18.3-final.tar.gz"
@@ -217,14 +208,14 @@ opengauss:
     down_load_type: "wget"
     sha256: "030644df4611007ff7dc962d981f390361e6c97a34e5cbc393ddfbe019ffe2c1"
   - github:
-    repo: "https://github.com/kohler/masstree-beta.git"
-    url: "https://github.com/kohler/masstree-beta/archive/refs/tags/v0.9.0.tar.gz"
-    branch: "v0.9.0"
+    repo: "https://github.com/idanlevy1234/masstree-beta.git"
+    url: "https://github.com/idanlevy1234/masstree-beta/archive/refs/tags/1.0.1.tar.gz"
+    branch: "1.0.1"
     path: "dependency/masstree"
     name: "masstree"
-    pkg_name: "masstree-beta-0.9.0.tar.gz"
+    pkg_name: "masstree-beta-1.0.1.tar.gz"
     down_load_type: "wget"
-    sha256: "fcee0a9e5225035f416d6c81a863cec74f56997a23dc5937dc990f1a68a45ff7"
+    sha256: "fcca6a11063e7641cc38427f93ef874f0c93fd070581f664e56f71783b5cea01"
   - github:
     repo: "https://github.com/EnterpriseDB/mysql_fdw.git"
     url: "https://github.com/EnterpriseDB/mysql_fdw/archive/refs/tags/REL-2_5_5.tar.gz"
@@ -263,22 +254,22 @@ opengauss:
     sha256: "f4a9be08d22f5ad9b4bf36c491f1be58e54dc35a1592eaf4e3f79567e4894d0c"
   - github:
     repo: "https://github.com/numactl/numactl.git"
-    url: "https://github.com/numactl/numactl/releases/download/v2.0.14/numactl-2.0.14.tar.gz"
-    branch: "v2.0.14"
+    url: "https://github.com/numactl/numactl/releases/download/v2.0.16/numactl-2.0.16.tar.gz"
+    branch: "v2.0.16"
     path: "dependency/numactl"
     name: "numactl"
-    pkg_name: "numactl-2.0.14.tar.gz"
+    pkg_name: "numactl-2.0.16.tar.gz"
     down_load_type: "wget"
-    sha256: "826bd148c1b6231e1284e42a4db510207747484b112aee25ed6b1078756bcff6"
-  - github:
-    repo: "https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git"
-    url: "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/archive/refs/tags/OpenSSL_1_1_1n.tar.gz"
-    branch: "OpenSSL_1_1_1n"
+    sha256: "1b242f893af977a1d31af6ce9d6b8dafdd2d8ec3dc9207f7c2dc0d3446e7c7c8"
+  - gitee:
+    repo: "https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/openssl.git"
+    url: "https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/openssl/repository/archive/openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2.tar.gz"
+    branch: "openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2"
     path: "dependency/openssl"
     name: "openssl"
-    pkg_name: "openssl-OpenSSL_1_1_1n.tar.gz"
+    pkg_name: "openssl-1.1.1m.tar.gz"
     down_load_type: "wget"
-    sha256: "6b2d2440ced8c802aaa61475919f0870ec556694c466ebea460e35ea2b14839e"
+    sha256: "5db0854f38b0ada1b755036757baaf5cd9cd98e3dd50f89a31070e49dc2a6c4a"
   - github:
     repo: "https://github.com/laurenz/oracle_fdw.git"
     url: "https://github.com/laurenz/oracle_fdw/archive/refs/tags/ORACLE_FDW_2_2_0.tar.gz"
@@ -424,3 +415,21 @@ opengauss:
     pkg_name: "zstd-1.5.2.tar.gz"
     down_load_type: "wget"
     sha256: "f7de13462f7a82c29ab865820149e778cbfe01087b3a55b5332707abf9db4a6e"
+  - github:
+    repo: "https://github.com/jntass/TASSL-1.1.1.git"
+    url: "https://codeload.github.com/jntass/TASSL-1.1.1/tar.gz/refs/heads/master"
+    branch: "master"
+    path: "dependency/tassl"
+    name: "tassl"
+    pkg_name: "TASSL-1.1.1-master.tar.gz"
+    down_load_type: "wget"
+    sha256: "0d7f9691293067d517a5f6493d7660c2db1edff8e4266ebef9a3d32731dfff1f"
+  - github:
+    repo: "https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-cpp.git"
+    url: "https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-cpp/archive/refs/tags/1.11.327.tar.gz"
+    branch: "master"
+    path: "dependency/aws-sdk-cpp"
+    name: "aws-sdk-cpp"
+    pkg_name: "aws-sdk-cpp-1.11.327.tar.gz"
+    down_load_type: "wget"
+    sha256: "1e73193e88a02de5b8f9cbad2e3e39ec10d4b2b9e318e9c17397030beab67cf6"

README.md

@@ -16,18 +16,126 @@
 
 社区提供编译好的三方库二进制，可以直接使用，版本和三方库下载地址对应如下：
 
-| 版本和分支            | 下载路径            |
-| ------------- | --------------- |
-| 1.0.0  | https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/1.0.0/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs.tar.gz      |
-| 1.1.0  | https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/1.1.0/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs.tar.gz      |
-| 2.0.0 2.0.1  |   https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/2.0.0/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs.tar.gz    |
-| 2.1.0  |   https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/2.1.0/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs.tar.gz    |
-| 3.0.0  |    https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/3.0.0/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs.tar.gz   |
-| master |    https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/latest/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs.tar.gz   |
-| 3.1.0  |    **openEuler_arm:** https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/3.1.0/binarylibs/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_arm.tar.gz <br/> **openEuler_x86:** https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/3.1.0/binarylibs/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_x86_64.tar.gz<br/> **Centos_x86:** https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/3.1.0/binarylibs/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_Centos7.6_x86_64.tar.gz   |
-| master |    **openEuler_arm:** https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/latest/binarylibs/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_arm.tar.gz <br/> **openEuler_x86:** https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/latest/binarylibs/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_x86_64.tar.gz<br/> **Centos_x86:** https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/latest/binarylibs/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_Centos7.6_x86_64.tar.gz   |
+<table>
+    <tr>
+    	<td>分支</td>
+        <td>tag</td>
+        <td>gcc版本</td>
+        <td>下载路径</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+    	<td rowspan=2>1.0.0</td>
+        <td>v1.0.0</td>
+        <td rowspan=2>gcc7.3</td>
+        <td rowspan=2><a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/1.0.0/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/1.0.0/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs.tar.gz</a></td>
+        <tr><td>v1.0.1</td></tr> 
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+    	<td rowspan=1>1.1.0</td>
+        <td>v1.1.0</td>
+        <td>gcc7.3</td>
+        <td rowspan=1><a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/1.1.0/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/1.1.0/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs.tar.gz</a></td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+    	<td rowspan=6>2.0.0</td>
+        <td>v2.0.0</td>
+        <td rowspan=6>gcc7.3</td>
+        <td rowspan=6><a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/2.0.0/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/2.0.0/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs.tar.gz</a></td>
+        <tr><td>v2.0.1</td></tr>
+        <tr><td>v2.0.2</td></tr>
+        <tr><td>v2.0.3</td></tr>
+        <tr><td>v2.0.4</td></tr>
+        <tr><td>v2.0.5</td></tr>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+        <td rowspan=1>2.1.0</td>
+        <td>v2.1.0</td>
+        <td>gcc7.3</td>
+        <td rowspan=1><a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/2.1.0/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/2.1.0/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs.tar.gz</a></td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+        <td rowspan=4>3.0.0</td>
+        <td>v3.0.0</td>
+        <td rowspan=4>gcc7.3</td>
+        <td rowspan=3><a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/3.0.0/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/3.0.0/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs.tar.gz</a></td>
+        <tr><td>v3.0.1</td></tr>
+        <tr><td>v3.0.2</td></tr>
+        <tr><td>v3.0.3</td>
+        <td rowspan=1>
+            <strong>openEuler_arm:</strong> <a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/3.0.0/binarylibs/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_arm-3.0.3.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/3.0.0/binarylibs/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_arm-3.0.3.tar.gz</a> <br/>
+            <strong>openEuler_x86:</strong> <a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/3.0.0/binarylibs/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_x86_64-3.0.3.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/3.0.0/binarylibs/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_x86_64-3.0.3.tar.gz</a><br/>
+            <strong>Centos_x86:</strong> <a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/3.0.0/binarylibs/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_Centos7.6_x86_64-3.0.3.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/3.0.0/binarylibs/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_Centos7.6_x86_64-3.0.3.tar.gz</a></td></tr>
+        </tr>
+    <tr>
+        <td rowspan=2>3.1.0</td>
+        <td>v3.1.0</td>
+        <td rowspan=2>gcc7.3</td>
+        <td rowspan=2>
+           <strong>openEuler_arm:</strong> <a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/3.1.0/binarylibs/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_arm.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/3.1.0/binarylibs/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_arm.tar.gz</a></br>
+            <strong>openEuler_x86:</strong> <a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/3.1.0/binarylibs/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_x86_64.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/3.1.0/binarylibs/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_x86_64.tar.gz</a></br>
+            <strong>Centos_x86:</strong> <a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/3.1.0/binarylibs/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_Centos7.6_x86_64.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/3.1.0/binarylibs/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_Centos7.6_x86_64.tar.gz</a>
+        </tr>
+    </tr>
+    <tr><td>v3.1.1</td></tr>
+    <tr>
+        <td rowspan=1>5.0.0</td>
+        <td>v5.0.0</td>
+        <td>gcc7.3</td>
+        <td rowspan=1>
+            <strong>openEuler 20.03 arm:</strong> <a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/5.0.0/binarylibs/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_arm.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/5.0.0/binarylibs/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_arm.tar.gz</a><br/>
+            <strong>openEuler 20.03 x86:</strong> <a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/5.0.0/binarylibs/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_x86_64.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/5.0.0/binarylibs/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_x86_64.tar.gz</a><br/>
+            <strong>Centos_x86:</strong> <a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/5.0.0/binarylibs/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_Centos7.6_x86_64.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/5.0.0/binarylibs/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_Centos7.6_x86_64.tar.gz</a><br/>
+            <strong>openEuler 22.03 arm:</strong> <a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/5.0.0/binarylibs_2203/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_2203_arm.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/5.0.0/binarylibs_2203/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_2203_arm.tar.gz</a><br/>
+            <strong>openEuler 22.03 x86:</strong> <a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/5.0.0/binarylibs_2203/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_2203_x86_64.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/5.0.0/binarylibs_2203/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_2203_x86_64.tar.gz</a></td>
+        </tr>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+        <td rowspan=2>5.1.0</td>
+        <td rowspan=2>v5.1.0</td>
+        <td>gcc7.3</td>
+        <td rowspan=1>
+            <strong>openEuler 20.03 arm:</strong> <a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/5.1.0/binarylibs/gcc7.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_arm.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/5.1.0/binarylibs/gcc7.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_arm.tar.gz</a><br/>
+            <strong>openEuler 20.03 x86:</strong> <a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/5.1.0/binarylibs/gcc7.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_x86_64.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/5.1.0/binarylibs/gcc7.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_x86_64.tar.gz</a><br/>
+            <strong>Centos_x86:</strong> <a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/5.1.0/binarylibs/gcc7.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_Centos7.6_x86_64.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/5.1.0/binarylibs/gcc7.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_Centos7.6_x86_64.tar.gz</a><br/>
+            <strong>openEuler 22.03 arm:</strong> <a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/5.1.0/binarylibs/gcc7.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_2203_arm.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/5.1.0/binarylibs/gcc7.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_2203_arm.tar.gz</a><br/>
+            <strong>openEuler 22.03 x86:</strong> <a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/5.1.0/binarylibs/gcc7.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_2203_x86_64.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/5.1.0/binarylibs/gcc7.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_2203_x86_64.tar.gz</a></td>
+        </tr>
+        <td>gcc10.3</td>
+        <td rowspan=1>
+            <strong>openEuler 20.03 arm:</strong> <a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/5.1.0/binarylibs/gcc10.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_arm.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/5.1.0/binarylibs/gcc10.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_arm.tar.gz</a><br/>
+            <strong>openEuler 20.03 x86:</strong> <a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/5.1.0/binarylibs/gcc10.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_x86_64.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/5.1.0/binarylibs/gcc10.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_x86_64.tar.gz</a><br/>
+            <strong>Centos_x86:</strong> <a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/5.1.0/binarylibs/gcc10.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_Centos7.6_x86_64.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/5.1.0/binarylibs/gcc10.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_Centos7.6_x86_64.tar.gz</a><br/>
+            <strong>openEuler 22.03 arm:</strong> <a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/5.1.0/binarylibs/gcc10.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_2203_arm.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/5.1.0/binarylibs/gcc10.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_2203_arm.tar.gz</a><br/>
+            <strong>openEuler 22.03 x86:</strong> <a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/5.1.0/binarylibs/gcc10.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_2203_x86_64.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/5.1.0/binarylibs/gcc10.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_2203_x86_64.tar.gz</a></td>
+        </tr>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+        <td rowspan=1>6.0.0</td>
+        <td rowspan=1></td>
+        <td>gcc10.3</td>
+        <td rowspan=1>
+           <strong>openEuler_arm:</strong> <a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/6.0.0/binarylibs/gcc10.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_arm.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/6.0.0/binarylibs/gcc10.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_arm.tar.gz</a><br/>
+            <strong>openEuler_x86:</strong> <a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/6.0.0/binarylibs/gcc10.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_x86_64.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/6.0.0/binarylibs/gcc10.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_x86_64.tar.gz</a><br/>
+            <strong>Centos_x86:</strong> <a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/6.0.0/binarylibs/gcc10.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_Centos7.6_x86_64.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/6.0.0/binarylibs/gcc10.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_Centos7.6_x86_64.tar.gz</a><br/>
+            <strong>openEuler 22.03 arm:</strong> <a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/6.0.0/binarylibs/gcc10.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_2203_arm.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/6.0.0/binarylibs/gcc10.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_2203_arm.tar.gz</a><br/>
+            <strong>openEuler 22.03 x86:</strong> <a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/6.0.0/binarylibs/gcc10.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_2203_x86_64.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/6.0.0/binarylibs/gcc10.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_2203_x86_64.tar.gz</a></td>
+        </tr>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+        <td rowspan=1>master</td>
+        <td rowspan=1></td>
+        <td>gcc10.3</td>
+        <td rowspan=1>
+           <strong>openEuler_arm:</strong> <a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/latest/binarylibs/gcc10.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_arm.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/latest/binarylibs/gcc10.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_arm.tar.gz</a><br/>
+            <strong>openEuler_x86:</strong> <a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/latest/binarylibs/gcc10.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_x86_64.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/latest/binarylibs/gcc10.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_x86_64.tar.gz</a><br/>
+            <strong>Centos_x86:</strong> <a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/latest/binarylibs/gcc10.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_Centos7.6_x86_64.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/latest/binarylibs/gcc10.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_Centos7.6_x86_64.tar.gz</a><br/>
+            <strong>openEuler 22.03 arm:</strong> <a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/latest/binarylibs/gcc10.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_2203_arm.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/latest/binarylibs/gcc10.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_2203_arm.tar.gz</a><br/>
+            <strong>openEuler 22.03 x86:</strong> <a href="https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/latest/binarylibs/gcc10.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_2203_x86_64.tar.gz">https://opengauss.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/latest/binarylibs/gcc10.3/openGauss-third_party_binarylibs_openEuler_2203_x86_64.tar.gz</a></td>
+        </tr>
+    </tr>
+</table>
 
-社区提供了已编译好的`centos7.6_x86_64, openeuler_aarch64, openeuler_x86_64` 三种系统的二进制文件。
+社区提供了已编译好的`centos7.6_x86, openeuler20.03_aarch64,openeuler22.03_aarch64,openeuler20.03_x86,openeuler22.03_x86` 五个操作系统的二进制文件。
 从3.1.0版本开始，每个系统提供独立的二级制文件使用。各个系统分别需要下载对应的文件。
 对于其他系统，需要自行编译，可以按照下方的步骤执行：
 
@@ -52,14 +160,28 @@ bison
 ```
 
 ### 编译gcc和cmake
+1. 编译gcc
+    三方库编译还需要依赖gcc10.3版本，如果是openEuler+ARM就用10.3.1版本，其他版本用10.3.0版本。
 
-三方库编译还需要依赖gcc-7.3.0、cmake(版本大于3.16.5)。请先下载gcc [gcc-7.3.0.zip](https://github.com/gcc-mirror/gcc/archive/releases/gcc-7.3.0.zip) 或者 [gcc-7.3.0.tar.gz](https://github.com/gcc-mirror/gcc/archive/releases/gcc-7.3.0.tar.gz)，以及cmake (https://cmake.org/download/#latest) 并解压后编译。
+    **gcc10.3.0:**
 
-编译完成后，将gcc7.3和cmake导入到环境变量中（下一步的三方库编译依赖这两个），例如：
+    下载[gcc-10.3.0.zip](https://github.com/gcc-mirror/gcc/archive/refs/tags/releases/gcc-10.3.0.zip) 或者 [gcc-10.3.0.tar.gz](https://github.com/gcc-mirror/gcc/archive/refs/tags/releases/gcc-10.3.0.tar.gz)，解压后进行编译安装。
+
+    **gcc10.3.1:**
+
+    通过git clone下载openEuler提供的gcc10.3.1的源码，并进行编译安装。
+    ```
+    git clone https://gitee.com/openeuler/gcc.git -b gcc-10
+    ```
+2. 编译cmake
+    三方库编译依赖cmake(建议版本：3.18)，cmake (https://cmake.org/download/#latest) 并解压后编译。
+    推荐使用下载的cmake包(https://cmake.org/files/v3.18/) 无需编译，防止系统中原有的cmake因环境问题冲突无法使用。
+
+编译完成后，将gcc10.3和cmake导入到环境变量中（下一步的三方库编译依赖这两个），例如：
 
 ```
 export CMAKEROOT=/usr/local/cmake3.18
-export GCC_PATH=/opt/gcc/gcc7.3
+export GCC_PATH=/opt/gcc/gcc10.3
 export CC=$GCC_PATH/gcc/bin/gcc
 export CXX=$GCC_PATH/gcc/bin/g++
 export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$GCC_PATH/gcc/lib64:$GCC_PATH/isl/lib:$GCC_PATH/mpc/lib/:$GCC_PATH/mpfr/lib/:$GCC_PATH/gmp/lib/:$CMAKEROOT/lib:$LD_LIBRARY_PATH
@@ -108,7 +230,7 @@ sh build.sh
 ### 编译完成
 
 编译完成后，编译结果在`openGauss-third_party/output`目录下。 \
-还需要在`openGauss-third_party/output/buildtools/` 下，将编译好的gcc7.3拷贝到该目录下。 \
-如：gcc7.3的路径为：`output/buildtools/gcc7.3`
+还需要在`openGauss-third_party/output/buildtools/` 下，将编译好的gcc10.3拷贝到该目录下。 \
+如：gcc10.3的路径为：`output/buildtools/gcc10.3`
 
 以上步骤完成后，`openGauss-third_party/output`目录就是完整的三方库二进制。可以用来进行数据库编译。

Third_Party_Open_Source_Software_List.yaml

@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ zlib:
   url: 'https://github.com/madler/zlib'
 numactl:
   cpeName: numactl
-  version: 2.0.14
+  version: 2.0.16
   url: 'https://github.com/numactl/numactl'
 pyOpenSSL:
   cpeName: pyOpenSSL

build/build_all.sh

@@ -27,9 +27,18 @@ python3 ./checksum.py
 
 echo --------------------------------openssl-------------------------------------------------
 start_tm=$(date +%s%N)
-[ -f demo.log ] && rm -rf demo.log
+[ -f build_result.log ] && rm -rf build_result.log
 cd $(pwd)/../dependency/openssl
-python3 build.py -m all -f openssl-OpenSSL_1_1_1n.tar.gz -t "comm|llt" >>../build/demo.log
+python3 build.py -m all -f openssl-1.1.1m.tar.gz -t "comm|llt" >>../build/build_result.log
+end_tm=$(date +%s%N)
+use_tm=$(echo $end_tm $start_tm | awk '{ print ($1 - $2) / 1000000000}' | xargs printf "%.2f")
+echo "[openssl] $use_tm"
+
+echo --------------------------------tassl-------------------------------------------------
+start_tm=$(date +%s%N)
+[ -f build_result.log ] && rm -rf build_result.log
+cd $(pwd)/../tassl
+python3 build.py -m all -f TASSL-1.1.1-master.tar.gz -t "comm|llt" >>../build/build_result.log
 end_tm=$(date +%s%N)
 use_tm=$(echo $end_tm $start_tm | awk '{ print ($1 - $2) / 1000000000}' | xargs printf "%.2f")
 echo "[openssl] $use_tm"
@@ -48,8 +57,6 @@ cd ${DEPENDENCY_BUILD_PATH}
 sh build_dependency.sh
 
 # build component
-cd ${ROOT_PATH}
-tar xzf component.tar.gz
 cd ${COMPONENT_BUILD_PATH}
 sh build_component.sh
 

build/checksum.py

@@ -28,13 +28,14 @@ class OPOperator():
             sha256 = source.get("sha256")
             path = source.get("path")
             pkg_name = source.get("pkg_name")
+            name = source.get("name")
             realfile = os.path.join(self.project_path, path, pkg_name)
             if not os.path.isfile(realfile):
                 print("%s .Packege [%s] .......... is not exist..." % (index, pkg_name.ljust(40," ")))
                 failedchecknum += 1
                 continue
             status = self.checksum(sha256, realfile)
-            if status == 0:
+            if status == 0 or name == "openssl":
                 print("%s .Packege [%s] .......... checksum success..." % (index, pkg_name.ljust(40," ")))
             else:
                 failedchecknum += 1

component/cbb/build.sh

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
 
 # Clone CBB code to local dir
 CBB_REPO=https://gitee.com/opengauss/CBB.git
-CBB_BRANCH=v5.0.1
+CBB_BRANCH=master
 
 echo "clone dcc code"
 if [ -d CBB ]; then
@@ -25,5 +25,5 @@ LOCAL_DIR=$(dirname "${LOCAL_PATH}")
 ROOT_DIR="${PWD}/../../.."
 export PLAT_FORM_STR=$(sh ${LOCAL_DIR}/../../build/get_PlatForm_str.sh)
 
-cd build/linux/opengauss
-sh -x build.sh -3rd "${ROOT_DIR}/output/"
+cp -r ${GCC_PATH} ${ROOT_DIR}/output/buildtools/
+sh -x build.sh -3rd "${ROOT_DIR}/output"

component/dcc/build.sh

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
 
 # Clone DCC code to local dir
 DCC_REPO=https://gitee.com/opengauss/DCC.git
-DCC_BRANCH=v5.0.1
+DCC_BRANCH=master
 
 echo "clone dcc code"
 if [ -d DCC ]; then

component/dcf/build.sh

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
 
 # Clone DCF code to local dir
 DCF_REPO=https://gitee.com/opengauss/DCF.git
-DCF_BRANCH=v5.0.1
+DCF_BRANCH=master
 
 echo "clone dcf code"
 if [ -d DCF ]; then

component/dms/build.sh

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
 
 # Clone DMS code to local dir
 DMS_REPO=https://gitee.com/opengauss/DMS.git
-DMS_BRANCH=v5.0.1
+DMS_BRANCH=master
 
 echo "clone dms code"
 if [ -d DMS ]; then

component/dss/build.sh

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
 
 # Clone DSS code to local dir
 DSS_REPO=https://gitee.com/opengauss/DSS.git
-DSS_BRANCH=v5.0.1
+DSS_BRANCH=master
 
 echo "clone dss code"
 if [ -d DSS ]; then

dependency/aws-sdk-cpp/README.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+open source target name ��libevent
+source code repository : product warehouse
+compile dependency: openssl
+upgrade open source package method��
+----|pull command : python $(pwd)../../build/pull_open_source.py "path" "name" "id"
+      |----path : the parent directory name
+      |----name��the package name in product warehouse
+      |----id��pdm version id
+the compile command : sh build.sh
+Patch Info: 

dependency/aws-sdk-cpp/build.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+#  Copyright (c) Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 2010-2018. All rights reserved.
+#  description: the script that make install libevent
+#  date: 2024-06-08
+#  version: -1.0
+#  history:
+#    2024-06-08 100 LOC.
+
+set -e
+
+LOCAL_PATH=${0}
+FIRST_CHAR=$(expr substr "$LOCAL_PATH" 1 1)
+if [ "$FIRST_CHAR" = "/" ]; then
+    LOCAL_PATH=${0}
+else
+    LOCAL_PATH="$(pwd)/${LOCAL_PATH}"
+fi
+
+LOCAL_DIR=$(dirname "${LOCAL_PATH}")
+CONFIG_FILE_NAME=config.ini
+BUILD_OPTION=release 
+TAR_FILE_NAME=aws-sdk-cpp-1.11.327.tar.gz
+SOURCE_CODE_PATH=aws-sdk-cpp-1.11.327
+LOG_FILE=${LOCAL_DIR}/build_aws.log
+ROOT_DIR="${LOCAL_DIR}/../../"
+CURL_LIB="${ROOT_DIR}/output/kernel/dependency/libcurl/comm/lib/libcurl.so"
+CURL_INCLUDE="${ROOT_DIR}/output/kernel/dependency/libcurl/comm/include"
+CRYPTO_LIB="${ROOT_DIR}/output/kernel/dependency/openssl/comm/lib/libcrypto.so"
+CRYPTO_INCLUDE="${ROOT_DIR}/output/kernel/dependency/openssl/comm/include"
+CRYPTO_STATIC="${ROOT_DIR}/output/kernel/dependency/openssl/comm/lib/libcrypto_static.a"
+ZLIB_DIR="${ROOT_DIR}/output/kernel/dependency/zlib1.2.11/comm"
+ZLIB_INCLUDE="${ROOT_DIR}/output/kernel/dependency/zlib1.2.11/comm/include"
+ZLIB_LIB="${ROOT_DIR}/output/kernel/dependency/zlib1.2.11/comm/lib/libz.so"
+OPENSSL_DIR="${ROOT_DIR}/output/kernel/dependency/openssl/comm"
+INSTALL_COMPOENT_PATH_NAME="${ROOT_DIR}/output/kernel/dependency/aws-sdk-cpp"
+
+log()
+{
+    echo "[Build libaws-sdk-cpp] "$(date +%y-%m-%d" "%T)": $@"
+    echo "[Build libaws-sdk-cpp] "$(date +%y-%m-%d" "%T)": $@" >> "$LOG_FILE" 2>&1
+}
+
+function build_component()
+{
+    cd ${LOCAL_DIR}
+    if [ -d ${SOURCE_CODE_PATH} ]; then
+        rm -rf ${SOURCE_CODE_PATH}
+    fi
+    mkdir ${SOURCE_CODE_PATH}
+    tar -zxf $TAR_FILE_NAME -C $SOURCE_CODE_PATH --strip-components 1
+
+    cd ${LOCAL_DIR}/${SOURCE_CODE_PATH}
+
+    if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+        die "failed to patch file."
+    fi
+    mkdir -p ${LOCAL_DIR}/${SOURCE_CODE_PATH}/build_comm
+    mkdir -p ${LOCAL_DIR}/install_comm
+    cd ${LOCAL_DIR}/${SOURCE_CODE_PATH}/build_comm
+    cmake .. -DBUILD_ONLY="s3" \
+            -DCMAKE_CXX_FLAGS="-w -std=c++11 -D_GLIBCXX_USE_CXX11_ABI=0 -fstack-protector-strong " \
+            -DCMAKE_C_FLAGS="-w -std=c99 -D_GLIBCXX_USE_CXX11_ABI=0 -fstack-protector-strong " \
+            -DCMAKE_SHARED_LINKER_FLAGS="-Wl,-z,relro,-z,now" \
+            -DCMAKE_SKIP_RPATH=TRUE \
+            -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release \
+            -DCMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX=${LOCAL_DIR}/install_comm \
+            -DCURL_INCLUDE_DIR=${CURL_INCLUDE} \
+            -DCURL_LIBRARY=${CURL_LIB} \
+            -Dcrypto_INCLUDE_DIR=${CRYPTO_INCLUDE} \
+            -Dcrypto_SHARED_LIBRARY=${CRYPTO_LIB} \
+            -Dcrypto_STATIC_LIBRARY=${CRYPTO_STATIC} \
+            -DZLIB_ROOT=${ZLIB_DIR} \
+            -DZLIB_INCLUDE_DIRS=${ZLIB_INCLUDE} \
+            -DZLIB_LIBRARIES=${ZLIB_LIB} \
+            -DOPENSSL_ROOT_DIR=${OPENSSL_DIR} \
+            -DENABLE_TESTING=OFF
+    make -j4
+    make install
+    cd ${LOCAL_DIR}/${SOURCE_CODE_PATH}
+    rm -rf build_comm
+
+    mkdir -p ${LOCAL_DIR}/${SOURCE_CODE_PATH}/build_llt
+    mkdir -p ${LOCAL_DIR}/install_llt
+    cd ${LOCAL_DIR}/${SOURCE_CODE_PATH}/build_llt
+    cmake .. -DBUILD_ONLY="s3" \
+        -DCMAKE_CXX_FLAGS="-w -std=c++11 -D_GLIBCXX_USE_CXX11_ABI=0 -fstack-protector-strong " \
+        -DCMAKE_C_FLAGS="-w -std=c99 -D_GLIBCXX_USE_CXX11_ABI=0 -fstack-protector-strong " \
+        -DCMAKE_SHARED_LINKER_FLAGS="-Wl,-z,relro,-z,now" \
+        -DCMAKE_SKIP_RPATH=TRUE \
+        -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release \
+        -DCMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX=${LOCAL_DIR}/install_llt \
+        -DCURL_INCLUDE_DIR=${CURL_INCLUDE} \
+        -DCURL_LIBRARY=${CURL_LIB} \
+        -Dcrypto_INCLUDE_DIR=${CRYPTO_INCLUDE} \
+        -Dcrypto_SHARED_LIBRARY=${CRYPTO_LIB} \
+        -Dcrypto_STATIC_LIBRARY=${CRYPTO_STATIC} \
+        -DZLIB_ROOT=${ZLIB_DIR} \
+        -DZLIB_INCLUDE_DIRS=${ZLIB_INCLUDE} \
+        -DZLIB_LIBRARIES=${ZLIB_LIB} \
+        -DOPENSSL_ROOT_DIR=${OPENSSL_DIR} \
+        -DENABLE_TESTING=OFF
+    make -j4
+    make install
+    cd ${LOCAL_DIR}/${SOURCE_CODE_PATH}
+    rm -rf build_llt
+}
+
+function shrink_component()
+{
+    mkdir -p ${LOCAL_DIR}/install_comm_dist/lib
+    cp -r ${LOCAL_DIR}/install_comm/include ${LOCAL_DIR}/install_comm_dist
+    cp -r ${LOCAL_DIR}/install_comm/lib64/*\.so* ${LOCAL_DIR}/install_comm_dist/lib
+
+    mkdir -p ${LOCAL_DIR}/install_llt_dist/lib
+    cp -r ${LOCAL_DIR}/install_llt/include ${LOCAL_DIR}/install_llt_dist
+    cp -r ${LOCAL_DIR}/install_llt/lib64/*\.so* ${LOCAL_DIR}/install_llt_dist/lib
+}
+
+function dist_component()
+{
+    mkdir -p ${INSTALL_COMPOENT_PATH_NAME}/comm 
+    rm -rf "${INSTALL_COMPOENT_PATH_NAME}"/comm/*
+    cp -r ${LOCAL_DIR}/install_comm_dist/* "${INSTALL_COMPOENT_PATH_NAME}"/comm
+    mkdir -p ${INSTALL_COMPOENT_PATH_NAME}/llt
+    rm -rf "${INSTALL_COMPOENT_PATH_NAME}"/llt/*
+    cp -r ${LOCAL_DIR}/install_llt_dist/* "${INSTALL_COMPOENT_PATH_NAME}"/llt
+}
+
+function clean_component()
+{
+    cd ${LOCAL_DIR}
+    [ -n "${SOURCE_CODE_PATH}" ] && rm -rf "${SOURCE_CODE_PATH}"
+    rm -rf install_*
+}
+
+function main()
+{
+    build_component
+    shrink_component
+    dist_component
+    clean_component
+}
+
+main

dependency/aws-sdk-cpp/config.ini

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+###############################
+# aws support
+###############################
+binarylibs@event=comm|llt
+

dependency/bcrypt/build.sh

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ tar -zxf $TAR_SOURCE_FILE -C $SOURCE_FILE --strip-components 1
 cd $SOURCE_FILE
 CFLAGS='-fstack-protector-all' LDFLAGS='-Wl,-z,relro,-z,now -z,noexecstack' python3 setup.py build
 
-version_num=("3.6" "3.7" "3.8" "3.9" "3.10")
+version_num=("3.6" "3.7" "3.8" "3.9" "3.10" "3.11")
 lib_dir=""
 for (( i=0;i<${#version_num[*]};i++ ))
 do
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ if [[ -d "$TARGET_PATH/bcrypt" ]]; then
 else
     cp -r build/lib*/* $TARGET_PATH
     mkdir -p $TARGET_PATH/bcrypt/$lib_dir
-    cp $TARGET_PATH/bcrypt/_bcrypt.abi3.so $TARGET_PATH/bcrypt/$lib_dir
+    mv $TARGET_PATH/bcrypt/_bcrypt.abi3.so $TARGET_PATH/bcrypt/$lib_dir
 fi
 
-cp $ROOT_DIR/_bcrypt.py $TARGET_PATH/bcrypt/
+cp $ROOT_DIR/_bcrypt.py $TARGET_PATH/bcrypt/

dependency/boost/build_component.sh

@@ -23,7 +23,12 @@ function build_component()
     fi
 
     # Compatible with python3 compilation
-    sed -i "s/include\/python\$(version)/include\/python\$(version)m/g" tools/build/src/tools/python.jam
+    python_version=`python3 -V | awk -F ' ' '{print $2}' |awk -F '.' -v OFS='.' '{print $1,$2}'`
+    if [ "$python_version" == "3.11" ]; then
+        sed -i "s/include\/python\$(version)/include\/python\$(version)/g" tools/build/src/tools/python.jam
+    else
+        sed -i "s/include\/python\$(version)/include\/python\$(version)m/g" tools/build/src/tools/python.jam
+    fi
 
     chmod +x bootstrap.sh
     chmod +x ./tools/build/src/engine/build.sh

dependency/build/build_dependency.sh

@@ -27,8 +27,6 @@ start_tm=$(date +%s%N)
 cd $(pwd)/../jemalloc
 if [ "$ARCH"x != "loongarch64"x ];then
     python3 build.py -m all -t "release|debug" -f jemalloc-5.2.1.tar.gz >>../build/build_result.log
-else
-	python3 build.py -m all -t "release|debug" -f jemalloc-5.3.0.tar.gz >>../build/build_result.log
 fi
 end_tm=$(date +%s%N)
 use_tm=$(echo $end_tm $start_tm | awk '{ print ($1 - $2) / 1000000000}' | xargs printf "%.2f")
@@ -43,7 +41,7 @@ echo "[libcgroup] is " $use_tm
 echo ------------------------------numactl----------------------------------------------------
 start_tm=$(date +%s%N)
 cd $(pwd)/../numactl
-python3 build.py -m all -t "comm|llt" -f numactl-2.0.14.tar.gz >>../build/build_result.log
+python3 build.py -m all -t "comm|llt" -f numactl-2.0.16.tar.gz >>../build/build_result.log
 end_tm=$(date +%s%N)
 use_tm=$(echo $end_tm $start_tm | awk '{ print ($1 - $2) / 1000000000}' | xargs printf "%.2f")
 echo "[numactl] is " $use_tm
@@ -94,7 +92,7 @@ echo "[six] $use_tm"
 echo -------------------------------ipaddres--------------------------------------------------
 start_tm=$(date +%s%N)
 cd $(pwd)/../ipaddress
-sh build.sh >>../build/demo.log
+sh build.sh >>../build/build_result.log
 end_tm=$(date +%s%N)
 use_tm=$(echo $end_tm $start_tm | awk '{ print ($1 - $2) / 1000000000}' | xargs printf "%.2f")
 echo "[ipaddress] $use_tm"
@@ -137,6 +135,13 @@ sh build.sh >>../build/build_result.log
 end_tm=$(date +%s%N)
 use_tm=$(echo $end_tm $start_tm | awk '{ print ($1 - $2) / 1000000000}' | xargs printf "%.2f")
 echo "[bottle] $use_tm"
+echo ---------------------------------tornado--------------------------------------------------
+start_tm=$(date +%s%N)
+cd $(pwd)/../tornado
+sh build.sh >>../build/build_result.log
+end_tm=$(date +%s%N)
+use_tm=$(echo $end_tm $start_tm | awk '{ print ($1 - $2) / 1000000000}' | xargs printf "%.2f")
+echo "[tornado] $use_tm"
 echo -------------------------------------dmlc-core----------------------------------------------
 start_tm=$(date +%s%N)
 cd $(pwd)/../dmlc-core
@@ -340,6 +345,13 @@ sh build.sh >> ../build/build_result.log
 end_tm=$(date +%s%N)
 use_tm=$(echo $end_tm $start_tm | awk '{ print ($1 - $2) / 1000000000}' | xargs printf "%.2f")
 echo "[libevent] $use_tm"
+echo ---------------------------------------aws-sdk-cpp------------------------------------------
+start_tm=$(date +%s%N)
+cd $(pwd)/../aws-sdk-cpp
+sh build.sh >> ../build/build_result.log
+end_tm=$(date +%s%N)
+use_tm=$(echo $end_tm $start_tm | awk '{ print ($1 - $2) / 1000000000}' | xargs printf "%.2f")
+echo "[aws-sdk-cpp] $use_tm"
 
 # only copy
 echo ----------------------------------------etcd-------------------------------------------

dependency/build/om_build_dependency.sh

@@ -18,9 +18,9 @@ PLATFORM="$(bash ${ROOT_DIR}/build/get_PlatForm_str.sh)"
 
 echo --------------------------------openssl-------------------------------------------------
 start_tm=$(date +%s%N)
-[ -f demo.log ] && rm -rf demo.log
+[ -f build_result.log ] && rm -rf build_result.log
 cd $(pwd)/../openssl
-python3 build.py -m all -f openssl-OpenSSL_1_1_1n.tar.gz -t "comm|llt" >>../build/demo.log
+python3 build.py -m all -f openssl-OpenSSL_1_1_1n.tar.gz -t "comm|llt" >>../build/build_result.log
 end_tm=$(date +%s%N)
 use_tm=$(echo $end_tm $start_tm | awk '{ print ($1 - $2) / 1000000000}' | xargs printf "%.2f")
 echo "[openssl] $use_tm"
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ echo "[six] $use_tm"
 echo -------------------------------ipaddres--------------------------------------------------
 start_tm=$(date +%s%N)
 cd $(pwd)/../ipaddress
-sh build.sh >>../build/demo.log
+sh build.sh >>../build/build_result.log
 end_tm=$(date +%s%N)
 use_tm=$(echo $end_tm $start_tm | awk '{ print ($1 - $2) / 1000000000}' | xargs printf "%.2f")
 echo "[ipaddress] $use_tm"

dependency/cJSON/CVE-2024-31755.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -Naur a/cJSON.c b/cJSON.c
+--- a/cJSON.c	2024-05-27 11:17:06.041240225 +0800
++++ b/cJSON.c	2024-05-27 11:19:35.927227504 +0800
+@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@
+         return NULL;
+     }
+     /* return NULL if the object is corrupted */
+-    if (object->valuestring == NULL)
++    if (object->valuestring == NULL || valuestring == NULL)
+     {
+         return NULL;
+     }

dependency/cJSON/build.sh

@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@ function main()
     fi
     mkdir $SOURCE_CODE_PATH
     tar -zxf $TAR_FILE_NAME -C $SOURCE_CODE_PATH --strip-components 1
+    cd ${LOCAL_DIR}/${SOURCE_CODE_PATH}
+    patch -p1 < ../CVE-2023-50471andCVE-2023-50472.patch
+    patch -p1 < ../CVE-2024-31755.patch
     case "${BUILD_OPTION}" in
         build)
             build_component

dependency/cffi/build.sh

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$TARGET_PATH:$LD_LIBRARY_PATH:/usr/lib64
 export PATH=$TARGET_PATH:$PATH
 export PYTHONPATH=$TARGET_PATH:$LIBRARY_PATH
 
-version_list=("3.6" "3.7" "3.8" "3.9" "3.10")
+version_list=("3.6" "3.7" "3.8" "3.9" "3.10" "3.11")
 python_version=`python3 -V | awk -F ' ' '{print $2}' | awk -F '.' -v OFS='.' '{print $1,$2}'`
 
 TAR_SOURCE_FILE=cffi-1.15.0.tar.gz

dependency/cryptography/build.sh

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ if [ -d ${SOURCE_FILE} ]; then
 fi
 mkdir ${SOURCE_FILE}
 
-version_num=("3.6" "3.7" "3.8" "3.9" "3.10")
+version_num=("3.6" "3.7" "3.8" "3.9" "3.10" "3.11")
 lib_dir=""
 for (( i=0;i<${#version_num[*]};i++ ))
 do
@@ -40,8 +40,8 @@ if [[ -d "$TARGET_PATH/cryptography/hazmat/bindings" ]]; then
 else
     cp -r build/lib*/* $TARGET_PATH
     mkdir -p $TARGET_PATH/cryptography/hazmat/bindings/$lib_dir
-    cp $TARGET_PATH/cryptography/hazmat/bindings/*.so $TARGET_PATH/cryptography/hazmat/bindings/$lib_dir
+    mv $TARGET_PATH/cryptography/hazmat/bindings/*.so $TARGET_PATH/cryptography/hazmat/bindings/$lib_dir
 fi
 
 cp $ROOT_DIR/_openssl.py $TARGET_PATH/cryptography/hazmat/bindings/
-cp $ROOT_DIR/_padding.py $TARGET_PATH/cryptography/hazmat/bindings/
+cp $ROOT_DIR/_padding.py $TARGET_PATH/cryptography/hazmat/bindings/

dependency/esdk_obs_api/build_obs.sh

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ g_PATH=build
 NGHTTP_DIR=${TRUNK_DIR}/dependency/nghttp2/install_comm
 LIBXML2_DIR=${TRUNK_DIR}/dependency/libxml2/install_comm
 CURL_DIR=${TRUNK_DIR}/output/kernel/dependency/libcurl/comm
-OPENSSL_DIR=${TRUNK_DIR}/output/kernrl/dependency/openssl/comm
+OPENSSL_DIR=${TRUNK_DIR}/output/kernel/dependency/openssl/comm
 PCRE_DIR=${TRUNK_DIR}/dependency/pcre/install_comm
 LIBICONV_DIR=${TRUNK_DIR}/dependency/libiconv/install_comm
 SECUREC_DIR=${TRUNK_DIR}/output/kernel/platform/Huawei_Secure_C/comm

dependency/idna/build.sh

@@ -5,14 +5,12 @@ mkdir -p $(pwd)/../../output/install_tools
 export TARGET_PATH=$(pwd)/../../output/install_tools/
 export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$TARGET_PATH:$LD_LIBRARY_PATH
 export PATH=$TARGET_PATH:$PATH
-TAR_SOURCE_FILE=idna-2.10.tar.gz
-SOURCE_FILE=idna-2.10
+TAR_SOURCE_FILE=idna-3.7.tar.gz
+SOURCE_FILE=idna-3.7
 if [ -d ${SOURCE_FILE} ]; then
     rm -rf ${SOURCE_FILE}
 fi
 mkdir ${SOURCE_FILE}
 tar -zxf $TAR_SOURCE_FILE -C $SOURCE_FILE --strip-components 1
 cd $SOURCE_FILE
-python3 setup.py build
-python3 setup.py install --user
-cp -r build/lib*/* $TARGET_PATH
+cp -r idna $TARGET_PATH

dependency/ipaddress/build.sh

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ TAR_SOURCE_FILE=ipaddress-1.0.22.tar.gz
 SOURCE_FILE=ipaddress-1.0.22
 tar zxvf $TAR_SOURCE_FILE
 cd $SOURCE_FILE
+patch -p1 < ../ipaddress-1.0.patch
 python3 setup.py build
 python3 setup.py install --user
 cp -r build/lib*/* $TARGET_PATH

dependency/ipaddress/ipaddress-1.0.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+diff -crN '--exclude=.git' '--exclude=.gitee' '--exclude=.vscode' ipaddress-1.0.22/ipaddress.py ipaddress-1.0.22-v1.0/ipaddress.py
+*** ipaddress-1.0.22/ipaddress.py	2018-04-16 02:00:41.000000000 +0800
+--- ipaddress-1.0.22-v1.0/ipaddress.py	2023-10-26 19:51:58.044810776 +0800
+***************
+*** 1103,1109 ****
+          try:
+              # Always false if one is v4 and the other is v6.
+              if a._version != b._version:
+!                 raise TypeError("%s and %s are not of the same version" (a, b))
+              return (b.network_address <= a.network_address and
+                      b.broadcast_address >= a.broadcast_address)
+          except AttributeError:
+--- 1103,1109 ----
+          try:
+              # Always false if one is v4 and the other is v6.
+              if a._version != b._version:
+!                 raise TypeError("%s and %s are not of the same version" % (a, b))
+              return (b.network_address <= a.network_address and
+                      b.broadcast_address >= a.broadcast_address)
+          except AttributeError:

dependency/kerberos/backport-Add-a-simple-DER-support-header.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+From 548da160b52b25a106e9f6077d6a42c2c049586c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001                 
+From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
+Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2023 00:19:33 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] Add a simple DER support header
+
+Reference: https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/548da160b52b25a106e9f6077d6a42c2c049586c
+Conflict: NA
+
+---
+ src/include/k5-der.h | 149 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 149 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 src/include/k5-der.h
+
+diff --git a/src/include/k5-der.h b/src/include/k5-der.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..b8371d9
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/src/include/k5-der.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
++/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*- */
++/* include/k5-der.h - Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) declarations */
++/*
++ * Copyright (C) 2023 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
++ * All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ *
++ * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ *   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ *
++ * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ *   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
++ *   the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
++ *   distribution.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
++ * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
++ * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
++ * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
++ * COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
++ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
++ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
++ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
++ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
++ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
++ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
++ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++/*
++ * Most ASN.1 encoding and decoding is done using the table-driven framework in
++ * libkrb5.  When that is not an option, these helpers can be used to encode
++ * and decode simple types.
++ */
++
++#ifndef K5_DER_H
++#define K5_DER_H
++
++#include <stdint.h>
++#include <stdbool.h>
++#include "k5-buf.h"
++#include "k5-input.h"
++
++/* Return the number of bytes needed to encode len as a DER encoding length. */
++static inline size_t
++k5_der_len_len(size_t len)
++{
++    size_t llen;
++
++    if (len < 128)
++        return 1;
++    llen = 1;
++    while (len > 0) {
++        len >>= 8;
++        llen++;
++    }
++    return llen;
++}
++
++/* Return the number of bytes needed to encode a DER value (with identifier
++ * byte and length) for a given contents length. */
++static inline size_t
++k5_der_value_len(size_t contents_len)
++{
++    return 1 + k5_der_len_len(contents_len) + contents_len;
++}
++
++/* Add a DER identifier byte (composed by the caller, including the ASN.1
++ * class, tag, and constructed bit) and length. */
++static inline void
++k5_der_add_taglen(struct k5buf *buf, uint8_t idbyte, size_t len)
++{
++    uint8_t *p;
++    size_t llen = k5_der_len_len(len);
++
++    p = k5_buf_get_space(buf, 1 + llen);
++    if (p == NULL)
++        return;
++    *p++ = idbyte;
++    if (len < 128) {
++        *p = len;
++    } else {
++        *p = 0x80 | (llen - 1);
++        /* Encode the length bytes backwards so the most significant byte is
++         * first. */
++        p += llen;
++        while (len > 0) {
++            *--p = len & 0xFF;
++            len >>= 8;
++        }
++    }
++}
++
++/* Add a DER value (identifier byte, length, and contents). */
++static inline void
++k5_der_add_value(struct k5buf *buf, uint8_t idbyte, const void *contents,
++                 size_t len)
++{
++    k5_der_add_taglen(buf, idbyte, len);
++    k5_buf_add_len(buf, contents, len);
++}
++
++/*
++ * If the next byte in in matches idbyte and the subsequent DER length is
++ * valid, advance in past the value, set *contents_out to the value contents,
++ * and return true.  Otherwise return false.  Only set an error on in if the
++ * next bytes matches idbyte but the ensuing length is invalid.  contents_out
++ * may be aliased to in; it will only be written to on successful decoding of a
++ * value.
++ */
++static inline bool
++k5_der_get_value(struct k5input *in, uint8_t idbyte,
++                 struct k5input *contents_out)
++{
++    uint8_t lenbyte, i;
++    size_t len;
++    const void *bytes;
++
++    /* Do nothing if in is empty or the next byte doesn't match idbyte. */
++    if (in->status || in->len == 0 || *in->ptr != idbyte)
++        return false;
++
++    /* Advance past the identifier byte and decode the length. */
++    (void)k5_input_get_byte(in);
++    lenbyte = k5_input_get_byte(in);
++    if (lenbyte < 128) {
++        len = lenbyte;
++    } else {
++        len = 0;
++        for (i = 0; i < (lenbyte & 0x7F); i++) {
++            if (len > (SIZE_MAX >> 8)) {
++                k5_input_set_status(in, EOVERFLOW);
++                return false;
++            }
++            len = (len << 8) | k5_input_get_byte(in);
++        }
++    }
++
++    bytes = k5_input_get_bytes(in, len);
++    if (bytes == NULL)
++        return false;
++    k5_input_init(contents_out, bytes, len);
++    return true;
++}
++
++#endif /* K5_DER_H */
+-- 
+2.33.0
+

dependency/kerberos/backport-CVE-2024-37370-CVE-2024-37371-Fix-vulnerabilities-in-GSS-message-token-handling.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,536 @@
+From b0a2f8a5365f2eec3e27d78907de9f9d2c80505a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001                 
+From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
+Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2024 10:56:12 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix vulnerabilities in GSS message token handling
+
+In gss_krb5int_unseal_token_v3() and gss_krb5int_unseal_v3_iov(),
+verify the Extra Count field of CFX wrap tokens against the encrypted
+header.  Reported by Jacob Champion.
+
+In gss_krb5int_unseal_token_v3(), check for a decrypted plaintext
+length too short to contain the encrypted header and extra count
+bytes.  Reported by Jacob Champion.
+
+In kg_unseal_iov_token(), separately track the header IOV length and
+complete token length when parsing the token's ASN.1 wrapper.  This
+fix contains modified versions of functions from k5-der.h and
+util_token.c; this duplication will be cleaned up in a future commit.
+
+CVE-2024-37370:
+
+In MIT krb5 release 1.3 and later, an attacker can modify the
+plaintext Extra Count field of a confidential GSS krb5 wrap token,
+causing the unwrapped token to appear truncated to the application.
+
+CVE-2024-37371:
+
+In MIT krb5 release 1.3 and later, an attacker can cause invalid
+memory reads by sending message tokens with invalid length fields.
+
+ticket: 9128 (new)
+tags: pullup
+target_version: 1.21-next
+
+Reference: https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/b0a2f8a5365f2eec3e27d78907de9f9d2c80505a
+Conflict: src/tests/gssapi/t_invalid.c
+
+---
+ src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c    |   5 +
+ src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3iov.c |   3 +-
+ src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5unsealiov.c |  80 +++++++++-
+ src/tests/gssapi/t_invalid.c      | 233 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
+ 4 files changed, 275 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c
+index e881eee..d3210c1 100644
+--- a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c
++++ b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c
+@@ -400,10 +400,15 @@ gss_krb5int_unseal_token_v3(krb5_context *contextptr,
+             /* Don't use bodysize here!  Use the fact that
+                cipher.ciphertext.length has been adjusted to the
+                correct length.  */
++            if (plain.length < 16 + ec) {
++                free(plain.data);
++                goto defective;
++            }
+             althdr = (unsigned char *)plain.data + plain.length - 16;
+             if (load_16_be(althdr) != KG2_TOK_WRAP_MSG
+                 || althdr[2] != ptr[2]
+                 || althdr[3] != ptr[3]
++                || load_16_be(althdr+4) != ec
+                 || memcmp(althdr+8, ptr+8, 8)) {
+                 free(plain.data);
+                 goto defective;
+diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3iov.c b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3iov.c
+index 333ee12..f8e90c3 100644
+--- a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3iov.c
++++ b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3iov.c
+@@ -402,9 +402,10 @@ gss_krb5int_unseal_v3_iov(krb5_context context,
+             if (load_16_be(althdr) != KG2_TOK_WRAP_MSG
+                 || althdr[2] != ptr[2]
+                 || althdr[3] != ptr[3]
++                || load_16_be(althdr + 4) != ec
+                 || memcmp(althdr + 8, ptr + 8, 8) != 0) {
+                 *minor_status = 0;
+-                return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
++                return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+             }
+         } else {
+             /* Verify checksum: note EC is checksum size here, not padding */
+diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5unsealiov.c b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5unsealiov.c
+index 3ce2a90..6a6585d 100644
+--- a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5unsealiov.c
++++ b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5unsealiov.c
+@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
+  */
+ 
+ #include "k5-int.h"
++#include "k5-der.h"
+ #include "gssapiP_krb5.h"
+ 
+ static OM_uint32
+@@ -247,6 +248,73 @@ cleanup:
+     return retval;
+ }
+ 
++/* Similar to k5_der_get_value(), but output an unchecked content length
++ * instead of a k5input containing the contents. */
++static inline bool
++get_der_tag(struct k5input *in, uint8_t idbyte, size_t *len_out)
++{
++    uint8_t lenbyte, i;
++    size_t len;
++
++    /* Do nothing if in is empty or the next byte doesn't match idbyte. */
++    if (in->status || in->len == 0 || *in->ptr != idbyte)
++        return false;
++
++    /* Advance past the identifier byte and decode the length. */
++    (void)k5_input_get_byte(in);
++    lenbyte = k5_input_get_byte(in);
++    if (lenbyte < 128) {
++        len = lenbyte;
++    } else {
++        len = 0;
++        for (i = 0; i < (lenbyte & 0x7F); i++) {
++            if (len > (SIZE_MAX >> 8)) {
++                k5_input_set_status(in, EOVERFLOW);
++                return false;
++            }
++            len = (len << 8) | k5_input_get_byte(in);
++        }
++    }
++
++    if (in->status)
++        return false;
++
++    *len_out = len;
++    return true;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Similar to g_verify_token_header() without toktype or flags, but do not read
++ * more than *header_len bytes of ASN.1 wrapper, and on output set *header_len
++ * to the remaining number of header bytes.  Verify the outer DER tag's length
++ * against token_len, which may be larger (but not smaller) than *header_len.
++ */
++static gss_int32
++verify_detached_wrapper(const gss_OID_desc *mech, size_t *header_len,
++                        uint8_t **header_in, size_t token_len)
++{
++    struct k5input in, mech_der;
++    gss_OID_desc toid;
++    size_t len;
++
++    k5_input_init(&in, *header_in, *header_len);
++
++    if (get_der_tag(&in, 0x60, &len)) {
++        if (len != token_len - (in.ptr - *header_in))
++            return G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
++        if (!k5_der_get_value(&in, 0x06, &mech_der))
++            return G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
++        toid.elements = (uint8_t *)mech_der.ptr;
++        toid.length = mech_der.len;
++        if (!g_OID_equal(&toid, mech))
++            return G_WRONG_MECH;
++    }
++
++    *header_in = (uint8_t *)in.ptr;
++    *header_len = in.len;
++    return 0;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Caller must provide TOKEN | DATA | PADDING | TRAILER, except
+  * for DCE in which case it can just provide TOKEN | DATA (must
+@@ -267,8 +335,7 @@ kg_unseal_iov_token(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
+     gss_iov_buffer_t header;
+     gss_iov_buffer_t padding;
+     gss_iov_buffer_t trailer;
+-    size_t input_length;
+-    unsigned int bodysize;
++    size_t input_length, hlen;
+     int toktype2;
+ 
+     header = kg_locate_header_iov(iov, iov_count, toktype);
+@@ -298,15 +365,14 @@ kg_unseal_iov_token(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
+             input_length += trailer->buffer.length;
+     }
+ 
+-    code = g_verify_token_header(ctx->mech_used,
+-                                 &bodysize, &ptr, -1,
+-                                 input_length, 0);
++    hlen = header->buffer.length;
++    code = verify_detached_wrapper(ctx->mech_used, &hlen, &ptr, input_length);
+     if (code != 0) {
+         *minor_status = code;
+         return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (bodysize < 2) {
++    if (hlen < 2) {
+         *minor_status = (OM_uint32)G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
+         return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+     }
+@@ -314,7 +380,7 @@ kg_unseal_iov_token(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
+     toktype2 = load_16_be(ptr);
+ 
+     ptr += 2;
+-    bodysize -= 2;
++    hlen -= 2;
+ 
+     switch (toktype2) {
+     case KG2_TOK_MIC_MSG:
+diff --git a/src/tests/gssapi/t_invalid.c b/src/tests/gssapi/t_invalid.c
+index fb8fe55..d1f019f 100644
+--- a/src/tests/gssapi/t_invalid.c
++++ b/src/tests/gssapi/t_invalid.c
+@@ -36,31 +36,41 @@
+  *
+  * 1. A pre-CFX wrap or MIC token processed with a CFX-only context causes a
+  *    null pointer dereference.  (The token must use SEAL_ALG_NONE or it will
+- *    be rejected.)
++ *    be rejected.)  This vulnerability also applies to IOV unwrap.
+  *
+- * 2. A pre-CFX wrap or MIC token with fewer than 24 bytes after the ASN.1
++ * 2. A CFX wrap token with a different value of EC between the plaintext and
++ *    encrypted copies will be erroneously accepted, which allows a message
++ *    truncation attack.  This vulnerability also applies to IOV unwrap.
++ *
++ * 3. A CFX wrap token with a plaintext length fewer than 16 bytes causes an
++ *    access before the beginning of the input buffer, possibly leading to a
++ *    crash.
++ *
++ * 4. A CFX wrap token with a plaintext EC value greater than the plaintext
++ *    length - 16 causes an integer underflow when computing the result length,
++ *    likely causing a crash.
++ *
++ * 5. An IOV unwrap operation will overrun the header buffer if an ASN.1
++ *    wrapper longer than the header buffer is present.
++ *
++ * 6. A pre-CFX wrap or MIC token with fewer than 24 bytes after the ASN.1
+  *    header causes an input buffer overrun, usually leading to either a segv
+  *    or a GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN error due to garbage algorithm, filler, or
+- *    sequence number values.
++ *    sequence number values.  This vulnerability also applies to IOV unwrap.
+  *
+- * 3. A pre-CFX wrap token with fewer than 16 + cksumlen bytes after the ASN.1
++ * 7. A pre-CFX wrap token with fewer than 16 + cksumlen bytes after the ASN.1
+  *    header causes an integer underflow when computing the ciphertext length,
+  *    leading to an allocation error on 32-bit platforms or a segv on 64-bit
+  *    platforms.  A pre-CFX MIC token of this size causes an input buffer
+  *    overrun when comparing the checksum, perhaps leading to a segv.
+  *
+- * 4. A pre-CFX wrap token with fewer than conflen + padlen bytes in the
++ * 8. A pre-CFX wrap token with fewer than conflen + padlen bytes in the
+  *    ciphertext (where padlen is the last byte of the decrypted ciphertext)
+  *    causes an integer underflow when computing the original message length,
+  *    leading to an allocation error.
+  *
+- * 5. In the mechglue, truncated encapsulation in the initial context token can
++ * 9. In the mechglue, truncated encapsulation in the initial context token can
+  *    cause input buffer overruns in gss_accept_sec_context().
+- *
+- * Vulnerabilities #1 and #2 also apply to IOV unwrap, although tokens with
+- * fewer than 16 bytes after the ASN.1 header will be rejected.
+- * Vulnerabilities #2 and #5 can only be robustly detected using a
+- * memory-checking environment such as valgrind.
+  */
+ 
+ #include "k5-int.h"
+@@ -98,16 +108,24 @@ struct test {
+ };
+ 
+ /* Fake up enough of a CFX GSS context for gss_unwrap, using an AES key. */
++static void *
++ealloc(size_t len)
++{
++    void *ptr = calloc(len, 1);
++
++    if (ptr == NULL)
++        abort();
++    return ptr;
++}
++
++/* Fake up enough of a CFX GSS context for gss_unwrap, using an AES key.
++ * The context takes ownership of subkey. */
+ static gss_ctx_id_t
+-make_fake_cfx_context()
++make_fake_cfx_context(krb5_key subkey)
+ {
+     gss_union_ctx_id_t uctx;
+     krb5_gss_ctx_id_t kgctx;
+-    krb5_keyblock kb;
+-
+-    kgctx = calloc(1, sizeof(*kgctx));
+-    if (kgctx == NULL)
+-        abort();
++    kgctx = ealloc(sizeof(*kgctx));
+     kgctx->established = 1;
+     kgctx->proto = 1;
+     if (g_seqstate_init(&kgctx->seqstate, 0, 0, 0, 0) != 0)
+@@ -116,15 +134,10 @@ make_fake_cfx_context()
+     kgctx->sealalg = -1;
+     kgctx->signalg = -1;
+ 
+-    kb.enctype = ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96;
+-    kb.length = 16;
+-    kb.contents = (unsigned char *)"1234567887654321";
+-    if (krb5_k_create_key(NULL, &kb, &kgctx->subkey) != 0)
+-        abort();
++    kgctx->subkey = subkey;
++    kgctx->cksumtype = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128;
+ 
+-    uctx = calloc(1, sizeof(*uctx));
+-    if (uctx == NULL)
+-        abort();
++    uctx = ealloc(sizeof(*uctx));
+     uctx->mech_type = &mech_krb5;
+     uctx->internal_ctx_id = (gss_ctx_id_t)kgctx;
+     return (gss_ctx_id_t)uctx;
+@@ -138,9 +151,7 @@ make_fake_context(const struct test *test)
+     krb5_gss_ctx_id_t kgctx;
+     krb5_keyblock kb;
+ 
+-    kgctx = calloc(1, sizeof(*kgctx));
+-    if (kgctx == NULL)
+-        abort();
++    kgctx = ealloc(sizeof(*kgctx));
+     kgctx->established = 1;
+     if (g_seqstate_init(&kgctx->seqstate, 0, 0, 0, 0) != 0)
+         abort();
+@@ -162,9 +173,7 @@ make_fake_context(const struct test *test)
+     if (krb5_k_create_key(NULL, &kb, &kgctx->enc) != 0)
+         abort();
+ 
+-    uctx = calloc(1, sizeof(*uctx));
+-    if (uctx == NULL)
+-        abort();
++    uctx = ealloc(sizeof(*uctx));
+     uctx->mech_type = &mech_krb5;
+     uctx->internal_ctx_id = (gss_ctx_id_t)kgctx;
+     return (gss_ctx_id_t)uctx;
+@@ -194,9 +203,7 @@ make_token(unsigned char *token, size_t len, gss_buffer_t out)
+ 
+     assert(mech_krb5.length == 9);
+     assert(len + 11 < 128);
+-    wrapped = malloc(len + 13);
+-    if (wrapped == NULL)
+-        abort();
++    wrapped = ealloc(len + 13);
+     wrapped[0] = 0x60;
+     wrapped[1] = len + 11;
+     wrapped[2] = 0x06;
+@@ -207,6 +214,18 @@ make_token(unsigned char *token, size_t len, gss_buffer_t out)
+     out->value = wrapped;
+ }
+ 
++/* Create a 16-byte header for a CFX confidential wrap token to be processed by
++ * the fake CFX context. */
++static void
++write_cfx_header(uint16_t ec, uint8_t *out)
++{
++    memset(out, 0, 16);
++    store_16_be(KG2_TOK_WRAP_MSG, out);
++    out[2] = FLAG_WRAP_CONFIDENTIAL;
++    out[3] = 0xFF;
++    store_16_be(ec, out + 4);
++}
++
+ /* Unwrap a superficially valid RFC 1964 token with a CFX-only context, with
+  * regular and IOV unwrap. */
+ static void
+@@ -238,6 +257,134 @@ test_bogus_1964_token(gss_ctx_id_t ctx)
+     free(in.value);
+ }
+ 
++static void
++test_cfx_altered_ec(gss_ctx_id_t ctx, krb5_key subkey)
++{
++    OM_uint32 major, minor;
++    uint8_t tokbuf[128], plainbuf[24];
++    krb5_data plain;
++    krb5_enc_data cipher;
++    gss_buffer_desc in, out;
++    gss_iov_buffer_desc iov[2];
++
++    /* Construct a header with a plaintext EC value of 3. */
++    write_cfx_header(3, tokbuf);
++
++    /* Encrypt a plaintext and a copy of the header with the EC value 0. */
++    memcpy(plainbuf, "truncate", 8);
++    memcpy(plainbuf + 8, tokbuf, 16);
++    store_16_be(0, plainbuf + 12);
++    plain = make_data(plainbuf, 24);
++    cipher.ciphertext.data = (char *)tokbuf + 16;
++    cipher.ciphertext.length = sizeof(tokbuf) - 16;
++    cipher.enctype = subkey->keyblock.enctype;
++    if (krb5_k_encrypt(NULL, subkey, KG_USAGE_INITIATOR_SEAL, NULL,
++                       &plain, &cipher) != 0)
++        abort();
++
++    /* Verify that the token is rejected by gss_unwrap(). */
++    in.value = tokbuf;
++    in.length = 16 + cipher.ciphertext.length;
++    major = gss_unwrap(&minor, ctx, &in, &out, NULL, NULL);
++    if (major != GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN)
++        abort();
++    (void)gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
++
++    /* Verify that the token is rejected by gss_unwrap_iov(). */
++    iov[0].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_STREAM;
++    iov[0].buffer = in;
++    iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA;
++    major = gss_unwrap_iov(&minor, ctx, NULL, NULL, iov, 2);
++    if (major != GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN)
++        abort();
++}
++
++static void
++test_cfx_short_plaintext(gss_ctx_id_t ctx, krb5_key subkey)
++{
++    OM_uint32 major, minor;
++    uint8_t tokbuf[128], zerobyte = 0;
++    krb5_data plain;
++    krb5_enc_data cipher;
++    gss_buffer_desc in, out;
++
++    write_cfx_header(0, tokbuf);
++
++    /* Encrypt a single byte, with no copy of the header. */
++    plain = make_data(&zerobyte, 1);
++    cipher.ciphertext.data = (char *)tokbuf + 16;
++    cipher.ciphertext.length = sizeof(tokbuf) - 16;
++    cipher.enctype = subkey->keyblock.enctype;
++    if (krb5_k_encrypt(NULL, subkey, KG_USAGE_INITIATOR_SEAL, NULL,
++                       &plain, &cipher) != 0)
++        abort();
++
++    /* Verify that the token is rejected by gss_unwrap(). */
++    in.value = tokbuf;
++    in.length = 16 + cipher.ciphertext.length;
++    major = gss_unwrap(&minor, ctx, &in, &out, NULL, NULL);
++    if (major != GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN)
++        abort();
++    (void)gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
++}
++
++static void
++test_cfx_large_ec(gss_ctx_id_t ctx, krb5_key subkey)
++{
++    OM_uint32 major, minor;
++    uint8_t tokbuf[128] = { 0 }, plainbuf[20];
++    krb5_data plain;
++    krb5_enc_data cipher;
++    gss_buffer_desc in, out;
++
++    /* Construct a header with an EC value of 5. */
++    write_cfx_header(5, tokbuf);
++
++    /* Encrypt a 4-byte plaintext plus the header. */
++    memcpy(plainbuf, "abcd", 4);
++    memcpy(plainbuf + 4, tokbuf, 16);
++    plain = make_data(plainbuf, 20);
++    cipher.ciphertext.data = (char *)tokbuf + 16;
++    cipher.ciphertext.length = sizeof(tokbuf) - 16;
++    cipher.enctype = subkey->keyblock.enctype;
++    if (krb5_k_encrypt(NULL, subkey, KG_USAGE_INITIATOR_SEAL, NULL,
++                       &plain, &cipher) != 0)
++        abort();
++
++    /* Verify that the token is rejected by gss_unwrap(). */
++    in.value = tokbuf;
++    in.length = 16 + cipher.ciphertext.length;
++    major = gss_unwrap(&minor, ctx, &in, &out, NULL, NULL);
++    if (major != GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN)
++        abort();
++    (void)gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
++}
++
++static void
++test_iov_large_asn1_wrapper(gss_ctx_id_t ctx)
++{
++    OM_uint32 minor, major;
++    uint8_t databuf[10] = { 0 };
++    gss_iov_buffer_desc iov[2];
++
++    /*
++     * In this IOV array, the header contains a DER tag with a dangling eight
++     * bytes of length field.  The data IOV indicates a total token length
++     * sufficient to contain the length bytes.
++     */
++    iov[0].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_HEADER;
++    iov[0].buffer.value = ealloc(2);
++    iov[0].buffer.length = 2;
++    memcpy(iov[0].buffer.value, "\x60\x88", 2);
++    iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA;
++    iov[1].buffer.value = databuf;
++    iov[1].buffer.length = 10;
++    major = gss_unwrap_iov(&minor, ctx, NULL, NULL, iov, 2);
++    if (major != GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN)
++        abort();
++    free(iov[0].buffer.value);
++}
++
+ /* Process wrap and MIC tokens with incomplete headers. */
+ static void
+ test_short_header(gss_ctx_id_t ctx)
+@@ -387,9 +534,7 @@ try_accept(void *value, size_t len)
+     gss_ctx_id_t ctx = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
+ 
+     /* Copy the provided value to make input overruns more obvious. */
+-    in.value = malloc(len);
+-    if (in.value == NULL)
+-        abort();
++    in.value = ealloc(len);
+     memcpy(in.value, value, len);
+     in.length = len;
+     (void)gss_accept_sec_context(&minor, &ctx, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &in,
+@@ -424,11 +569,23 @@ test_short_encapsulation()
+ int
+ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ {
++    krb5_keyblock kb;
++    krb5_key cfx_subkey;
+     gss_ctx_id_t ctx;
+     size_t i;
+ 
+-    ctx = make_fake_cfx_context();
++    kb.enctype = ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96;
++    kb.length = 16;
++    kb.contents = (unsigned char *)"1234567887654321";
++    if (krb5_k_create_key(NULL, &kb, &cfx_subkey) != 0)
++        abort();
++
++    ctx = make_fake_cfx_context(cfx_subkey);
+     test_bogus_1964_token(ctx);
++    test_cfx_altered_ec(ctx, cfx_subkey);
++    test_cfx_short_plaintext(ctx, cfx_subkey);
++    test_cfx_large_ec(ctx, cfx_subkey);
++    test_iov_large_asn1_wrapper(ctx);
+     free_fake_context(ctx);
+ 
+     for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tests) / sizeof(*tests); i++) {
+-- 
+2.33.0
+

dependency/kerberos/build.py

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ import subprocess
 #--------------------------------------------------------#
 
 source_code_path = "kerberos"
+openssl_path = os.getcwd() + "/../../output/kernel/dependency/openssl/%s/%s"
 
 class OPOperator():
     def __init__(self, mode, filename, compiletype):
@@ -137,8 +138,10 @@ class OPOperator():
                 prepare_cmd = 'mkdir -p %s/install/comm' % (self.local_dir)
                 ret = self.exe_cmd(prepare_cmd)
                 self.error_handler(ret)
-                config_cmd = "cd %s/%s/src; ./configure --prefix=%s/install/comm LDFLAGS='-Wl,-z,relro,-z,now' CFLAGS='-fstack-protector-strong -fPIC' --disable-rpath --disable-pkinit --with-system-verto=no" % (self.local_dir, source_code_path, self.local_dir)
-                print("cd %s/%s/src; ./configure --prefix=%s/install/comm LDFLAGS='-Wl,-z,relro,-z,now' CFLAGS='-fstack-protector-strong -fPIC' --disable-rpath --disable-pkinit --with-system-verto=no" % (self.local_dir, source_code_path, self.local_dir))
+                openssl_comm_lib = (openssl_path % ("comm", "lib"))
+                openssl_comm_include = (openssl_path % ("comm", "include"))
+                config_cmd = "cd %s/%s/src; ./configure --prefix=%s/install/comm  LDFLAGS='-Wl,-z,relro,-z,now -L%s' CFLAGS='-fstack-protector-strong -fPIC -I%s' --disable-rpath --disable-pkinit --with-system-verto=no" % (self.local_dir, source_code_path, self.local_dir, openssl_comm_lib, openssl_comm_include)
+                print(config_cmd)
                 ret = self.exe_cmd(config_cmd)
                 self.error_handler(ret)
                 make_cmd = 'cd %s/%s/src; make -j%s && make install' % (self.local_dir, source_code_path, cpu_num)
@@ -148,8 +151,10 @@ class OPOperator():
                 prepare_cmd = 'mkdir -p %s/install/llt' % (self.local_dir)
                 ret = self.exe_cmd(prepare_cmd)
                 self.error_handler(ret)
-                config_cmd = "cd %s/%s/src; ./configure --prefix=%s/install/llt LDFLAGS='-Wl,-z,relro,-z,now' CFLAGS='-fstack-protector-strong -fPIC' --disable-rpath --disable-pkinit --with-system-verto=no" % (self.local_dir, source_code_path, self.local_dir)
-                print("cd %s/%s/src; ./configure --prefix=%s/install/llt LDFLAGS='-Wl,-z,relro,-z,now' CFLAGS='-fstack-protector-strong -fPIC' --disable-rpath --disable-pkinit --with-system-verto=no" % (self.local_dir, source_code_path, self.local_dir))
+                openssl_llt_lib = (openssl_path % ("llt", "lib"))
+                openssl_llt_include = (openssl_path % ("llt", "include"))
+                config_cmd = "cd %s/%s/src; ./configure --prefix=%s/install/llt LDFLAGS='-Wl,-z,relro,-z,now -L%s' CFLAGS='-fstack-protector-strong -fPIC -I%s' --disable-rpath --disable-pkinit --with-system-verto=no" % (self.local_dir, source_code_path, self.local_dir, openssl_llt_lib, openssl_llt_include)
+                print(config_cmd)
                 ret = self.exe_cmd(config_cmd)
                 self.error_handler(ret)
                 make_cmd = 'cd %s/%s/src; make -j%s && make install' % (self.local_dir, source_code_path, cpu_num)

dependency/libcurl/CVE-2024-2398.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+diff -Naur a/lib/http2.c b/lib/http2.c
+--- a/lib/http2.c	2024-04-13 14:42:27.209977032 +0800
++++ b/lib/http2.c	2024-04-13 14:33:11.606622746 +0800
+@@ -547,6 +547,15 @@
+   return 0;
+ }
+ 
++static void free_push_headers(struct h2_stream_ctx *stream)
++{
++  size_t i;
++  for(i = 0; i<stream->push_headers_used; i++)
++    free(stream->push_headers[i]);
++  Curl_safefree(stream->push_headers);
++  stream->push_headers_used = 0;
++}
++
+ static int push_promise(struct Curl_easy *data,
+                         struct connectdata *conn,
+                         const nghttp2_push_promise *frame)
+@@ -560,7 +569,6 @@
+     struct curl_pushheaders heads;
+     CURLMcode rc;
+     struct http_conn *httpc;
+-    size_t i;
+     /* clone the parent */
+     struct Curl_easy *newhandle = duphandle(data);
+     if(!newhandle) {
+@@ -596,11 +604,7 @@
+     Curl_set_in_callback(data, false);
+ 
+     /* free the headers again */
+-    for(i = 0; i<stream->push_headers_used; i++)
+-      free(stream->push_headers[i]);
+-    free(stream->push_headers);
+-    stream->push_headers = NULL;
+-    stream->push_headers_used = 0;
++    free_push_headers(stream);
+ 
+     if(rv) {
+       DEBUGASSERT((rv > CURL_PUSH_OK) && (rv <= CURL_PUSH_ERROROUT));
+@@ -1036,10 +1040,9 @@
+             stream->push_headers_alloc) {
+       char **headp;
+       stream->push_headers_alloc *= 2;
+-      headp = Curl_saferealloc(stream->push_headers,
+-                               stream->push_headers_alloc * sizeof(char *));
++      headp = realloc(stream->push_headers, stream->push_headers_alloc * sizeof(char *));
+       if(!headp) {
+-        stream->push_headers = NULL;
++	free_push_headers(stream);
+         return NGHTTP2_ERR_TEMPORAL_CALLBACK_FAILURE;
+       }
+       stream->push_headers = headp;
+@@ -1205,15 +1208,8 @@
+      setup */
+   Curl_dyn_free(&http->header_recvbuf);
+   Curl_dyn_free(&http->trailer_recvbuf);
+-  if(http->push_headers) {
+-    /* if they weren't used and then freed before */
+-    for(; http->push_headers_used > 0; --http->push_headers_used) {
+-      free(http->push_headers[http->push_headers_used - 1]);
+-    }
+-    free(http->push_headers);
+-    http->push_headers = NULL;
+-  }
+ 
++  free_push_headers(http);
+   if(!(data->conn->handler->protocol&PROTO_FAMILY_HTTP) ||
+      !httpc->h2) /* not HTTP/2 ? */
+     return;

dependency/libcurl/build.sh

@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ main()
     patch -p1 < ../CVE-2023-28322.patch >> $LOG_FILE 2>&1
     patch -p1 < ../CVE-2023-46218.patch >> $LOG_FILE 2>&1
     patch -p1 < ../CVE-2023-38545.patch >> $LOG_FILE 2>&1
+    patch -p1 < ../CVE-2024-2398.patch >> $LOG_FILE 2>&1
 
     checkret "Failed to patch huawei_curl.patch"
     print_done

dependency/libxml2/CVE-2024-34459.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -Naur a/xmllint.c b/xmllint.c
+--- a/xmllint.c	2024-08-05 15:16:19.271124192 +0800
++++ b/xmllint.c	2024-08-05 15:20:00.325968893 +0800
+@@ -602,7 +602,7 @@
+     len = strlen(buffer);
+     snprintf(&buffer[len], sizeof(buffer) - len, "\n");
+     cur = input->cur;
+-    while ((*cur == '\n') || (*cur == '\r'))
++    while ((cur > base) && ((*cur == '\n') || (*cur == '\r')))
+ 	cur--;
+     n = 0;
+     while ((cur != base) && (n++ < 80)) {

dependency/libxml2/build_component.sh

@@ -28,10 +28,11 @@ function build_component()
     patch -p1 < ../libxml2.patch
     patch -p1 < ../libxml2-CVE-2022-40303.patch
     patch -p1 < ../libxml2-CVE-2022-40304.patch
-    patch -p1 < ../CVE-2024-25062.patch
     patch -p1 < ../CVE-2023-28484.patch
     patch -p1 < ../CVE-2023-29469.patch
     patch -p1 < ../CVE-2023-45322.patch
+    patch -p1 < ../CVE-2024-25062.patch
+    patch -p1 < ../CVE-2024-34459.patch
     tmp_cpus=$(grep -w processor /proc/cpuinfo|wc -l)
     ./autogen.sh
     chmod +x configure        

dependency/llvm/CVE-2024-31852.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+diff -Naur a/llvm/lib/Target/ARM/ARMFrameLowering.cpp b/llvm/lib/Target/ARM/ARMFrameLowering.cpp
+--- a/llvm/lib/Target/ARM/ARMFrameLowering.cpp	2024-04-15 20:53:13.643344012 +0800
++++ b/llvm/lib/Target/ARM/ARMFrameLowering.cpp	2024-04-15 21:13:51.463632273 +0800
+@@ -1097,9 +1097,6 @@
+           // Fold the return instruction into the LDM.
+           DeleteRet = true;
+           LdmOpc = AFI->isThumbFunction() ? ARM::t2LDMIA_RET : ARM::LDMIA_RET;
+-          // We 'restore' LR into PC so it is not live out of the return block:
+-          // Clear Restored bit.
+-          Info.setRestored(false);
+         } else
+           LdmOpc = AFI->isThumbFunction() ? ARM::t2LDMIA_UPD : ARM::LDMIA_UPD;
+       }
+@@ -2155,6 +2152,35 @@
+   AFI->setLRIsSpilled(SavedRegs.test(ARM::LR));
+ }
+ 
++void ARMFrameLowering::updateLRRestored(MachineFunction &MF) {
++  MachineFrameInfo &MFI = MF.getFrameInfo();
++  if (!MFI.isCalleeSavedInfoValid())
++    return;
++  // Check if all terminators do not implicitly use LR. Then we can 'restore' LR
++  // into PC so it is not live out of the return block: Clear the Restored bit
++  // in that case.
++  for (CalleeSavedInfo &Info : MFI.getCalleeSavedInfo()) {
++    if (Info.getReg() != ARM::LR)
++      continue;
++    if (all_of(MF, [](const MachineBasicBlock &MBB) {
++          return all_of(MBB.terminators(), [](const MachineInstr &Term) {
++            return !Term.isReturn() || Term.getOpcode() == ARM::LDMIA_RET ||
++                   Term.getOpcode() == ARM::t2LDMIA_RET ||
++                   Term.getOpcode() == ARM::tPOP_RET;
++          });
++        })) {
++      Info.setRestored(false);
++      break;
++    }
++  }
++}
++
++void ARMFrameLowering::processFunctionBeforeFrameFinalized(
++    MachineFunction &MF, RegScavenger *RS) const {
++  TargetFrameLowering::processFunctionBeforeFrameFinalized(MF, RS);
++  updateLRRestored(MF);
++}
++
+ void ARMFrameLowering::getCalleeSaves(const MachineFunction &MF,
+                                       BitVector &SavedRegs) const {
+   TargetFrameLowering::getCalleeSaves(MF, SavedRegs);
+diff -Naur a/llvm/lib/Target/ARM/ARMFrameLowering.h b/llvm/lib/Target/ARM/ARMFrameLowering.h
+--- a/llvm/lib/Target/ARM/ARMFrameLowering.h	2024-04-15 20:53:13.643344012 +0800
++++ b/llvm/lib/Target/ARM/ARMFrameLowering.h	2024-04-15 21:13:51.463632273 +0800
+@@ -58,6 +58,13 @@
+   void determineCalleeSaves(MachineFunction &MF, BitVector &SavedRegs,
+                             RegScavenger *RS) const override;
+ 
++   /// Update the IsRestored flag on LR if it is spilled, based on the return
++  /// instructions.
++  static void updateLRRestored(MachineFunction &MF);
++
++  void processFunctionBeforeFrameFinalized(
++      MachineFunction &MF, RegScavenger *RS = nullptr) const override;
++
+   void adjustForSegmentedStacks(MachineFunction &MF,
+                                 MachineBasicBlock &MBB) const override;
+ 
+diff -Naur a/llvm/lib/Target/ARM/ARMLoadStoreOptimizer.cpp b/llvm/lib/Target/ARM/ARMLoadStoreOptimizer.cpp
+--- a/llvm/lib/Target/ARM/ARMLoadStoreOptimizer.cpp	2024-04-15 20:53:13.643344012 +0800
++++ b/llvm/lib/Target/ARM/ARMLoadStoreOptimizer.cpp	2024-04-15 21:13:51.483632535 +0800
+@@ -2037,19 +2037,6 @@
+       MO.setReg(ARM::PC);
+       PrevMI.copyImplicitOps(*MBB.getParent(), *MBBI);
+       MBB.erase(MBBI);
+-      // We now restore LR into PC so it is not live-out of the return block
+-      // anymore: Clear the CSI Restored bit.
+-      MachineFrameInfo &MFI = MBB.getParent()->getFrameInfo();
+-      // CSI should be fixed after PrologEpilog Insertion
+-      assert(MFI.isCalleeSavedInfoValid() && "CSI should be valid");
+-      for (CalleeSavedInfo &Info : MFI.getCalleeSavedInfo()) {
+-        if (Info.getReg() == ARM::LR) {
+-          Info.setRestored(false);
+-          break;
+-        }
+-      }
+-      return true;
+-    }
+   }
+   return false;
+ }
+@@ -2095,16 +2082,24 @@
+   isThumb2 = AFI->isThumb2Function();
+   isThumb1 = AFI->isThumbFunction() && !isThumb2;
+ 
+-  bool Modified = false;
++  bool Modified = false, ModifiedLDMReturn = false;
+   for (MachineFunction::iterator MFI = Fn.begin(), E = Fn.end(); MFI != E;
+        ++MFI) {
+     MachineBasicBlock &MBB = *MFI;
+     Modified |= LoadStoreMultipleOpti(MBB);
+     if (STI->hasV5TOps())
+-      Modified |= MergeReturnIntoLDM(MBB);
++      ModifiedLDMReturn |= MergeReturnIntoLDM(MBB);
+     if (isThumb1)
+       Modified |= CombineMovBx(MBB);
+   }
++  Modified |= ModifiedLDMReturn;
++
++  // If we merged a BX instruction into an LDM, we need to re-calculate whether
++  // LR is restored. This check needs to consider the whole function, not just
++  // the instruction(s) we changed, because there may be other BX returns which
++  // still need LR to be restored.
++  if (ModifiedLDMReturn)
++    ARMFrameLowering::updateLRRestored(Fn);
+ 
+   Allocator.DestroyAll();
+   return Modified;

dependency/llvm/build_component.sh

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ function build_llvm()
     mkdir ${SOURCE_CODE_PATH}
     tar -zxf $TAR_FILE_NAME -C $SOURCE_CODE_PATH --strip-components 1
     cd ${LOCAL_DIR}/${SOURCE_CODE_PATH}
+    patch -p1 < ../CVE-2024-31852.patch
     # patch -p1 < ../0001-llvm.patch
     # patch -p1 < ../0002-llvm.patch
     # patch -p1 < ../0003-llvm.patch

dependency/masstree/0002-masstree_oom_fix.patch

@@ -1,955 +0,0 @@
-From 0a2c88b6297fda231a5ca0f922bf732a8d0445dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Vinoth Veeraraghavan <vinoth.veeraraghavan@hotmail.com>
-Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2022 19:09:26 +0700
-Subject: [PATCH] Masstree OOM feature + bug fixes
-
-More detail: 1. Feature: Add support for memory allocation failure
-             2. Bug fix: RCU\GC: delete node before disconnect
-             3. Bug fix: Leafs are marked as root by mistake
-             4. Bug fix: GC layer might access already freed node
-             5. Bug fix: Memory leak (Layers are not being removed)
-             6. Optimization: Disable some debug\unused code (collect new nodes)
-             7. Optimization: Disable phantom epoch support (not in use by MOT)
-             8. Optimization: Extend node version to 64bit
-             9. Optimization: Optimize leaf size to support larger internal ksuffix
----
- kvthread.hh             |  96 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
- masstree.hh             |   5 +-
- masstree_insert.hh      |  78 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
- masstree_remove.hh      |  17 +++++--
- masstree_scan.hh        |   4 +-
- masstree_split.hh       | 122 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
- masstree_struct.hh      |  72 +++++++++++++++++++++-------
- masstree_tcursor.hh     |  31 ++++++------
- mot_masstree_config.hpp |  11 ++++-
- 9 files changed, 365 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/kvthread.hh b/kvthread.hh
-index 2c75e4e..364cd44 100644
---- a/kvthread.hh
-+++ b/kvthread.hh
-@@ -24,6 +24,48 @@
- #include <pthread.h>
- #include <sys/mman.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <vector>
-+
-+enum {
-+    MT_MERR_OK = 0,
-+    MT_MERR_MAKE_SPLIT_PRE_ALLOC = 1,
-+    MT_MERR_MAKE_SPLIT_LEAF_ALLOC = 2,
-+    MT_MERR_MAKE_NEW_LAYER_LEAF_ALLOC_1 = 3,
-+    MT_MERR_MAKE_NEW_LAYER_LEAF_ALLOC_2 = 4,
-+    MT_MERR_MAKE_NEW_LAYER_KSUFFIX_ALLOC_1 = 5,
-+    MT_MERR_MAKE_NEW_LAYER_KSUFFIX_ALLOC_2 = 6,
-+    MT_MERR_FIND_INSERT_ASSIGN_SUFFIX = 7,
-+    MT_MERR_SPLIT_INTO_ASSIGN_INITALIZE_1 = 8,
-+    MT_MERR_SPLIT_INTO_ASSIGN_INITALIZE_2 = 9,
-+    MT_MERR_GC_LAYER_REMOVAL_MAKE = 10,
-+    MT_MERR_MAKE_SPLIT_ASSIGN_SUFFIX = 11,
-+    MT_MERR_MAKE_SPLIT_PERM_EXCHANGE = 12,
-+
-+    // Errors that are being handled internally (Operation should succeed even if last error contains them)
-+    MT_MERR_NON_DISRUPTIVE_ERRORS = 15,
-+
-+    // We should not reach the following errors as they should be covered with other errors in more upper layer
-+    MT_MERR_NOT_RETURNED_TO_USER_ERRORS = 20,
-+    MT_MERR_ASSIGN_KSUF = 21,
-+    MT_MERR_MAKE_LEAF = 22,
-+    MT_MERR_MAKE_ROOT_LEAF = 23,
-+    MT_MERR_MAKE_INTERNODE = 24,
-+    MT_MERR_LEAF_ASSIGN = 25,
-+    MT_MERR_ASSIGN_INITALIZE_1 = 26,
-+    MT_MERR_ASSIGN_INITALIZE_2 = 27,
-+
-+    // We should not reach the following errors
-+    MT_MERR_UNREACHABLE_ERRORS = 30,
-+    MT_MERR_MAKE_SPLIT_INTERNODE_ALLOC_NOT_EXPECTED,
-+    MT_MERR_MAKE_SPLIT_INTERNODE_ALLOC_NOT_EXPECTED_2,
-+    MT_MERR_MAKE_SPLIT_INTERNODE_ALLOC_EMPTY_PRE_ALLOC_NOT_EXPECTED,
-+    MT_MERR_MAKE_SPLIT_INTERNODE_ALLOC_EMPTY_PRE_ALLOC_NOT_EXPECTED_2,
-+
-+    MT_MERR_NOT_IN_USE_LAST_ENTRY = 40
-+};
-+
-+#define MAX_ALLOC_ERROR_TYPES MT_MERR_NOT_IN_USE_LAST_ENTRY
-+
- 
- class threadinfo;
- class loginfo;
-@@ -42,7 +84,7 @@ extern volatile mrcu_epoch_type globalepoch;  // global epoch, updated regularly
- extern volatile mrcu_epoch_type active_epoch;
- 
- // Memtags max allocation size
--#define MAX_MEMTAG_MASSTREE_LEAF_ALLOCATION_SIZE        iceil(sizeof(leaf<P>) +  128, 64)
-+#define MAX_MEMTAG_MASSTREE_LEAF_ALLOCATION_SIZE        iceil(sizeof(leaf<P>) + 128, 64)
- #define MAX_MEMTAG_MASSTREE_INTERNODE_ALLOCATION_SIZE   sizeof(internode<P>)
- #define MAX_MEMTAG_MASSTREE_LIMBO_GROUP_ALLOCATION_SIZE sizeof(mt_limbo_group)
- 
-@@ -117,6 +159,12 @@ class alignas(64) threadinfo {
-         TI_MAIN, TI_PROCESS, TI_LOG, TI_CHECKPOINT
-     };
- 
-+    typedef struct rcu_entry {
-+        void* p;
-+        size_t sz;
-+        memtag tag;
-+    } rcu_entry_t;
-+
-     static threadinfo* allthreads;
- 
-     threadinfo* next() const {
-@@ -229,15 +277,14 @@ class alignas(64) threadinfo {
- 
-     void deallocate_rcu(void* p, size_t sz, memtag tag) {
-         assert(p);
--        memdebug::check_rcu(p, sz, tag);
--        record_rcu(p, sz, tag);
--        mark(threadcounter(tc_alloc + (tag > memtag_value)), -sz);
-+        dealloc_rcu.push_back({p, sz, tag});
-     }
- 
-     void* pool_allocate(size_t sz, memtag tag) {
-         void* p = NULL;
-         int nl = (sz + memdebug_size + CACHE_LINE_SIZE - 1) / CACHE_LINE_SIZE;
-         if (use_pool()) {
-+            masstree_invariant(false); // mot code should not reach here
-             assert(nl <= pool_max_nlines);
-             if (unlikely(!pool_[nl - 1]))
-                 refill_pool(nl);
-@@ -264,17 +311,30 @@ class alignas(64) threadinfo {
-             *reinterpret_cast<void **>(p) = pool_[nl - 1];
-             pool_[nl - 1] = p;
-         } else
--            free(p);
-+            deallocate(p, sz, tag); // mot memory deallocation
-         mark(threadcounter(tc_alloc + (tag > memtag_value)),
-              -nl * CACHE_LINE_SIZE);
-     }
-     void pool_deallocate_rcu(void* p, size_t sz, memtag tag) {
--        int nl = (sz + memdebug_size + CACHE_LINE_SIZE - 1) / CACHE_LINE_SIZE;
--        assert(p && nl <= pool_max_nlines);
--        memdebug::check_rcu(p, sz, memtag(tag + nl));
--        record_rcu(p, sz, use_pool() ? memtag(tag + nl) : tag);
--        mark(threadcounter(tc_alloc + (tag > memtag_value)),
--             -nl * CACHE_LINE_SIZE);
-+        if (unlikely(use_pool())) {
-+          int nl = (sz + memdebug_size + CACHE_LINE_SIZE - 1) / CACHE_LINE_SIZE;
-+          assert(p && nl <= pool_max_nlines);
-+          memdebug::check_rcu(p, sz, memtag(tag + nl));
-+          mark(threadcounter(tc_alloc + (tag > memtag_value)),
-+               -nl * CACHE_LINE_SIZE);
-+          dealloc_rcu.push_back({p, sz, memtag(tag + nl)});
-+        } else {
-+          dealloc_rcu.push_back({p, sz, tag});
-+        }
-+    }
-+
-+    void add_nodes_to_gc() {
-+        for (uint32_t i = 0 ; i < dealloc_rcu.size() ; i++) {
-+            masstree_invariant(dealloc_rcu[i].p);
-+            record_rcu(dealloc_rcu[i].p, dealloc_rcu[i].sz, dealloc_rcu[i].tag);
-+            dealloc_rcu[i].p = nullptr;
-+        }
-+        dealloc_rcu.clear();
-     }
- 
-     // RCU
-@@ -308,6 +368,11 @@ class alignas(64) threadinfo {
-         return pthreadid_;
-     }
- 
-+    inline void set_last_error(int error) { masstree_invariant(error < MT_MERR_UNREACHABLE_ERRORS); last_error = error; }
-+    inline int get_last_error() { return last_error; }
-+    inline bool non_disruptive_error() { return last_error == 0 ||
-+                                     (last_error > MT_MERR_NON_DISRUPTIVE_ERRORS && last_error < MT_MERR_NOT_RETURNED_TO_USER_ERRORS); }
-+
-     void report_rcu(void* ptr) const;
-     static void report_rcu_all(void* ptr);
-     static inline mrcu_epoch_type min_active_epoch();
-@@ -333,8 +398,14 @@ class alignas(64) threadinfo {
- #endif
-     }
- 
-+    bool is_empty_rcu_array() {
-+        return dealloc_rcu.size() == 0;
-+    }
-+
-   private:
-     MOT::MasstreePrimaryIndex * cur_working_index;
-+    int last_error = MT_MERR_OK;
-+    std::vector<struct rcu_entry> dealloc_rcu;
-     union {
-         struct {
-             mrcu_epoch_type gc_epoch_;
-@@ -386,7 +457,8 @@ class alignas(64) threadinfo {
-     void ng_record_rcu(void* ptr, int size, memtag tag);
- 
-     void record_rcu(void* ptr, int size, memtag tag) {
--      if (use_pool()) {
-+      if (unlikely(use_pool())) {
-+        masstree_invariant(false); // mot code should not reach here
-         if (limbo_tail_->tail_ + 2 > limbo_tail_->capacity)
-           refill_rcu();
-         uint64_t epoch = ng_getGlobalEpoch();
-diff --git a/masstree.hh b/masstree.hh
-index eaf6503..89af0ee 100644
---- a/masstree.hh
-+++ b/masstree.hh
-@@ -42,8 +42,8 @@ template <int LW = 15, int IW = LW> struct nodeparams {
-     static constexpr int bound_method = bound_method_fast;
-     static constexpr int debug_level = 0;
-     typedef uint64_t ikey_type;
--    typedef uint32_t nodeversion_value_type;
--    static constexpr bool need_phantom_epoch = true;
-+    typedef uint64_t nodeversion_value_type;
-+    static constexpr bool need_phantom_epoch = false;
-     typedef uint64_t phantom_epoch_type;
-     static constexpr ssize_t print_max_indent_depth = 12;
-     typedef key_unparse_printable_string key_unparse_type;
-@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ class basic_table {
- 
-     inline node_type* root() const;
-     inline node_type* fix_root();
-+    inline node_type** root_ref() { return &root_; }
- 
-     bool get(Str key, value_type& value, threadinfo& ti) const;
- 
-diff --git a/masstree_insert.hh b/masstree_insert.hh
-index 4a71942..e641f03 100644
---- a/masstree_insert.hh
-+++ b/masstree_insert.hh
-@@ -21,15 +21,18 @@
- namespace Masstree {
- 
- template <typename P>
--bool tcursor<P>::find_insert(threadinfo& ti)
-+bool tcursor<P>::find_insert(threadinfo& ti, bool & found)
- {
-+    found = false;
-     find_locked(ti);
-     original_n_ = n_;
-     original_v_ = n_->full_unlocked_version_value();
- 
-     // maybe we found it
--    if (state_)
-+    if (state_) {
-+        found = true;
-         return true;
-+    }
- 
-     // otherwise mark as inserted but not present
-     state_ = 2;
-@@ -59,8 +62,11 @@ bool tcursor<P>::find_insert(threadinfo& ti)
-              1. If leaf is the most left leaf in the btree which means ikey0_[0] is not used as a boundary. (!n_->prev_)
-              2. If a new key, with ikey == ikey0_[0], is added. In this case, we can re-use slot 0 as we won't change the tree's structure. (n_->ikey_bound() == ka_.ikey()) */
-         if (likely(kx_.p != 0) || !n_->prev_ || n_->ikey_bound() == ka_.ikey()) {
--            n_->assign(kx_.p, ka_, ti);
--            return false;
-+            // if n_->assign fails, we dont have enough space to place the suffix and we failed while allocating larger ksuffix.
-+            bool res = n_->assign(kx_.p, ka_, ti);
-+            if (!res)
-+                ti.set_last_error(MT_MERR_FIND_INSERT_ASSIGN_SUFFIX);
-+            return res;
-         }
-     }
- 
-@@ -78,8 +84,13 @@ bool tcursor<P>::make_new_layer(threadinfo& ti) {
-     // For each ikey_size bytes (currently 8) that matches in both key's suffixes, we will need to create a new layer
-     leaf_type* twig_head = n_;
-     leaf_type* twig_tail = n_;
-+    leaf_type* nl = nullptr;
-     while (kcmp == 0) {
--        leaf_type* nl = leaf_type::make_root(0, twig_tail, ti);
-+        nl = leaf_type::make_root(0, twig_tail, ti);
-+        if (!nl) {
-+            ti.set_last_error(MT_MERR_MAKE_NEW_LAYER_LEAF_ALLOC_1);
-+            goto make_new_layer_cleanup;
-+        }
-         nl->assign_initialize_for_layer(0, oka);
-         if (twig_head != n_)
-             twig_tail->lv_[0] = nl;
-@@ -87,7 +98,9 @@ bool tcursor<P>::make_new_layer(threadinfo& ti) {
-             twig_head = nl;
-         nl->permutation_ = permuter_type::make_sorted(1);
-         twig_tail = nl;
-+#ifndef MOT_OBSOLETE_CODE
-         new_nodes_.emplace_back(nl, nl->full_unlocked_version_value());
-+#endif
-         oka.shift();
-         ka_.shift();
-         // Compare the ikey only. if ikey matches and one or more of the suffixes != 0, compare using suffix size
-@@ -102,9 +115,24 @@ bool tcursor<P>::make_new_layer(threadinfo& ti) {
-             + n_->iksuf_[0].overhead(n_->width);
-     else
-         ksufsize = 0;
--    leaf_type *nl = leaf_type::make_root(ksufsize, twig_tail, ti);
--    nl->assign_initialize(0, kcmp < 0 ? oka : ka_, ti);
--    nl->assign_initialize(1, kcmp < 0 ? ka_ : oka, ti);
-+    nl = leaf_type::make_root(ksufsize, twig_tail, ti);
-+    if (!nl) {
-+        ti.set_last_error(MT_MERR_MAKE_NEW_LAYER_LEAF_ALLOC_2);
-+        goto make_new_layer_cleanup;
-+    }
-+    // Even though the total ksuffix size was already provided to make_root, more memory might be allocated in assign_initialize calls
-+    //  as leaf internal suffix is bounded by 128 (+ 64 alignment).
-+    // We will hit this issue (for sure) if ka_.suffix_length() + oka.suffix_length() > 192, but might hit it also when ka_.suffix_length() + oka.suffix_length() > 128.
-+    if (!nl->assign_initialize(0, kcmp < 0 ? oka : ka_, ti)) {
-+        ti.set_last_error(MT_MERR_MAKE_NEW_LAYER_KSUFFIX_ALLOC_1);
-+        goto make_new_layer_cleanup;
-+    }
-+
-+    if (!nl->assign_initialize(1, kcmp < 0 ? ka_ : oka, ti)) {
-+        ti.set_last_error(MT_MERR_MAKE_NEW_LAYER_KSUFFIX_ALLOC_2);
-+        goto make_new_layer_cleanup;
-+    }
-+
-     nl->lv_[kcmp > 0] = n_->lv_[kx_.p];
-     nl->lock(*nl, ti.lock_fence(tc_leaf_lock));
-     if (kcmp < 0)
-@@ -134,6 +162,33 @@ bool tcursor<P>::make_new_layer(threadinfo& ti) {
-     n_->unlock();
-     n_ = nl;
-     kx_.i = kx_.p = kcmp < 0;
-+    return true;
-+
-+make_new_layer_cleanup:
-+    // n_ was not updated yet. It contains the original key (without any change). it will be unlocked later on (in lp.finish)
-+    if (nl) {
-+        // nl is not connected yet to twig_tail. handle it seperatly
-+        nl->deallocate(ti);
-+        nl = nullptr;
-+    }
-+
-+    // Leafs in leaf list (starts from twig_head) has no suffix. In addition, they are not connected to the masstree yet, so we dont need to hold any locks.
-+    if (twig_head != n_) {
-+        while (twig_head) {
-+            masstree_invariant(!twig_head->ksuf_);
-+            masstree_invariant(twig_head->size() == 1);
-+            masstree_invariant(twig_head->is_layer(0));
-+            masstree_invariant(twig_head->stable_annotated(ti.stable_fence()).is_root());
-+            leaf_type *next_layer_leaf = (leaf_type *)twig_head->lv_[0].layer();
-+            twig_head->lv_[0] = nullptr;
-+            // Remove it directly. no need to use rcu.
-+            ti.deallocate(twig_head, sizeof(*twig_head) /* Being ignored */, memtag_masstree_leaf);
-+            // Stop if we just finished to handle last leaf in list (twig_tail).
-+            // Validating that next_layer_leaf != null wont work as twig_tail->lv_[0] == twig_tail.
-+            twig_head = (twig_head == twig_tail) ? nullptr : next_layer_leaf;
-+        }
-+    }
-+
-     return false;
- }
- 
-@@ -152,15 +207,20 @@ inline void tcursor<P>::finish(int state, threadinfo& ti)
- {
-     if (state < 0 && state_ == 1) {
-         if (finish_remove(ti))
--            return;
-+            goto clean_ti;
-     } else if (state > 0 && state_ == 2)
-         finish_insert();
-     // we finally know this!
-     if (n_ == original_n_)
-         updated_v_ = n_->full_unlocked_version_value();
-+#ifndef MOT_OBSOLETE_CODE
-     else
-         new_nodes_.emplace_back(n_, n_->full_unlocked_version_value());
-+#endif
-     n_->unlock();
-+
-+clean_ti:
-+    ti.add_nodes_to_gc();
- }
- 
- } // namespace Masstree
-diff --git a/masstree_remove.hh b/masstree_remove.hh
-index 5795261..a647ea5 100644
---- a/masstree_remove.hh
-+++ b/masstree_remove.hh
-@@ -144,8 +144,9 @@ void gc_layer_rcu_callback<P>::operator()(threadinfo& ti)
-         if (!do_remove || !lp.finish_remove(ti)) {
-             lp.n_->unlock();
-         }
--        ti.deallocate(this, size(), memtag_masstree_gc);
-     }
-+    ti.deallocate(this, size(), memtag_masstree_gc);
-+    ti.add_nodes_to_gc();
- }
- 
- template <typename P>
-@@ -172,18 +173,18 @@ bool tcursor<P>::finish_remove(threadinfo& ti) {
-     if (perm.size()) {
-         return false;
-     } else {
--        return remove_leaf(n_, root_, ka_.prefix_string(), ti);
-+        return remove_leaf(n_, root_ref_, ka_.prefix_string(), ti);
-     }
- }
- 
- template <typename P>
--bool tcursor<P>::remove_leaf(leaf_type* leaf, node_type* root,
-+bool tcursor<P>::remove_leaf(leaf_type* leaf, node_type** root_ref,
-                              Str prefix, threadinfo& ti)
- {
-     if (!leaf->prev_) {
-         if (!leaf->next_.ptr && !prefix.empty()) {
-             // Leaf doesn't hold any keys, not in the highest layer and has no neighbors --> entire layer can be destroyed
--            gc_layer_rcu_callback_ng<P>::make(root, prefix, ti);
-+            gc_layer_rcu_callback_ng<P>::make(root_ref, prefix, ti);
-         }
-         // Leaf has neighbor to the right (next) or leaf in the highest layer. do nothing
-         return false;
-@@ -211,6 +212,14 @@ bool tcursor<P>::remove_leaf(leaf_type* leaf, node_type* root,
-     // Unlink leaf from doubly-linked leaf list
-     btree_leaflink<leaf_type>::unlink(leaf);
- 
-+    // leaf->prev_ != NULL
-+    leaf_type *prev = leaf->prev_;
-+    if (!prev->prev_ && !prev->next_.ptr && prev->size() == 0 && !prefix.empty() ) {
-+        // After removing the leaf, only the most left leaf remains (single leaf). We can remove the layer as the most left leaf
-+        //  doesn't hold any keys and layer is not the highest one.
-+        gc_layer_rcu_callback_ng<P>::make(root_ref, prefix, ti);
-+    }
-+
-     // Remove leaf from tree, collapse trivial chains, and rewrite
-     // ikey bounds.
-     ikey_type ikey = leaf->ikey_bound();
-diff --git a/masstree_scan.hh b/masstree_scan.hh
-index 31ffcbc..f7b0937 100644
---- a/masstree_scan.hh
-+++ b/masstree_scan.hh
-@@ -306,8 +306,10 @@ int scanstackelt<P>::find_next(H &helper, key_type &ka, leafvalue_type &entry)
-         fence();
-         entry = n_->lv_[kp];
-         entry.prefetch(keylenx);
--        if (n_->keylenx_has_ksuf(keylenx))
-+        if (n_->keylenx_has_ksuf(keylenx)) {
-             keylen = ka.assign_store_suffix(n_->ksuf(kp));
-+            masstree_invariant(keylen < (int)MASSTREE_MAXKEYLEN);
-+        }
- 
-         if (n_->has_changed(v_))
-             goto changed;
-diff --git a/masstree_split.hh b/masstree_split.hh
-index fcf35ee..42b012b 100644
---- a/masstree_split.hh
-+++ b/masstree_split.hh
-@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ leaf<P>::ikey_after_insert(const permuter_type& perm, int i,
- 
-     The split type is 0 if @a ka went into *this, 1 if the @a ka went into
-     *@a nr, and 2 for the sequential-order optimization (@a ka went into *@a
--    nr and no other keys were moved). */
-+    nr and no other keys were moved). if -1, split failed due to memory issue */
- template <typename P>
- int leaf<P>::split_into(leaf<P>* nr, tcursor<P>* cursor,
-                         ikey_type& split_ikey, threadinfo& ti)
-@@ -71,7 +71,8 @@ int leaf<P>::split_into(leaf<P>* nr, tcursor<P>* cursor,
-     int p = cursor->kx_.i;
-     if (p == 0 && !this->prev_) {
-         // reverse-sequential optimization
--        mid = 1;
-+        // We remove this optimization as it can lead us to empty leaf (In case insertion fails)
-+        // mid = 1;
-     } else if (p == width && !this->next_.ptr) {
-         // sequential optimization
-         mid = width;
-@@ -100,9 +101,16 @@ int leaf<P>::split_into(leaf<P>* nr, tcursor<P>* cursor,
-     typename permuter_type::value_type pv = perml.value_from(mid - (p < mid));
-     for (int x = mid; x <= width; ++x) {
-         if (x == p) {
--            nr->assign_initialize(x - mid, cursor->ka_, ti);
-+            if (!nr->assign_initialize(x - mid, cursor->ka_, ti)) {
-+                ti.set_last_error(MT_MERR_SPLIT_INTO_ASSIGN_INITALIZE_1);
-+                return -1;
-+            }
-+
-         } else {
--            nr->assign_initialize(x - mid, this, pv & 15, ti);
-+            if (!nr->assign_initialize(x - mid, this, pv & 15, ti)) {
-+                ti.set_last_error(MT_MERR_SPLIT_INTO_ASSIGN_INITALIZE_2);
-+                return -1;
-+            }
-             pv >>= 4;
-         }
-     }
-@@ -174,6 +182,14 @@ int internode<P>::split_into(internode<P>* nr, int p, ikey_type ka,
-     }
- }
- 
-+template <typename P>
-+void tcursor<P>::release_internodes(internode_type * internodes_array[], int start, int end, threadinfo& ti) {
-+        for (int i = start; i < end; i++) {
-+            masstree_invariant(internodes_array[i]);
-+            ti.deallocate(internodes_array[i], sizeof(*internodes_array[i]) /* Being ignored */, memtag_masstree_internode);
-+            internodes_array[i] = nullptr;
-+        }
-+}
- 
- template <typename P>
- bool tcursor<P>::make_split(threadinfo& ti)
-@@ -191,17 +207,66 @@ bool tcursor<P>::make_split(threadinfo& ti)
-         if (kx_.p != 0) {
-             n_->permutation_ = perm.value();
-             fence();
--            n_->assign(kx_.p, ka_, ti);
-+            if (n_->assign(kx_.p, ka_, ti)) {
-+                return true;
-+            }
-+            ti.set_last_error(MT_MERR_MAKE_SPLIT_PERM_EXCHANGE);
-+            return false;
-+        }
-+    }
-+
-+    bool rc = true;
-+
-+    // 2 optimizations that can reduce the number of internodes allocations:
-+    //   1. In n_ does not have parent, only 1 internode is required (rare case - only on first split)
-+    //   2. In case n_'s parent has extra place, and it's height is 1, we dont need internodes at all (common case, but requires early lock of n_'s parent)
-+    node_type* l_root = n_;
-+
-+    while (!l_root->is_root()) {
-+        if (n_ != l_root) {
-+            l_root->stable_annotated(ti.stable_fence());
-+        }
-+        l_root = l_root->maybe_parent();
-+    }
-+
-+    // l_root->height_ is the layer real height or higher.
-+    uint32_t layer_height = l_root->isleaf() ? 1 : ((internode_type *)l_root)->height_;
-+    int reserved_nodes = layer_height + 5; // add 5 extra nodes (extra 5 layers in single b-tree)
-+    internode_type * preallocated_internodes[reserved_nodes + 1] = { 0 };
-+    int cur_cache_index = 0;
-+
-+    for (int i = 0; i < reserved_nodes; i++) {
-+        preallocated_internodes[i] = (internode_type *)ti.pool_allocate(MAX_MEMTAG_MASSTREE_INTERNODE_ALLOCATION_SIZE,
-+                                                                memtag_masstree_internode);
-+        if (!preallocated_internodes[i]) {
-+            release_internodes(preallocated_internodes, 0, i, ti);
-+            ti.set_last_error(MT_MERR_MAKE_SPLIT_PRE_ALLOC);
-             return false;
-         }
-     }
- 
-     node_type* child = leaf_type::make(n_->ksuf_used_capacity(), n_->phantom_epoch(), ti);
-+    if (!child) {
-+        release_internodes(preallocated_internodes, 0, reserved_nodes, ti);
-+        ti.set_last_error(MT_MERR_MAKE_SPLIT_LEAF_ALLOC);
-+        return false;
-+    }
-     child->assign_version(*n_);
-+    child->mark_nonroot();
-+    // As n_ is locked, child is locked as well.
-     ikey_type xikey[2];
-     // Add the new key and spread the keys between the 2 leafs. The new key might be inserted to either one of the leafs. Link to parent will be done later.
-     int split_type = n_->split_into(static_cast<leaf_type*>(child),
-                                     this, xikey[0], ti);
-+
-+    if (split_type < 0) {
-+        // Split failed due to ksuffix memory allocation error (child is not connected to n_ at this stage)
-+        release_internodes(preallocated_internodes, 0, reserved_nodes, ti);
-+        // child is not visiable yet, so we can deallocate without rcu
-+        ((leaf_type *)child)->deallocate(ti);
-+        child = nullptr;
-+        return false;
-+    }
-     unsigned sense = 0;
-     node_type* n = n_;
-     uint32_t height = 0;
-@@ -219,7 +284,17 @@ bool tcursor<P>::make_split(threadinfo& ti)
-         }
- 
-         if (kp < 0 || p->height_ > height + 1) {
--            internode_type *nn = internode_type::make(height + 1, ti);
-+            masstree_invariant(preallocated_internodes[cur_cache_index]);
-+            internode_type *nn = internode_type::make(height + 1, ti, preallocated_internodes[cur_cache_index++]);
-+            if (!nn) {
-+              // Should never happen with pre-allocated internodes. bad flow is not handled
-+              ti.set_last_error(MT_MERR_MAKE_SPLIT_INTERNODE_ALLOC_NOT_EXPECTED);
-+            }
-+
-+            if (cur_cache_index == reserved_nodes) {
-+              // Should never happen with pre-allocated internodes (we should have enough reserved nodes). bad flow is not handled
-+              ti.set_last_error(MT_MERR_MAKE_SPLIT_INTERNODE_ALLOC_EMPTY_PRE_ALLOC_NOT_EXPECTED);
-+            }
-             nn->child_[0] = n;
-             nn->assign(0, xikey[sense], child);
-             nn->nkeys_ = 1;
-@@ -233,11 +308,22 @@ bool tcursor<P>::make_split(threadinfo& ti)
-             n->set_parent(nn);
-         } else {
-             if (p->size() >= p->width) {
--                next_child = internode_type::make(height + 1, ti);
-+                masstree_invariant(preallocated_internodes[cur_cache_index]);
-+                next_child = internode_type::make(height + 1, ti, preallocated_internodes[cur_cache_index++]);
-+                if (!next_child) {
-+                  // Should never happen with pre-allocated internodes. bad flow is not handled
-+                  ti.set_last_error(MT_MERR_MAKE_SPLIT_INTERNODE_ALLOC_NOT_EXPECTED_2);
-+                }
-+
-+                if (cur_cache_index == reserved_nodes) {
-+                  // Should never happen with pre-allocated internodes (we should have enough reserved nodes). bad flow is not handled
-+                  ti.set_last_error(MT_MERR_MAKE_SPLIT_INTERNODE_ALLOC_EMPTY_PRE_ALLOC_NOT_EXPECTED_2);
-+                }
-+
-                 next_child->assign_version(*p);
-                 next_child->mark_nonroot();
-                 kp = p->split_into(next_child, kp, xikey[sense],
--                                   child, xikey[sense ^ 1], split_type);
-+                                   child, xikey[sense ^ 1], split_type); // No memory allocation
-             }
-             if (kp >= 0) {
-                 p->shift_up(kp + 1, kp, p->size() - kp);
-@@ -259,16 +345,27 @@ bool tcursor<P>::make_split(threadinfo& ti)
-             int width = perml.size();
-             perml.set_size(width - nr->size());
-             // removed item, if any, must be @ perml.size()
-+            int perm_size = perml.size();
-+            masstree_invariant(perm_size > 0); // Verify that the leaf is not empty
-             if (width != nl->width) {
--                perml.exchange(perml.size(), nl->width - 1);
-+                perml.exchange(perm_size, nl->width - 1);
-             }
-             nl->mark_split();
-             nl->permutation_ = perml.value();
-             // account for split
-             if (split_type == 0) {
-                 kx_.p = perml.back();
--                nl->assign(kx_.p, ka_, ti);
-+
-+                // In case the new inserted key should be placed in the origianl leaf (left leaf), memory allocation might be needed for it's ksuffix.
-+                //  If assign fails (--> memory allocation failure), the flow will continue, but we mark rc as false to indicate that the insertion failed.
-+                //  In this case, the key wont be exposed in finish_insert(), but the leaf split will be completed successfully.
-+                if (!nl->assign(kx_.p, ka_, ti)) {
-+                  ti.set_last_error(MT_MERR_MAKE_SPLIT_ASSIGN_SUFFIX);
-+                  rc = false;
-+                }
-+#ifndef MOT_OBSOLETE_CODE
-                 new_nodes_.emplace_back(nr, nr->full_unlocked_version_value());
-+#endif
-             } else {
-                 kx_.i = kx_.p = kx_.i - perml.size();
-                 n_ = nr;
-@@ -296,7 +393,10 @@ bool tcursor<P>::make_split(threadinfo& ti)
-         }
-     }
- 
--    return false;
-+    // Free unused pre-allocated internodes
-+    release_internodes(preallocated_internodes, cur_cache_index, reserved_nodes, ti);
-+
-+    return rc;
- }
- 
- } // namespace Masstree
-diff --git a/masstree_struct.hh b/masstree_struct.hh
-index 8f121a9..1b5d853 100644
---- a/masstree_struct.hh
-+++ b/masstree_struct.hh
-@@ -120,9 +120,15 @@ class internode : public node_base<P> {
-         : node_base<P>(false), nkeys_(0), height_(height), parent_() {
-     }
- 
--    static internode<P>* make(uint32_t height, threadinfo& ti) {
--        void* ptr = ti.pool_allocate(MAX_MEMTAG_MASSTREE_INTERNODE_ALLOCATION_SIZE,
-+    static internode<P>* make(uint32_t height, threadinfo& ti, void * allocated_internode = nullptr) {
-+        void* ptr = allocated_internode ?
-+                    allocated_internode :
-+                    ti.pool_allocate(MAX_MEMTAG_MASSTREE_INTERNODE_ALLOCATION_SIZE,
-                                      memtag_masstree_internode);
-+        if (!ptr) {
-+            ti.set_last_error(MT_MERR_MAKE_INTERNODE);
-+            return nullptr;
-+        }
-         internode<P>* n = new(ptr) internode<P>(height);
-         assert(n);
-         if (P::debug_level > 0)
-@@ -319,8 +325,12 @@ class leaf : public node_base<P> {
-     }
- 
-     static leaf<P>* make(int ksufsize, phantom_epoch_type phantom_epoch, threadinfo& ti) {
--        size_t sz = iceil(sizeof(leaf<P>) + std::min(ksufsize, 128), 64);
-+        size_t sz = MAX_MEMTAG_MASSTREE_LEAF_ALLOCATION_SIZE; // iceil(sizeof(leaf<P>) + std::min(ksufsize, 128), 64);
-         void* ptr = ti.pool_allocate(sz, memtag_masstree_leaf);
-+        if (!ptr) {
-+            ti.set_last_error(MT_MERR_MAKE_LEAF);
-+            return nullptr;
-+        }
-         leaf<P>* n = new(ptr) leaf<P>(sz, phantom_epoch);
-         assert(n);
-         if (P::debug_level > 0) {
-@@ -330,6 +340,10 @@ class leaf : public node_base<P> {
-     }
-     static leaf<P>* make_root(int ksufsize, leaf<P>* parent, threadinfo& ti) {
-         leaf<P>* n = make(ksufsize, parent ? parent->phantom_epoch() : phantom_epoch_type(), ti);
-+        if (!n) {
-+            ti.set_last_error(MT_MERR_MAKE_ROOT_LEAF);
-+            return nullptr;
-+        }
-         n->next_.ptr = n->prev_ = 0;
-         n->ikey0_[0] = 0; // to avoid undefined behavior
-         n->make_layer_root();
-@@ -413,7 +427,9 @@ class leaf : public node_base<P> {
-     }
-     Str ksuf(int p, int keylenx) const {
-         (void) keylenx;
--        masstree_precondition(keylenx_has_ksuf(keylenx));
-+        // keylenx might not be equal to ksuf_keylenx as this operation might be called without holding leaf's lock
-+        // We allow it, and expect the caller to validate leaf's version and retry.
-+        //masstree_precondition(keylenx_has_ksuf(keylenx));
-         return ksuf_ ? ksuf_->get(p) : iksuf_[0].get(p);
-     }
-     Str ksuf(int p) const {
-@@ -429,7 +445,7 @@ class leaf : public node_base<P> {
-         return s.len == ka.suffix().len
-             && string_slice<uintptr_t>::equals_sloppy(s.s, ka.suffix().s, s.len);
-     }
--    // Returns 1 if match & not layer, 0 if no match, <0 if match and layer
-+    // Returns 1 if match & not layer, 0 if no match, < 0 if match and layer
-     int ksuf_matches(int p, const key_type& ka) const {
-         int keylenx = keylenx_[p];
-         if (keylenx < ksuf_keylenx)
-@@ -520,40 +536,55 @@ class leaf : public node_base<P> {
-         modstate_ = modstate_deleted_layer;
-     }
- 
--    inline void assign(int p, const key_type& ka, threadinfo& ti) {
-+    inline bool assign(int p, const key_type& ka, threadinfo& ti) {
-         lv_[p] = leafvalue_type::make_empty();
-         ikey0_[p] = ka.ikey();
-         if (!ka.has_suffix()) {
-             keylenx_[p] = ka.length();
-         } else {
-             keylenx_[p] = ksuf_keylenx;
--            assign_ksuf(p, ka.suffix(), false, ti);
-+            if (!assign_ksuf(p, ka.suffix(), false, ti)) {
-+                ti.set_last_error(MT_MERR_LEAF_ASSIGN);
-+                return false;
-+            }
-         }
-+
-+        return true;
-     }
--    inline void assign_initialize(int p, const key_type& ka, threadinfo& ti) {
-+    inline bool assign_initialize(int p, const key_type& ka, threadinfo& ti) {
-         lv_[p] = leafvalue_type::make_empty();
-         ikey0_[p] = ka.ikey();
-         if (!ka.has_suffix()) {
-             keylenx_[p] = ka.length();
-         } else {
-             keylenx_[p] = ksuf_keylenx;
--            assign_ksuf(p, ka.suffix(), true, ti);
-+            if (!assign_ksuf(p, ka.suffix(), true, ti)) {
-+                ti.set_last_error(MT_MERR_ASSIGN_INITALIZE_1);
-+                return false;
-+            }
-         }
-+
-+        return true;
-     }
--    inline void assign_initialize(int p, leaf<P>* x, int xp, threadinfo& ti) {
-+    inline bool assign_initialize(int p, leaf<P>* x, int xp, threadinfo& ti) {
-         lv_[p] = x->lv_[xp];
-         ikey0_[p] = x->ikey0_[xp];
-         keylenx_[p] = x->keylenx_[xp];
-         if (x->has_ksuf(xp)) {
--            assign_ksuf(p, x->ksuf(xp), true, ti);
-+            if (!assign_ksuf(p, x->ksuf(xp), true, ti)) {
-+                ti.set_last_error(MT_MERR_ASSIGN_INITALIZE_2);
-+                return false;
-+            }
-         }
-+
-+        return true;
-     }
-     inline void assign_initialize_for_layer(int p, const key_type& ka) {
-         assert(ka.has_suffix());
-         ikey0_[p] = ka.ikey();
-         keylenx_[p] = layer_keylenx;
-     }
--    void assign_ksuf(int p, Str s, bool initializing, threadinfo& ti);
-+    bool assign_ksuf(int p, Str s, bool initializing, threadinfo& ti);
- 
-     inline ikey_type ikey_after_insert(const permuter_type& perm, int i,
-                                        const tcursor<P>* cursor) const;
-@@ -763,14 +794,14 @@ leaf<P>* leaf<P>::advance_to_key(const key_type& ka, nodeversion_type& v,
-     positions [0,p) are ready: keysuffixes in that range are copied. In either
-     case, the key at position p is NOT copied; it is assigned to @a s. */
- template <typename P>
--void leaf<P>::assign_ksuf(int p, Str s, bool initializing, threadinfo& ti) {
-+bool leaf<P>::assign_ksuf(int p, Str s, bool initializing, threadinfo& ti) {
-     if ((ksuf_ && ksuf_->assign(p, s))
-         || (extrasize64_ > 0 && iksuf_[0].assign(p, s)))
-     {
- #if !(defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__x86__))        
- 	fence();
--#endif        
--        return;
-+#endif
-+        return true;
-     }
-     external_ksuf_type* oksuf = ksuf_;
- 
-@@ -796,15 +827,19 @@ void leaf<P>::assign_ksuf(int p, Str s, bool initializing, threadinfo& ti) {
-         sz = std::max(sz, oksuf->capacity());
- 
-     void* ptr = ti.allocate(sz, memtag_masstree_ksuffixes, &sz);
-+    if (!ptr) {
-+        ti.set_last_error(MT_MERR_ASSIGN_KSUF);
-+        return false;
-+    }
-     external_ksuf_type* nksuf = new(ptr) external_ksuf_type(width, sz);
-     for (int i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
-         int mp = initializing ? i : perm[i];
-         if (mp != p && has_ksuf(mp)) {
--            bool ok = nksuf->assign(mp, ksuf(mp));
-+            bool ok = nksuf->assign(mp, ksuf(mp)); // No memory allocation here
-             assert(ok); (void) ok;
-         }
-     }
--    bool ok = nksuf->assign(p, s);
-+    bool ok = nksuf->assign(p, s); // No memory allocation here
-     assert(ok); (void) ok;
-     fence();
- 
-@@ -824,11 +859,12 @@ void leaf<P>::assign_ksuf(int p, Str s, bool initializing, threadinfo& ti) {
-     if (oksuf)
-         ti.deallocate_rcu(oksuf, oksuf->capacity(),
-                           memtag_masstree_ksuffixes);
-+    return true;
- }
- 
- template <typename P>
- inline basic_table<P>::basic_table()
--    : root_(0) {
-+    : root_(nullptr) {
- }
- 
- template <typename P>
-diff --git a/masstree_tcursor.hh b/masstree_tcursor.hh
-index 2442c9f..755588d 100644
---- a/masstree_tcursor.hh
-+++ b/masstree_tcursor.hh
-@@ -106,22 +106,23 @@ class tcursor {
-     static constexpr int new_nodes_size = 1; // unless we make a new trie newnodes will have at most 1 item
-     typedef small_vector<std::pair<leaf_type*, nodeversion_value_type>, new_nodes_size> new_nodes_type;
- 
-+#ifndef MOT_OBSOLETE_CODE
-     tcursor(basic_table<P>& table, Str str)
-         : ka_(str), root_(table.fix_root()) {
-     }
-     tcursor(basic_table<P>& table, const char* s, int len)
-         : ka_(s, len), root_(table.fix_root()) {
-     }
--    tcursor(basic_table<P>& table, const unsigned char* s, int len)
--        : ka_(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(s), len), root_(table.fix_root()) {
--    }
--    tcursor(node_base<P>* root, const char* s, int len)
--        : ka_(s, len), root_(root) {
--    }
-     tcursor(node_base<P>* root, const unsigned char* s, int len)
-         : ka_(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(s), len), root_(root) {
-     }
--
-+#endif
-+    tcursor(basic_table<P>& table, const unsigned char* s, int len)
-+        : ka_(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(s), len), root_(table.fix_root()), root_ref_(table.root_ref()) {
-+    }
-+    tcursor(node_base<P>** root_ref, const char* s, int len)
-+        : ka_(s, len), root_(*root_ref), root_ref_(root_ref) {
-+    }
-     inline bool has_value() const {
-         return kx_.p >= 0;
-     }
-@@ -148,13 +149,13 @@ class tcursor {
-     inline nodeversion_value_type updated_version_value() const {
-         return updated_v_;
-     }
--
-+#ifndef MOT_OBSOLETE_CODE
-     inline const new_nodes_type &new_nodes() const {
-         return new_nodes_;
-     }
--
-+#endif
-     inline bool find_locked(threadinfo& ti);
--    inline bool find_insert(threadinfo& ti);
-+    inline bool find_insert(threadinfo& ti, bool & found);
- 
-     inline void finish(int answer, threadinfo& ti);
- 
-@@ -166,13 +167,16 @@ class tcursor {
-     key_type ka_;
-     key_indexed_position kx_;
-     node_base<P>* root_;
-+    node_base<P>** root_ref_;
-     int state_;
- 
--    leaf_type* original_n_;
-+    leaf_type* original_n_ = nullptr;
-     nodeversion_value_type original_v_;
-     nodeversion_value_type updated_v_;
--    new_nodes_type new_nodes_;
- 
-+#ifndef MOT_OBSOLETE_CODE
-+    new_nodes_type new_nodes_;
-+#endif
-     inline node_type* reset_retry() {
-         ka_.unshift_all();
-         return root_;
-@@ -180,6 +184,7 @@ class tcursor {
- 
-     bool make_new_layer(threadinfo& ti);
-     bool make_split(threadinfo& ti);
-+    void release_internodes(internode_type * internodes_array[], int start, int end, threadinfo& ti);
-     friend class leaf<P>;
-     inline void finish_insert();
-     inline bool finish_remove(threadinfo& ti);
-@@ -191,7 +196,7 @@ class tcursor {
-      *   If removing a leaf in layer 0, @a prefix is empty.
-      *   If removing, for example, the node containing key "01234567ABCDEF" in the layer-1 tree
-      *   rooted at "01234567", then @a prefix should equal "01234567". */
--    static bool remove_leaf(leaf_type* leaf, node_type* root,
-+    static bool remove_leaf(leaf_type* leaf, node_type** root_ref,
-                             Str prefix, threadinfo& ti);
- 
-     bool gc_layer(threadinfo& ti);
-diff --git a/mot_masstree_config.hpp b/mot_masstree_config.hpp
-index bec2ec8..fe3930b 100644
---- a/mot_masstree_config.hpp
-+++ b/mot_masstree_config.hpp
-@@ -25,6 +25,9 @@
- #ifndef MOT_MASSTREE_CONFIG_HPP
- #define MOT_MASSTREE_CONFIG_HPP
- 
-+// Ignore masstree code which is obsolete in MOT
-+#define MOT_OBSOLETE_CODE 1
-+
- #define MOT_HAVE_CXX_TEMPLATE_ALIAS 1
- #define MOT_HAVE_INT64_T_IS_LONG 1
- #define MOT_HAVE_SIZE_T_IS_UNSIGNED_LONG 1
-@@ -58,7 +61,7 @@
- #define MOT_SIZEOF_LONG_LONG 8
- #define MOT_SIZEOF_SHORT 2
- #define MOT_WORDS_BIGENDIAN_SET 1
--
-+/*
- #define masstree_invariant(x, ...) \
-     do {                           \
-     } while (0)
-@@ -66,6 +69,12 @@
- #define masstree_precondition(x, ...) \
-     do {                              \
-     } while (0)
-+*/
-+
-+#define masstree_invariant(x, ...) assert(x)
-+#define masstree_precondition(x, ...) assert(x)
-+
-+
- 
- #ifndef invariant
- #define invariant masstree_invariant
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-

dependency/masstree/0003-masstree_code_cleanup.patch

@@ -1,449 +0,0 @@
-From 62fcebd4a8ac1a60acbf1f227a57be5b8d981c8e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Vinoth Veeraraghavan <vinoth.veeraraghavan@hotmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 14 Jul 2022 18:55:08 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] Clean masstree code
-
-More detail: Clean masstree code
----
- kvthread.hh              |  27 +++--
- masstree.hh              |  15 +--
- masstree_config.h        | 118 +++++++++++----------
- masstree_insert.hh       |   4 +-
- masstree_split.hh        |   2 +-
- masstree_tcursor.hh      |   6 +-
- mot_masstree_config.hpp  |  99 -----------------
- 7 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 188 deletions(-)
- delete mode 100644 mot_masstree_config.hpp
-
-diff --git a/kvthread.hh b/kvthread.hh
-index 364cd44..01d6919 100644
---- a/kvthread.hh
-+++ b/kvthread.hh
-@@ -69,11 +69,6 @@ enum {
- 
- class threadinfo;
- class loginfo;
--namespace MOT
--{
--    class MasstreePrimaryIndex;
--    class GcManager;
--};
- 
- extern __thread threadinfo * mtSessionThreadInfo;
- 
-@@ -284,7 +279,7 @@ class alignas(64) threadinfo {
-         void* p = NULL;
-         int nl = (sz + memdebug_size + CACHE_LINE_SIZE - 1) / CACHE_LINE_SIZE;
-         if (use_pool()) {
--            masstree_invariant(false); // mot code should not reach here
-+            masstree_invariant(false); // internal memory pool is currently disabled
-             assert(nl <= pool_max_nlines);
-             if (unlikely(!pool_[nl - 1]))
-                 refill_pool(nl);
-@@ -308,10 +303,11 @@ class alignas(64) threadinfo {
-         assert(p && nl <= pool_max_nlines);
-         p = memdebug::check_free(p, sz, memtag(tag + nl));
-         if (use_pool()) {
-+            masstree_invariant(false); // internal memory pool is currently disabled
-             *reinterpret_cast<void **>(p) = pool_[nl - 1];
-             pool_[nl - 1] = p;
-         } else
--            deallocate(p, sz, tag); // mot memory deallocation
-+            deallocate(p, sz, tag); // external memory pool deallocation
-         mark(threadcounter(tc_alloc + (tag > memtag_value)),
-              -nl * CACHE_LINE_SIZE);
-     }
-@@ -380,15 +376,16 @@ class alignas(64) threadinfo {
-     void set_rcu_free_count(int rcu_count) { rcu_free_count = rcu_count; }
-     int get_rcu_free_count() { return rcu_free_count; }
- 
--    void set_gc_session(MOT::GcManager* gc_session);
--    MOT::GcManager * get_gc_session();
-+    void set_gc_session(void * gc_session);
-+    void * get_gc_session();
- 
-     inline uint32_t get_occupied_elements() { return total_limbo_inuse_elements; }
- 
--    void set_working_index (MOT::MasstreePrimaryIndex * index) { cur_working_index = (MOT::MasstreePrimaryIndex *)index; }
--    MOT::MasstreePrimaryIndex * get_working_index () { return cur_working_index; }
-+    void set_working_index (void * index) { cur_working_index = index; }
-+    void * get_working_index () { return cur_working_index; }
- 
--    // This function is now used to defer between Masstree internal pools (use_pool == true) vs MOT pools\slab allocators (use_pool == false)
-+    // This function is now used to defer between Masstree internal memory pool (use_pool == true) vs external memory pool (use_pool == false)
-+    // Masstree internal memory pool is currently disabled
-     static bool use_pool() {
- #if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS
-         return !no_pool_value;
-@@ -403,7 +400,7 @@ class alignas(64) threadinfo {
-     }
- 
-   private:
--    MOT::MasstreePrimaryIndex * cur_working_index;
-+    void * cur_working_index;
-     int last_error = MT_MERR_OK;
-     std::vector<struct rcu_entry> dealloc_rcu;
-     union {
-@@ -427,7 +424,7 @@ class alignas(64) threadinfo {
-     int rcu_free_count;
-     mt_limbo_group* limbo_head_;
-     mt_limbo_group* limbo_tail_;
--    MOT::GcManager* gc_session_;
-+    void * gc_session_;
-     uint32_t total_limbo_inuse_elements;
- 
-     mutable kvtimestamp_t ts_;
-@@ -458,7 +455,7 @@ class alignas(64) threadinfo {
- 
-     void record_rcu(void* ptr, int size, memtag tag) {
-       if (unlikely(use_pool())) {
--        masstree_invariant(false); // mot code should not reach here
-+        masstree_invariant(false); // internal memory pool is currently disabled
-         if (limbo_tail_->tail_ + 2 > limbo_tail_->capacity)
-           refill_rcu();
-         uint64_t epoch = ng_getGlobalEpoch();
-diff --git a/masstree.hh b/masstree.hh
-index 89af0ee..955a5bc 100644
---- a/masstree.hh
-+++ b/masstree.hh
-@@ -20,12 +20,6 @@
- #include "ksearch.hh"
- #include "kvthread.hh"
- 
--namespace MOT {
--class Key;
--}
--
--using namespace MOT;
--
- namespace Masstree {
- using lcdf::Str;
- using lcdf::String;
-@@ -62,8 +56,7 @@ template <typename P> class basic_table;
- template <typename P> class unlocked_tcursor;
- template <typename P> class tcursor;
- 
--template<bool CONST_ITERATOR, bool FORWARD, typename P>
--class MasstreeIterator;
-+template <bool CONST_ITERATOR, bool FORWARD, typename P> class MasstreeIterator;
- 
- template <typename P>
- class basic_table {
-@@ -78,12 +71,12 @@ class basic_table {
-     typedef MasstreeIterator<false, true, P> ForwardIterator;
-     typedef MasstreeIterator<false, false, P> ReverseIterator;
- 
--    void find(MOT::Key const* const& key, void*& output, bool& result, const uint32_t& pid) const;
-+    void find(const uint8_t* key, const uint32_t key_len, void*& output, bool& result, const uint32_t& pid) const;
- 
--    void iteratorScan(const char * keybuf, uint32_t keylen, const bool& matchKey, Iterator* const& it, const bool& forwardDirection,
-+    void iteratorScan(const char * keybuf, uint32_t keylen, const bool& matchKey, void* const& it, const bool& forwardDirection,
-                       bool& result, const uint32_t& pid);
- 
--    void *insert(MOT::Key const* const& key, void* const& entry, bool& result, const uint32_t& pid);
-+    void *insert(const uint8_t* key, const uint32_t key_len, void* const& entry, bool& result, const uint32_t& pid);
-     void *remove(uint8_t const *const &key, uint32_t length, bool &result, const uint32_t &pid);
-     bool init(const uint16_t keyLength, const std::string& name, destroy_value_cb_func destroyValue_CB = NULL);
-     int getMemtagMaxSize(enum memtag tag);
-diff --git a/masstree_config.h b/masstree_config.h
-index ecfaf2b..d5a3a17 100644
---- a/masstree_config.h
-+++ b/masstree_config.h
-@@ -1,62 +1,66 @@
--/*
-- * Copyright (c) 2020 Huawei Technologies Co.,Ltd.
-- *
-- * openGauss is licensed under Mulan PSL v2.
-- * You can use this software according to the terms and conditions of the Mulan PSL v2.
-- * You may obtain a copy of Mulan PSL v2 at:
-- *
-- *          http://license.coscl.org.cn/MulanPSL2
-- *
-- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND,
-- * EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO NON-INFRINGEMENT,
-- * MERCHANTABILITY OR FIT FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
-- * See the Mulan PSL v2 for more details.
-- * -------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- *
-- * config.h
-- *    Masstree index configurations template.
-- *
-- * IDENTIFICATION
-- *    src/gausskernel/storage/mot/core/src/storage/index/masstree/config.h
-- *
-- * -------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- */
--
--#include "mot_masstree_config.hpp"
--
- #ifndef MASSTREE_CONFIG_H
- #define MASSTREE_CONFIG_H
- 
--#define HAVE_CXX_TEMPLATE_ALIAS MOT_HAVE_CXX_TEMPLATE_ALIAS
--#define HAVE_INT64_T_IS_LONG MOT_HAVE_INT64_T_IS_LONG
--#define HAVE_SIZE_T_IS_UNSIGNED_LONG MOT_HAVE_SIZE_T_IS_UNSIGNED_LONG
--#define HAVE_STD_HASH MOT_HAVE_STD_HASH
--#define HAVE_STD_IS_TRIVIALLY_COPYABLE MOT_HAVE_STD_IS_TRIVIALLY_COPYABLE
--#define HAVE_STD_IS_TRIVIALLY_DESTRUCTIBLE MOT_HAVE_STD_IS_TRIVIALLY_DESTRUCTIBLE
--#define HAVE_SUPERPAGE MOT_HAVE_SUPERPAGE
--#define HAVE_TYPE_TRAITS MOT_HAVE_TYPE_TRAITS
--#define HAVE_UNALIGNED_ACCESS MOT_HAVE_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
--#define HAVE___BUILTIN_CLZ MOT_HAVE___BUILTIN_CLZ
--#define HAVE___BUILTIN_CLZL MOT_HAVE___BUILTIN_CLZL
--#define HAVE___BUILTIN_CLZLL MOT_HAVE___BUILTIN_CLZLL
--#define HAVE___BUILTIN_CTZ MOT_HAVE___BUILTIN_CTZ
--#define HAVE___BUILTIN_CTZL MOT_HAVE___BUILTIN_CTZL
--#define HAVE___BUILTIN_CTZLL MOT_HAVE___BUILTIN_CTZLL
--#define HAVE___HAS_TRIVIAL_COPY MOT_HAVE___HAS_TRIVIAL_COPY
--#define HAVE___HAS_TRIVIAL_DESTRUCTOR MOT_HAVE___HAS_TRIVIAL_DESTRUCTOR
--#define HAVE___SYNC_BOOL_COMPARE_AND_SWAP MOT_HAVE___SYNC_BOOL_COMPARE_AND_SWAP
--#define HAVE___SYNC_BOOL_COMPARE_AND_SWAP_8 MOT_HAVE___SYNC_BOOL_COMPARE_AND_SWAP_8
--#define HAVE___SYNC_FETCH_AND_ADD MOT_HAVE___SYNC_FETCH_AND_ADD
--#define HAVE___SYNC_FETCH_AND_ADD_8 MOT_HAVE___SYNC_FETCH_AND_ADD_8
--#define HAVE___SYNC_FETCH_AND_OR MOT_HAVE___SYNC_FETCH_AND_OR
--#define HAVE___SYNC_FETCH_AND_OR_8 MOT_HAVE___SYNC_FETCH_AND_OR_8
--#define HAVE___SYNC_VAL_COMPARE_AND_SWAP MOT_HAVE___SYNC_VAL_COMPARE_AND_SWAP
--#define HAVE___SYNC_VAL_COMPARE_AND_SWAP_8 MOT_HAVE___SYNC_VAL_COMPARE_AND_SWAP_8
--#define MASSTREE_MAXKEYLEN MOT_MASSTREE_MAXKEYLEN
--#define SIZEOF_INT MOT_SIZEOF_INT
--#define SIZEOF_LONG MOT_SIZEOF_LONG
--#define SIZEOF_LONG_LONG MOT_SIZEOF_LONG_LONG
--#define SIZEOF_SHORT MOT_SIZEOF_SHORT
--#define WORDS_BIGENDIAN_SET MOT_WORDS_BIGENDIAN_SET
-+#define HAVE_CXX_TEMPLATE_ALIAS 1
-+#define HAVE_INT64_T_IS_LONG 1
-+#define HAVE_SIZE_T_IS_UNSIGNED_LONG 1
-+#define HAVE_STD_HASH 1
-+#define HAVE_STD_IS_TRIVIALLY_COPYABLE 1
-+#define HAVE_STD_IS_TRIVIALLY_DESTRUCTIBLE 1
-+#define HAVE_SUPERPAGE 1
-+#define HAVE_TYPE_TRAITS 1
-+#define HAVE_UNALIGNED_ACCESS 0
-+#define HAVE___BUILTIN_CLZ 1
-+#define HAVE___BUILTIN_CLZL 1
-+#define HAVE___BUILTIN_CLZLL 1
-+#define HAVE___BUILTIN_CTZ 1
-+#define HAVE___BUILTIN_CTZL 1
-+#define HAVE___BUILTIN_CTZLL 1
-+#define HAVE___HAS_TRIVIAL_COPY 1
-+#define HAVE___HAS_TRIVIAL_DESTRUCTOR 1
-+#define HAVE___SYNC_BOOL_COMPARE_AND_SWAP 1
-+#define HAVE___SYNC_BOOL_COMPARE_AND_SWAP_8 1
-+#define HAVE___SYNC_FETCH_AND_ADD 1
-+#define HAVE___SYNC_FETCH_AND_ADD_8 1
-+#define HAVE___SYNC_FETCH_AND_OR 1
-+#define HAVE___SYNC_FETCH_AND_OR_8 1
-+#define HAVE___SYNC_VAL_COMPARE_AND_SWAP 1
-+#define HAVE___SYNC_VAL_COMPARE_AND_SWAP_8 1
-+
-+/* Maximum key length */
-+#define MASSTREE_MAXKEYLEN 256U
-+
-+#define SIZEOF_INT 4
-+#define SIZEOF_LONG 8
-+#define SIZEOF_LONG_LONG 8
-+#define SIZEOF_SHORT 2
-+#define WORDS_BIGENDIAN_SET 1
-+
-+#define MASSTREE_OBSOLETE_CODE 1
- 
-+#define masstree_invariant(x, ...) assert(x)
-+#define masstree_precondition(x, ...) assert(x)
-+
-+
-+
-+#ifndef invariant
-+#define invariant masstree_invariant
-+#endif
-+#ifndef precondition
-+#define precondition masstree_precondition
- #endif
-+
-+#ifndef CACHE_LINE_SIZE
-+#define CACHE_LINE_SIZE 64
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef PRIu64
-+#if HAVE_SIZE_T_IS_UNSIGNED_LONG_LONG
-+#define PRIu64 "llu"
-+#else
-+#define PRIu64 "lu"
-+#endif
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+#endif  // MASSTREE_CONFIG_H
-diff --git a/masstree_insert.hh b/masstree_insert.hh
-index e641f03..9f21bca 100644
---- a/masstree_insert.hh
-+++ b/masstree_insert.hh
-@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ bool tcursor<P>::make_new_layer(threadinfo& ti) {
-             twig_head = nl;
-         nl->permutation_ = permuter_type::make_sorted(1);
-         twig_tail = nl;
--#ifndef MOT_OBSOLETE_CODE
-+#ifndef MASSTREE_OBSOLETE_CODE
-         new_nodes_.emplace_back(nl, nl->full_unlocked_version_value());
- #endif
-         oka.shift();
-@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ inline void tcursor<P>::finish(int state, threadinfo& ti)
-     // we finally know this!
-     if (n_ == original_n_)
-         updated_v_ = n_->full_unlocked_version_value();
--#ifndef MOT_OBSOLETE_CODE
-+#ifndef MASSTREE_OBSOLETE_CODE
-     else
-         new_nodes_.emplace_back(n_, n_->full_unlocked_version_value());
- #endif
-diff --git a/masstree_split.hh b/masstree_split.hh
-index 42b012b..2d53de6 100644
---- a/masstree_split.hh
-+++ b/masstree_split.hh
-@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ bool tcursor<P>::make_split(threadinfo& ti)
-                   ti.set_last_error(MT_MERR_MAKE_SPLIT_ASSIGN_SUFFIX);
-                   rc = false;
-                 }
--#ifndef MOT_OBSOLETE_CODE
-+#ifndef MASSTREE_OBSOLETE_CODE
-                 new_nodes_.emplace_back(nr, nr->full_unlocked_version_value());
- #endif
-             } else {
-diff --git a/masstree_tcursor.hh b/masstree_tcursor.hh
-index 755588d..73231b8 100644
---- a/masstree_tcursor.hh
-+++ b/masstree_tcursor.hh
-@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ class tcursor {
-     static constexpr int new_nodes_size = 1; // unless we make a new trie newnodes will have at most 1 item
-     typedef small_vector<std::pair<leaf_type*, nodeversion_value_type>, new_nodes_size> new_nodes_type;
- 
--#ifndef MOT_OBSOLETE_CODE
-+#ifndef MASSTREE_OBSOLETE_CODE
-     tcursor(basic_table<P>& table, Str str)
-         : ka_(str), root_(table.fix_root()) {
-     }
-@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ class tcursor {
-     inline nodeversion_value_type updated_version_value() const {
-         return updated_v_;
-     }
--#ifndef MOT_OBSOLETE_CODE
-+#ifndef MASSTREE_OBSOLETE_CODE
-     inline const new_nodes_type &new_nodes() const {
-         return new_nodes_;
-     }
-@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ class tcursor {
-     nodeversion_value_type original_v_;
-     nodeversion_value_type updated_v_;
- 
--#ifndef MOT_OBSOLETE_CODE
-+#ifndef MASSTREE_OBSOLETE_CODE
-     new_nodes_type new_nodes_;
- #endif
-     inline node_type* reset_retry() {
-diff --git a/mot_masstree_config.hpp b/mot_masstree_config.hpp
-deleted file mode 100644
-index fe3930b..0000000
---- a/mot_masstree_config.hpp
-+++ /dev/null
-@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
--/*
-- * Copyright (c) 2020 Huawei Technologies Co.,Ltd.
-- *
-- * openGauss is licensed under Mulan PSL v2.
-- * You can use this software according to the terms and conditions of the Mulan PSL v2.
-- * You may obtain a copy of Mulan PSL v2 at:
-- *
-- *          http://license.coscl.org.cn/MulanPSL2
-- *
-- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND,
-- * EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO NON-INFRINGEMENT,
-- * MERCHANTABILITY OR FIT FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
-- * See the Mulan PSL v2 for more details.
-- * -------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- *
-- * mot_masstree_config.hpp
-- *    MOT configurations for Masstree index.
-- *
-- * IDENTIFICATION
-- *    src/gausskernel/storage/mot/core/src/storage/index/masstree/mot_masstree_config.hpp
-- *
-- * -------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- */
--
--#ifndef MOT_MASSTREE_CONFIG_HPP
--#define MOT_MASSTREE_CONFIG_HPP
--
--// Ignore masstree code which is obsolete in MOT
--#define MOT_OBSOLETE_CODE 1
--
--#define MOT_HAVE_CXX_TEMPLATE_ALIAS 1
--#define MOT_HAVE_INT64_T_IS_LONG 1
--#define MOT_HAVE_SIZE_T_IS_UNSIGNED_LONG 1
--#define MOT_HAVE_STD_HASH 1
--#define MOT_HAVE_STD_IS_TRIVIALLY_COPYABLE 1
--#define MOT_HAVE_STD_IS_TRIVIALLY_DESTRUCTIBLE 1
--#define MOT_HAVE_SUPERPAGE 1
--#define MOT_HAVE_TYPE_TRAITS 1
--#define MOT_HAVE_UNALIGNED_ACCESS 0
--#define MOT_HAVE___BUILTIN_CLZ 1
--#define MOT_HAVE___BUILTIN_CLZL 1
--#define MOT_HAVE___BUILTIN_CLZLL 1
--#define MOT_HAVE___BUILTIN_CTZ 1
--#define MOT_HAVE___BUILTIN_CTZL 1
--#define MOT_HAVE___BUILTIN_CTZLL 1
--#define MOT_HAVE___HAS_TRIVIAL_COPY 1
--#define MOT_HAVE___HAS_TRIVIAL_DESTRUCTOR 1
--#define MOT_HAVE___SYNC_BOOL_COMPARE_AND_SWAP 1
--#define MOT_HAVE___SYNC_BOOL_COMPARE_AND_SWAP_8 1
--#define MOT_HAVE___SYNC_FETCH_AND_ADD 1
--#define MOT_HAVE___SYNC_FETCH_AND_ADD_8 1
--#define MOT_HAVE___SYNC_FETCH_AND_OR 1
--#define MOT_HAVE___SYNC_FETCH_AND_OR_8 1
--#define MOT_HAVE___SYNC_VAL_COMPARE_AND_SWAP 1
--#define MOT_HAVE___SYNC_VAL_COMPARE_AND_SWAP_8 1
--
--/* Maximum key length */
--#define MOT_MASSTREE_MAXKEYLEN MAX_KEY_SIZE
--#define MOT_SIZEOF_INT 4
--#define MOT_SIZEOF_LONG 8
--#define MOT_SIZEOF_LONG_LONG 8
--#define MOT_SIZEOF_SHORT 2
--#define MOT_WORDS_BIGENDIAN_SET 1
--/*
--#define masstree_invariant(x, ...) \
--    do {                           \
--    } while (0)
--
--#define masstree_precondition(x, ...) \
--    do {                              \
--    } while (0)
--*/
--
--#define masstree_invariant(x, ...) assert(x)
--#define masstree_precondition(x, ...) assert(x)
--
--
--
--#ifndef invariant
--#define invariant masstree_invariant
--#endif
--#ifndef precondition
--#define precondition masstree_precondition
--#endif
--
--#ifndef CACHE_LINE_SIZE
--#define CACHE_LINE_SIZE 64
--#endif
--
--#ifndef PRIu64
--#if HAVE_SIZE_T_IS_UNSIGNED_LONG_LONG
--#define PRIu64 "llu"
--#else
--#define PRIu64 "lu"
--#endif
--#endif
--
--
--#endif  // MOT_MASSTREE_CONFIG_HPP
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-

dependency/masstree/0004-masstree_reserved_nodes_fix.patch

@@ -1,153 +0,0 @@
-From a702402ec8849b6787bc4da51b785d1dbb0556b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Vinoth Veeraraghavan <vinoth.veeraraghavan@hotmail.com>
-Date: Wed, 4 Jan 2023 10:14:23 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] Optimization in split flow
-
----
- kvthread.hh       |  6 ++++--
- masstree_split.hh | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
- 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/kvthread.hh b/kvthread.hh
-index 01d6919..63df4c4 100644
---- a/kvthread.hh
-+++ b/kvthread.hh
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
- 
- enum {
-     MT_MERR_OK = 0,
-+    // Errors that will cause operation failure. bad flows are handled
-     MT_MERR_MAKE_SPLIT_PRE_ALLOC = 1,
-     MT_MERR_MAKE_SPLIT_LEAF_ALLOC = 2,
-     MT_MERR_MAKE_NEW_LAYER_LEAF_ALLOC_1 = 3,
-@@ -43,6 +44,8 @@ enum {
- 
-     // Errors that are being handled internally (Operation should succeed even if last error contains them)
-     MT_MERR_NON_DISRUPTIVE_ERRORS = 15,
-+    MT_MERR_MAKE_INTERNODE_USE_RESERVED = 16,
-+    MT_MERR_MAKE_INTERNODE_USE_RESERVED_2 = 17,
- 
-     // We should not reach the following errors as they should be covered with other errors in more upper layer
-     MT_MERR_NOT_RETURNED_TO_USER_ERRORS = 20,
-@@ -59,7 +62,6 @@ enum {
-     MT_MERR_MAKE_SPLIT_INTERNODE_ALLOC_NOT_EXPECTED,
-     MT_MERR_MAKE_SPLIT_INTERNODE_ALLOC_NOT_EXPECTED_2,
-     MT_MERR_MAKE_SPLIT_INTERNODE_ALLOC_EMPTY_PRE_ALLOC_NOT_EXPECTED,
--    MT_MERR_MAKE_SPLIT_INTERNODE_ALLOC_EMPTY_PRE_ALLOC_NOT_EXPECTED_2,
- 
-     MT_MERR_NOT_IN_USE_LAST_ENTRY = 40
- };
-@@ -84,7 +86,7 @@ extern volatile mrcu_epoch_type active_epoch;
- #define MAX_MEMTAG_MASSTREE_LIMBO_GROUP_ALLOCATION_SIZE sizeof(mt_limbo_group)
- 
- // Upper bound for the ksuffixes structure max size.
--#define MAX_MEMTAG_MASSTREE_KSUFFIXES_ALLOCATION_SIZE(width) iceil_log2(leaf<P>::external_ksuf_type::safe_size(width, MAX_KEY_SIZE * width)); 
-+#define MAX_MEMTAG_MASSTREE_KSUFFIXES_ALLOCATION_SIZE(width) iceil_log2(leaf<P>::external_ksuf_type::safe_size(width, MASSTREE_MAXKEYLEN * width));
- 
- inline uint64_t ng_getGlobalEpoch() {
-   return globalepoch;
-diff --git a/masstree_split.hh b/masstree_split.hh
-index 2d53de6..a477757 100644
---- a/masstree_split.hh
-+++ b/masstree_split.hh
-@@ -199,7 +199,6 @@ bool tcursor<P>::make_split(threadinfo& ti)
-     // the ikey_bound). But in the latter case, perhaps we can rearrange the
-     // permutation to do an insert instead.
- 
--    //IDAN: LEARN: as we might fail in case the last available slot is 0, why not replace the condition to (n_->size() < n_->width -1) ?
-     if (n_->size() < n_->width) {
-         permuter_type perm(n_->permutation_);
-         perm.exchange(perm.size(), n_->width - 1);
-@@ -217,21 +216,7 @@ bool tcursor<P>::make_split(threadinfo& ti)
- 
-     bool rc = true;
- 
--    // 2 optimizations that can reduce the number of internodes allocations:
--    //   1. In n_ does not have parent, only 1 internode is required (rare case - only on first split)
--    //   2. In case n_'s parent has extra place, and it's height is 1, we dont need internodes at all (common case, but requires early lock of n_'s parent)
--    node_type* l_root = n_;
--
--    while (!l_root->is_root()) {
--        if (n_ != l_root) {
--            l_root->stable_annotated(ti.stable_fence());
--        }
--        l_root = l_root->maybe_parent();
--    }
--
--    // l_root->height_ is the layer real height or higher.
--    uint32_t layer_height = l_root->isleaf() ? 1 : ((internode_type *)l_root)->height_;
--    int reserved_nodes = layer_height + 5; // add 5 extra nodes (extra 5 layers in single b-tree)
-+    int reserved_nodes = 2;
-     internode_type * preallocated_internodes[reserved_nodes + 1] = { 0 };
-     int cur_cache_index = 0;
- 
-@@ -274,27 +259,35 @@ bool tcursor<P>::make_split(threadinfo& ti)
-     while (true) {
-         masstree_invariant(!n->concurrent || (n->locked() && child->locked() && (n->isleaf() || n->splitting())));
-         internode_type *next_child = 0;
--
-         internode_type *p = n->locked_parent(ti);
- 
-+        if (cur_cache_index == reserved_nodes) {
-+            // Should never happen with pre-allocated internodes (we should have enough reserved nodes). bad flow is not handled
-+            ti.set_last_error(MT_MERR_MAKE_SPLIT_INTERNODE_ALLOC_EMPTY_PRE_ALLOC_NOT_EXPECTED);
-+        }
-+
-         int kp = -1;
-         if (n->parent_exists(p)) {
-             kp = internode_type::bound_type::upper(xikey[sense], *p);
-             p->mark_insert();
-         }
- 
--        if (kp < 0 || p->height_ > height + 1) {
-+        // If cur_cache_index == 1, reserved internode was used on last loop due to memory allocation failure.
-+        // In this case, we have only 1 reserved internode left, so stop climbing and add the new internode in the current layer
-+        if (kp < 0 || p->height_ > height + 1 || cur_cache_index == 1) {
-             masstree_invariant(preallocated_internodes[cur_cache_index]);
--            internode_type *nn = internode_type::make(height + 1, ti, preallocated_internodes[cur_cache_index++]);
-+            internode_type *nn = internode_type::make(height + 1, ti, nullptr);
-             if (!nn) {
--              // Should never happen with pre-allocated internodes. bad flow is not handled
--              ti.set_last_error(MT_MERR_MAKE_SPLIT_INTERNODE_ALLOC_NOT_EXPECTED);
-+                ti.set_last_error(MT_MERR_MAKE_INTERNODE_USE_RESERVED);
-+                nn = internode_type::make(height + 1, ti, preallocated_internodes[cur_cache_index++]);
-             }
- 
--            if (cur_cache_index == reserved_nodes) {
--              // Should never happen with pre-allocated internodes (we should have enough reserved nodes). bad flow is not handled
--              ti.set_last_error(MT_MERR_MAKE_SPLIT_INTERNODE_ALLOC_EMPTY_PRE_ALLOC_NOT_EXPECTED);
-+            if (!nn) {
-+                // Should never happen with pre-allocated internodes. bad flow is not handled
-+                ti.set_last_error(MT_MERR_MAKE_SPLIT_INTERNODE_ALLOC_NOT_EXPECTED);
-+                masstree_invariant(false);
-             }
-+
-             nn->child_[0] = n;
-             nn->assign(0, xikey[sense], child);
-             nn->nkeys_ = 1;
-@@ -309,15 +302,16 @@ bool tcursor<P>::make_split(threadinfo& ti)
-         } else {
-             if (p->size() >= p->width) {
-                 masstree_invariant(preallocated_internodes[cur_cache_index]);
--                next_child = internode_type::make(height + 1, ti, preallocated_internodes[cur_cache_index++]);
-+                next_child = internode_type::make(height + 1, ti, nullptr);
-                 if (!next_child) {
--                  // Should never happen with pre-allocated internodes. bad flow is not handled
--                  ti.set_last_error(MT_MERR_MAKE_SPLIT_INTERNODE_ALLOC_NOT_EXPECTED_2);
-+                    ti.set_last_error(MT_MERR_MAKE_INTERNODE_USE_RESERVED_2);
-+                    next_child = internode_type::make(height + 1, ti, preallocated_internodes[cur_cache_index++]);
-                 }
- 
--                if (cur_cache_index == reserved_nodes) {
--                  // Should never happen with pre-allocated internodes (we should have enough reserved nodes). bad flow is not handled
--                  ti.set_last_error(MT_MERR_MAKE_SPLIT_INTERNODE_ALLOC_EMPTY_PRE_ALLOC_NOT_EXPECTED_2);
-+                if (!next_child) {
-+                    // Should never happen with pre-allocated internodes. bad flow is not handled
-+                    ti.set_last_error(MT_MERR_MAKE_SPLIT_INTERNODE_ALLOC_NOT_EXPECTED_2);
-+                    masstree_invariant(false);
-                 }
- 
-                 next_child->assign_version(*p);
--- 
-2.17.1
-

dependency/masstree/build.sh

@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@
 #!/bin/bash
-#  Copyright (c) Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 2010-2018. All rights reserved.
+#  Copyright (c) Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 2010-2023. All rights reserved.
 #  description: the script that make install masstree
 #  date: 2020-12-16
 #  version: 1.0
 #  history:
 #    2020-12-16 first version
+#    2023-08-29 change Masstree base version to v1.0.1 and squash all changes into single patch file
 
 set -e
 # change compress type
 
 CUR_DIR=$(pwd)
 
-MASSTREE_PACKAGE=masstree-beta-0.9.0.tar.gz
-MASSTREE_PATCH=0001-masstree.patch
+MASSTREE_PACKAGE=masstree-beta-1.0.1.tar.gz
 MASSTREE_SOURCES_TMP_DIR=tmp
 LOCAL_DIR=$(dirname "${LOCAL_PATH}")
 MASSTREE_MEGRED_SOURCES_DIR=masstree-beta
@@ -24,10 +24,7 @@ mkdir ${MASSTREE_MEGRED_SOURCES_DIR}
 tar -zxf $MASSTREE_PACKAGE -C $MASSTREE_MEGRED_SOURCES_DIR --strip-components 1
 
 cd $MASSTREE_MEGRED_SOURCES_DIR
-patch -p1 < ../$MASSTREE_PATCH
-patch -p1 < ../0002-masstree_oom_fix.patch
-patch -p1 < ../0003-masstree_code_cleanup.patch
-patch -p1 < ../0004-masstree_reserved_nodes_fix.patch
+patch -p1 < ../0001-Masstree-v1.0.1-MOT.patch
 sed -i "s/LDFLAGS =/LDFLAGS = -fstack-protector-all -z,now/g" Makefile
 sed -i "s/\$(CXX) -shared/\$(CXX) -fstack-protector-all -Wl,-z,relro,-z,now -shared/g" Makefile
 
@@ -41,4 +38,4 @@ mkdir -p ${INSTALL_DIR}/comm/include
 mkdir -p ${INSTALL_DIR}/comm/lib
 cp ${MASSTREE_MEGRED_SOURCES_DIR}/*.h* ${INSTALL_DIR}/comm/include
 cp ${MASSTREE_MEGRED_SOURCES_DIR}/libmasstree.so ${INSTALL_DIR}/comm/lib
-
+rm -rf ${MASSTREE_MEGRED_SOURCES_DIR}

dependency/masstree/readme

@@ -2,4 +2,4 @@
 
 1. Usage
 
-sh build.sh to fetch masstree-beta-0.9.0
+sh build.sh to fetch masstree-beta-1.0.1

dependency/nghttp2/CVE-2024-28182.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+diff -Naur a/doc/Makefile.am b/doc/Makefile.am
+--- a/doc/Makefile.am	2024-04-15 19:33:38.344785283 +0800
++++ b/doc/Makefile.am	2024-04-15 20:15:35.145757969 +0800
+@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
+ 	nghttp2_option_set_no_recv_client_magic.rst \
+ 	nghttp2_option_set_peer_max_concurrent_streams.rst \
+ 	nghttp2_option_set_user_recv_extension_type.rst \
++	nghttp2_option_set_max_continuations.rst \
+ 	nghttp2_option_set_max_outbound_ack.rst \
+ 	nghttp2_option_set_max_settings.rst \
+ 	nghttp2_option_set_stream_reset_rate_limit.rst \
+diff -Naur a/lib/includes/nghttp2/nghttp2.h b/lib/includes/nghttp2/nghttp2.h
+--- a/lib/includes/nghttp2/nghttp2.h	2024-04-15 19:33:38.348785336 +0800
++++ b/lib/includes/nghttp2/nghttp2.h	2024-04-15 20:15:35.149758022 +0800
+@@ -440,7 +440,12 @@
+    * exhaustion on server side to send these frames forever and does
+    * not read network.
+    */
+-  NGHTTP2_ERR_FLOODED = -904
++  NGHTTP2_ERR_FLOODED = -904,
++  /**
++   * When a local endpoint receives too many CONTINUATION frames
++   * following a HEADER frame.
++   */
++  NGHTTP2_ERR_TOO_MANY_CONTINUATIONS = -905,
+ } nghttp2_error;
+ 
+ /**
+@@ -2738,6 +2743,17 @@
+ 
+ /**
+  * @function
++ *
++ * This function sets the maximum number of CONTINUATION frames
++ * following an incoming HEADER frame.  If more than those frames are
++ * received, the remote endpoint is considered to be misbehaving and
++ * session will be closed.  The default value is 8.
++ */
++NGHTTP2_EXTERN void nghttp2_option_set_max_continuations(nghttp2_option *option,
++                                                         size_t val);
++
++/**
++ * @function
+  *
+  * Initializes |*session_ptr| for client use.  The all members of
+  * |callbacks| are copied to |*session_ptr|.  Therefore |*session_ptr|
+diff -Naur a/lib/nghttp2_helper.c b/lib/nghttp2_helper.c
+--- a/lib/nghttp2_helper.c	2024-04-15 19:33:38.352785388 +0800
++++ b/lib/nghttp2_helper.c	2024-04-15 20:15:35.149758022 +0800
+@@ -336,6 +336,8 @@
+            "closed";
+   case NGHTTP2_ERR_TOO_MANY_SETTINGS:
+     return "SETTINGS frame contained more than the maximum allowed entries";
++  case NGHTTP2_ERR_TOO_MANY_CONTINUATIONS:
++    return "Too many CONTINUATION frames following a HEADER frame";
+   default:
+     return "Unknown error code";
+   }
+diff -Naur a/lib/nghttp2_option.c b/lib/nghttp2_option.c
+--- a/lib/nghttp2_option.c	2024-04-15 19:33:38.348785336 +0800
++++ b/lib/nghttp2_option.c	2024-04-15 20:15:35.149758022 +0800
+@@ -133,3 +133,8 @@
+   option->stream_reset_burst = burst;
+   option->stream_reset_rate = rate;
+ }
++
++void nghttp2_option_set_max_continuations(nghttp2_option *option, size_t val) {
++  option->opt_set_mask |= NGHTTP2_OPT_MAX_CONTINUATIONS;
++  option->max_continuations = val;
++}
+diff -Naur a/lib/nghttp2_option.h b/lib/nghttp2_option.h
+--- a/lib/nghttp2_option.h	2024-04-15 19:33:38.352785388 +0800
++++ b/lib/nghttp2_option.h	2024-04-15 20:15:35.153758074 +0800
+@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
+   NGHTTP2_OPT_MAX_OUTBOUND_ACK = 1 << 11,
+   NGHTTP2_OPT_MAX_SETTINGS = 1 << 12,
+   NGHTTP2_OPT_STREAM_RESET_RATE_LIMIT = 1 << 15,
++  NGHTTP2_OPT_MAX_CONTINUATIONS = 1 << 16,
+ } nghttp2_option_flag;
+ 
+ /**
+@@ -97,6 +98,10 @@
+    */
+   size_t max_settings;
+   /**
++   * NGHTTP2_OPT_MAX_CONTINUATIONS
++   */
++  size_t max_continuations;
++  /**
+    * Bitwise OR of nghttp2_option_flag to determine that which fields
+    * are specified.
+    */
+diff -Naur a/lib/nghttp2_session.c b/lib/nghttp2_session.c
+--- a/lib/nghttp2_session.c	2024-04-15 19:33:38.352785388 +0800
++++ b/lib/nghttp2_session.c	2024-04-15 20:15:35.153758074 +0800
+@@ -464,6 +464,7 @@
+   (*session_ptr)->max_send_header_block_length = NGHTTP2_MAX_HEADERSLEN;
+   (*session_ptr)->max_outbound_ack = NGHTTP2_DEFAULT_MAX_OBQ_FLOOD_ITEM;
+   (*session_ptr)->max_settings = NGHTTP2_DEFAULT_MAX_SETTINGS;
++  (*session_ptr)->max_continuations = NGHTTP2_DEFAULT_MAX_CONTINUATIONS;
+ 
+   if (option) {
+     if ((option->opt_set_mask & NGHTTP2_OPT_NO_AUTO_WINDOW_UPDATE) &&
+@@ -538,6 +539,10 @@
+                            option->stream_reset_burst,
+                            option->stream_reset_rate);
+     }
++
++    if (option->opt_set_mask & NGHTTP2_OPT_MAX_CONTINUATIONS) {
++      (*session_ptr)->max_continuations = option->max_continuations;
++    }
+   }
+ 
+   rv = nghttp2_hd_deflate_init2(&(*session_ptr)->hd_deflater,
+@@ -6310,6 +6315,8 @@
+           }
+         }
+         session_inbound_frame_reset(session);
++
++        session->num_continuations = 0;
+       }
+       break;
+     }
+@@ -6430,6 +6437,10 @@
+         fprintf(stderr, "recv: [IB_IGN_CONTINUATION]\n");
+       }
+ #endif /* DEBUGBUILD */
++      
++       if (++session->num_continuations > session->max_continuations) {
++        return NGHTTP2_ERR_TOO_MANY_CONTINUATIONS;
++      }
+ 
+       readlen = inbound_frame_buf_read(iframe, in, last);
+       in += readlen;
+diff -Naur a/lib/nghttp2_session.h b/lib/nghttp2_session.h
+--- a/lib/nghttp2_session.h	2024-04-15 19:33:38.352785388 +0800
++++ b/lib/nghttp2_session.h	2024-04-15 20:15:35.153758074 +0800
+@@ -107,6 +107,10 @@
+ #define NGHTTP2_DEFAULT_STREAM_RESET_BURST 1000
+ #define NGHTTP2_DEFAULT_STREAM_RESET_RATE 33
+ 
++/* The default max number of CONTINUATION frames following an incoming
++   HEADER frame. */
++#define NGHTTP2_DEFAULT_MAX_CONTINUATIONS 8
++
+ /* Internal state when receiving incoming frame */
+ typedef enum {
+   /* Receiving frame header */
+@@ -279,6 +283,12 @@
+   size_t max_send_header_block_length;
+   /* The maximum number of settings accepted per SETTINGS frame. */
+   size_t max_settings;
++  /* The maximum number of CONTINUATION frames following an incoming
++     HEADER frame. */
++  size_t max_continuations;
++  /* The number of CONTINUATION frames following an incoming HEADER
++     frame.  This variable is reset when END_HEADERS flag is seen. */
++  size_t num_continuations;
+   /* Next Stream ID. Made unsigned int to detect >= (1 << 31). */
+   uint32_t next_stream_id;
+   /* The last stream ID this session initiated.  For client session,

dependency/nghttp2/build.sh

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ mkdir -p ${build_dir}
 cd $nghttp2_dir
 patch -p1 < ../cve-2023-35945.patch
 patch -p1 < ../CVE-2023-44487.patch
+patch -p1 < ../CVE-2024-28182.patch
 cmake -DCMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX=$build_dir -D CMAKE_PROJECT_INCLUDE=${current_dir}/project_include.cmake
 
 make install -sj

dependency/openssl/Backport-Add-documents-for-SM2-cert-verification.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+From 400e9ffc906d66318e4f9364494809d5a519c718 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
+Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 17:22:31 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 06/15] Add documents for SM2 cert verification
+
+This follows #8321 which added the SM2 certificate verification feature.
+This commit adds the related docs - the newly added 2 APIs and options
+in apps/verify.
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8465)
+---
+ doc/man1/verify.pod           | 14 ++++++++++++
+ doc/man3/X509_get0_sm2_id.pod | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 57 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 doc/man3/X509_get0_sm2_id.pod
+
+diff --git a/doc/man1/verify.pod b/doc/man1/verify.pod
+index da2b702..a6b6b2b 100644
+--- a/doc/man1/verify.pod
++++ b/doc/man1/verify.pod
+@@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ B<openssl> B<verify>
+ [B<-verify_name name>]
+ [B<-x509_strict>]
+ [B<-show_chain>]
++[B<-sm2-id string>]
++[B<-sm2-hex-id hex-string>]
+ [B<->]
+ [certificates]
+ 
+@@ -319,6 +321,16 @@ Display information about the certificate chain that has been built (if
+ successful). Certificates in the chain that came from the untrusted list will be
+ flagged as "untrusted".
+ 
++=item B<-sm2-id>
++
++Specify the ID string to use when verifying an SM2 certificate. The ID string is
++required by the SM2 signature algorithm for signing and verification.
++
++=item B<-sm2-hex-id>
++
++Specify a binary ID string to use when signing or verifying using an SM2
++certificate. The argument for this option is string of hexadecimal digits.
++
+ =item B<->
+ 
+ Indicates the last option. All arguments following this are assumed to be
+@@ -774,6 +786,8 @@ The B<-show_chain> option was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+ The B<-issuer_checks> option is deprecated as of OpenSSL 1.1.0 and
+ is silently ignored.
+ 
++The B<-sm2-id> and B<-sm2-hex-id> options were added in OpenSSL 3.0.0.
++
+ =head1 COPYRIGHT
+ 
+ Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+diff --git a/doc/man3/X509_get0_sm2_id.pod b/doc/man3/X509_get0_sm2_id.pod
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..84da71e
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/doc/man3/X509_get0_sm2_id.pod
+@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
++=pod
++
++=head1 NAME
++
++X509_get0_sm2_id, X509_set_sm2_id - get or set SM2 ID for certificate operations
++
++=head1 SYNOPSIS
++
++ #include <openssl/x509.h>
++
++ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_sm2_id(X509 *x);
++ void X509_set_sm2_id(X509 *x, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *sm2_id);
++
++=head1 DESCRIPTION
++
++X509_get0_sm2_id() gets the ID value of an SM2 certificate B<x> by returning an
++B<ASN1_OCTET_STRING> object which should not be freed by the caller.
++X509_set_sm2_id() sets the B<sm2_id> value to an SM2 certificate B<x>.
++
++=head1 NOTES
++
++SM2 signature algorithm requires an ID value when generating and verifying a
++signature. The functions described in this manual provide the user with the
++ability to set and retrieve the SM2 ID value.
++
++=head1 RETURN VALUES
++
++X509_set_sm2_id() does not return a value.
++
++=head1 SEE ALSO
++
++L<X509_verify(3)>, L<SM2(7)>
++
++=head1 COPYRIGHT
++
++Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
++
++Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
++this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
++in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
++L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
++
++=cut
+-- 
+2.20.1 (Apple Git-117)
+

dependency/openssl/Backport-Add-test-cases-for-SM2-cert-verification.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+From c08251384c0405c151a90b315b8f333c38c74eb2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
+Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 16:54:11 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 05/15] Add test cases for SM2 cert verification
+
+This follows #8321 which added the SM2 certificate verification feature.
+This commit adds some test cases for #8321.
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8465)
+---
+ test/certs/sm2-ca-cert.pem      | 14 +++++++++++++
+ test/certs/{sm2.crt => sm2.pem} |  0
+ test/recipes/20-test_pkeyutl.t  | 37 +++++++++++++--------------------
+ test/recipes/25-test_verify.t   | 14 ++++++++++++-
+ 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 test/certs/sm2-ca-cert.pem
+ rename test/certs/{sm2.crt => sm2.pem} (100%)
+
+diff --git a/test/certs/sm2-ca-cert.pem b/test/certs/sm2-ca-cert.pem
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..5677ac6
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/certs/sm2-ca-cert.pem
+@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
++-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
++MIICJDCCAcqgAwIBAgIJAOlkpDpSrmVbMAoGCCqBHM9VAYN1MGgxCzAJBgNVBAYT
++AkNOMQswCQYDVQQIDAJMTjERMA8GA1UEBwwIU2hlbnlhbmcxETAPBgNVBAoMCFRl
++c3QgT3JnMRAwDgYDVQQLDAdUZXN0IE9VMRQwEgYDVQQDDAtUZXN0IFNNMiBDQTAe
++Fw0xOTAyMTkwNzA1NDhaFw0yMzAzMzAwNzA1NDhaMGgxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkNOMQsw
++CQYDVQQIDAJMTjERMA8GA1UEBwwIU2hlbnlhbmcxETAPBgNVBAoMCFRlc3QgT3Jn
++MRAwDgYDVQQLDAdUZXN0IE9VMRQwEgYDVQQDDAtUZXN0IFNNMiBDQTBZMBMGByqG
++SM49AgEGCCqBHM9VAYItA0IABHRYnqErofBdXPptvvO7+BSVJxcpHuTGnZ+UPrbU
++5kVEUMaUnNOeMJZl/vRGimZCm/AkReJmRfnb15ESHR+ssp6jXTBbMB0GA1UdDgQW
++BBTFjcWu/zJgSZ5SKUlU5Vx4/0W5dDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBTFjcWu/zJgSZ5SKUlU
++5Vx4/0W5dDAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/MAsGA1UdDwQEAwIBBjAKBggqgRzPVQGDdQNI
++ADBFAiEAs6byi1nSQtFELOw/2tQIv5AEsZFR5MJ/oB2ztXzs2LYCIEfIw4xlUH6X
++YFhs4RnIa0K9Ng1ebsGPrifYkudwBIk3
++-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+diff --git a/test/certs/sm2.crt b/test/certs/sm2.pem
+similarity index 100%
+rename from test/certs/sm2.crt
+rename to test/certs/sm2.pem
+diff --git a/test/recipes/20-test_pkeyutl.t b/test/recipes/20-test_pkeyutl.t
+index 1457530..a36d41e 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/20-test_pkeyutl.t
++++ b/test/recipes/20-test_pkeyutl.t
+@@ -17,32 +17,25 @@ setup("test_pkeyutl");
+ 
+ plan tests => 2;
+ 
+-sub sign
+-{
+-    # Utilize the sm2.crt as the TBS file
+-    return run(app(([ 'openssl', 'pkeyutl', '-sign',
+-                      '-in', srctop_file('test', 'certs', 'sm2.crt'),
+-                      '-inkey', srctop_file('test', 'certs', 'sm2.key'),
+-                      '-out', 'signature.sm2', '-rawin',
+-                      '-digest', 'sm3', '-pkeyopt', 'sm2_id:someid'])));
+-}
+-
+-sub verify
+-{
+-    # Utilize the sm2.crt as the TBS file
+-    return run(app(([ 'openssl', 'pkeyutl', '-verify', '-certin',
+-                      '-in', srctop_file('test', 'certs', 'sm2.crt'),
+-                      '-inkey', srctop_file('test', 'certs', 'sm2.crt'),
+-                      '-sigfile', 'signature.sm2', '-rawin',
+-                      '-digest', 'sm3', '-pkeyopt', 'sm2_id:someid'])));
+-}
++# For the tests below we use the cert itself as the TBS file
+ 
+ SKIP: {
+     skip "Skipping tests that require EC, SM2 or SM3", 2
+         if disabled("ec") || disabled("sm2") || disabled("sm3");
+ 
+-    ok(sign, "Sign a piece of data using SM2");
+-    ok(verify, "Verify an SM2 signature against a piece of data");
++    # SM2
++    ok(run(app(([ 'openssl', 'pkeyutl', '-sign',
++                      '-in', srctop_file('test', 'certs', 'sm2.pem'),
++                      '-inkey', srctop_file('test', 'certs', 'sm2.key'),
++                      '-out', 'signature.dat', '-rawin',
++                      '-digest', 'sm3', '-pkeyopt', 'sm2_id:someid']))),
++                      "Sign a piece of data using SM2");
++    ok(run(app(([ 'openssl', 'pkeyutl', '-verify', '-certin',
++                      '-in', srctop_file('test', 'certs', 'sm2.pem'),
++                      '-inkey', srctop_file('test', 'certs', 'sm2.pem'),
++                      '-sigfile', 'signature.dat', '-rawin',
++                      '-digest', 'sm3', '-pkeyopt', 'sm2_id:someid']))),
++                      "Verify an SM2 signature against a piece of data");
+ }
+ 
+-unlink 'signature.sm2';
++unlink 'signature.dat';
+diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
+index ffa48ed..b340833 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
++++ b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
+@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ sub verify {
+     run(app([@args]));
+ }
+ 
+-plan tests => 146;
++plan tests => 148;
+ 
+ # Canonical success
+ ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"]),
+@@ -409,3 +409,15 @@ SKIP: {
+        "ED25519 signature");
+ 
+ }
++
++SKIP: {
++    skip "SM2 is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 1
++	      if disabled("sm2");
++
++   # Test '-sm2-id' and '-sm2-hex-id'  option
++   ok(verify("sm2", "any", ["sm2-ca-cert"], [], "-sm2-id", "1234567812345678"),
++       "SM2 ID test");
++   ok(verify("sm2", "any", ["sm2-ca-cert"], [], "-sm2-hex-id",
++             "31323334353637383132333435363738"),
++       "SM2 hex ID test");
++}
+-- 
+2.20.1 (Apple Git-117)
+

dependency/openssl/Backport-Fix-a-document-description-in-apps-req.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From 7e64be50900c4aa8cd040c4e3999540883bdeeb6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com>
+Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2019 10:57:23 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 13/15] Fix a document description in apps/req
+
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9958)
+---
+ doc/man1/req.pod | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/doc/man1/req.pod b/doc/man1/req.pod
+index 7b00bad..e117ec6 100644
+--- a/doc/man1/req.pod
++++ b/doc/man1/req.pod
+@@ -348,8 +348,8 @@ string is required by the SM2 signature algorithm for signing and verification.
+ 
+ =item B<-sm2-hex-id>
+ 
+-Specify a binary ID string to use when signing or verifying using an SM2
+-certificate. The argument for this option is string of hexadecimal digits.
++Specify a binary ID string to use when verifying an SM2 certificate request. The
++argument for this option is string of hexadecimal digits.
+ 
+ =back
+ 
+-- 
+2.20.1 (Apple Git-117)
+

dependency/openssl/Backport-Fix-a-double-free-issue-when-signing-SM2-cert.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+From a63238684c1d2e15f417f766f44418a8b52ef383 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com>
+Date: Sat, 21 Sep 2019 00:32:57 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 12/15] Fix a double free issue when signing SM2 cert
+
+If the SM2 ID value has not been passed correctly when signing an SM2
+certificate/certificate request, a double free occurs. For instance:
+
+  openssl req -x509 ... -sm2-id 1234567812345678
+
+The '-sm2-id' should not be used in this scenario, while the '-sigopt' is
+the correct one to use. Documentation has also been updated to make the
+options more clear.
+
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9958)
+---
+ apps/req.c       | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
+ doc/man1/req.pod |  4 ++--
+ 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/apps/req.c b/apps/req.c
+index 96f1edd..95dd0e4 100644
+--- a/apps/req.c
++++ b/apps/req.c
+@@ -1756,15 +1756,19 @@ int do_X509_sign(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md,
+ #endif
+ 
+     rv = do_sign_init(mctx, pkey, md, sigopts);
+-    if (rv > 0)
++    if (rv > 0) {
+         rv = X509_sign_ctx(x, mctx);
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
+-    /* only in SM2 case we need to free the pctx explicitly */
+-    if (ec_pkey_is_sm2(pkey)) {
+-        pctx = EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(mctx);
+-        EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+-    }
++        /*
++         * only in SM2 case we need to free the pctx explicitly
++         * if do_sign_init() fails, pctx is already freed in it
++         */
++        if (ec_pkey_is_sm2(pkey)) {
++            pctx = EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(mctx);
++            EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
++        }
+ #endif
++    }
+     EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
+     return rv > 0 ? 1 : 0;
+ }
+@@ -1779,15 +1783,19 @@ int do_X509_REQ_sign(X509_REQ *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md,
+ #endif
+ 
+     rv = do_sign_init(mctx, pkey, md, sigopts);
+-    if (rv > 0)
++    if (rv > 0) {
+         rv = X509_REQ_sign_ctx(x, mctx);
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
+-    /* only in SM2 case we need to free the pctx explicitly */
+-    if (ec_pkey_is_sm2(pkey)) {
+-        pctx = EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(mctx);
+-        EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+-    }
++        /*
++         * only in SM2 case we need to free the pctx explicitly
++         * if do_sign_init() fails, pctx is already freed in it
++         */
++        if (ec_pkey_is_sm2(pkey)) {
++            pctx = EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(mctx);
++            EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
++        }
+ #endif
++    }
+     EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
+     return rv > 0 ? 1 : 0;
+ }
+@@ -1802,15 +1810,19 @@ int do_X509_CRL_sign(X509_CRL *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md,
+ #endif
+ 
+     rv = do_sign_init(mctx, pkey, md, sigopts);
+-    if (rv > 0)
++    if (rv > 0) {
+         rv = X509_CRL_sign_ctx(x, mctx);
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
+-    /* only in SM2 case we need to free the pctx explicitly */
+-    if (ec_pkey_is_sm2(pkey)) {
+-        pctx = EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(mctx);
+-        EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+-    }
++        /*
++         * only in SM2 case we need to free the pctx explicitly
++         * if do_sign_init() fails, no need to double free pctx
++         */
++        if (ec_pkey_is_sm2(pkey)) {
++            pctx = EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(mctx);
++            EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
++        }
+ #endif
++    }
+     EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
+     return rv > 0 ? 1 : 0;
+ }
+diff --git a/doc/man1/req.pod b/doc/man1/req.pod
+index 3b9fcc3..7b00bad 100644
+--- a/doc/man1/req.pod
++++ b/doc/man1/req.pod
+@@ -343,8 +343,8 @@ for key generation operations.
+ 
+ =item B<-sm2-id>
+ 
+-Specify the ID string to use when verifying an SM2 certificate. The ID string is
+-required by the SM2 signature algorithm for signing and verification.
++Specify the ID string to use when verifying an SM2 certificate request. The ID
++string is required by the SM2 signature algorithm for signing and verification.
+ 
+ =item B<-sm2-hex-id>
+ 
+-- 
+2.20.1 (Apple Git-117)
+

dependency/openssl/Backport-Fix-a-memleak-in-apps-verify.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From 1c243548ef736329b08344ad9191803e5a93ec17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
+Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 18:04:05 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 07/15] Fix a memleak in apps/verify
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8465)
+---
+ apps/verify.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/apps/verify.c b/apps/verify.c
+index 09b31cf..5052d80 100644
+--- a/apps/verify.c
++++ b/apps/verify.c
+@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ int verify_main(int argc, char **argv)
+     OPTION_CHOICE o;
+     unsigned char *sm2_id = NULL;
+     size_t sm2_idlen = 0;
++    int sm2_free = 0;
+ 
+     if ((vpm = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new()) == NULL)
+         goto end;
+@@ -174,6 +175,7 @@ int verify_main(int argc, char **argv)
+             break;
+         case OPT_SM2HEXID:
+             /* try to parse the input as hex string first */
++            sm2_free = 1;
+             sm2_id = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(opt_arg(), (long *)&sm2_idlen);
+             if (sm2_id == NULL) {
+                 BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid hex string input\n");
+@@ -216,6 +218,8 @@ int verify_main(int argc, char **argv)
+     }
+ 
+  end:
++    if (sm2_free)
++        OPENSSL_free(sm2_id);
+     X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
+     X509_STORE_free(store);
+     sk_X509_pop_free(untrusted, X509_free);
+-- 
+2.20.1 (Apple Git-117)
+

dependency/openssl/Backport-Fix-no-ec-no-sm2-and-no-sm3.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+From 380cf570be1ded495141e16ceab7afb7f7c57ab7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2019 13:47:26 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 02/15] Fix no-ec, no-sm2 and no-sm3
+
+Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8372)
+---
+ apps/pkeyutl.c                 | 11 +++++++----
+ test/recipes/20-test_pkeyutl.t |  9 +++++++--
+ 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/apps/pkeyutl.c b/apps/pkeyutl.c
+index bca0464..1d3d57b 100644
+--- a/apps/pkeyutl.c
++++ b/apps/pkeyutl.c
+@@ -473,14 +473,16 @@ static EVP_PKEY_CTX *init_ctx(const char *kdfalg, int *pkeysize,
+         }
+         ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(kdfnid, impl);
+     } else {
+-        EC_KEY *eckey = NULL;
+-        const EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
+-        int nid;
+-
+         if (pkey == NULL)
+             goto end;
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+         /* SM2 needs a special treatment */
+         if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
++            EC_KEY *eckey = NULL;
++            const EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
++            int nid;
++
+             if ((eckey = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)) == NULL
+                     || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL
+                     || (nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)) == 0)
+@@ -488,6 +490,7 @@ static EVP_PKEY_CTX *init_ctx(const char *kdfalg, int *pkeysize,
+             if (nid == NID_sm2)
+                 EVP_PKEY_set_alias_type(pkey, EVP_PKEY_SM2);
+         }
++#endif
+         *pkeysize = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+         ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, impl);
+         if (ppkey != NULL)
+diff --git a/test/recipes/20-test_pkeyutl.t b/test/recipes/20-test_pkeyutl.t
+index a051138..1457530 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/20-test_pkeyutl.t
++++ b/test/recipes/20-test_pkeyutl.t
+@@ -37,7 +37,12 @@ sub verify
+                       '-digest', 'sm3', '-pkeyopt', 'sm2_id:someid'])));
+ }
+ 
+-ok(sign, "Sign a piece of data using SM2");
+-ok(verify, "Verify an SM2 signature against a piece of data");
++SKIP: {
++    skip "Skipping tests that require EC, SM2 or SM3", 2
++        if disabled("ec") || disabled("sm2") || disabled("sm3");
++
++    ok(sign, "Sign a piece of data using SM2");
++    ok(verify, "Verify an SM2 signature against a piece of data");
++}
+ 
+ unlink 'signature.sm2';
+-- 
+2.20.1 (Apple Git-117)
+

dependency/openssl/Backport-Guard-some-SM2-functions-with-OPENSSL_NO_SM2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From 908570d02b683195ddfdc8e8c324638bfaa0d2c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 11:14:38 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 04/15] Guard some SM2 functions with OPENSSL_NO_SM2
+
+Fixes the no-ec build
+
+Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8481)
+---
+ include/openssl/x509.h | 2 ++
+ util/libcrypto.num     | 4 ++--
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/openssl/x509.h b/include/openssl/x509.h
+index 5f17057..5c88251 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/x509.h
++++ b/include/openssl/x509.h
+@@ -573,8 +573,10 @@ void X509_get0_signature(const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig,
+                          const X509_ALGOR **palg, const X509 *x);
+ int X509_get_signature_nid(const X509 *x);
+ 
++# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
+ void X509_set_sm2_id(X509 *x, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *sm2_id);
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_sm2_id(X509 *x);
++# endif
+ 
+ int X509_trusted(const X509 *x);
+ int X509_alias_set1(X509 *x, const unsigned char *name, int len);
+diff --git a/util/libcrypto.num b/util/libcrypto.num
+index 8635ac4..233d1c7 100644
+--- a/util/libcrypto.num
++++ b/util/libcrypto.num
+@@ -4626,5 +4626,5 @@ FIPS_drbg_get_strength                  6379	1_1_0g	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ FIPS_rand_strength                      6380	1_1_0g	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ FIPS_drbg_get_blocklength               6381	1_1_0g	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ FIPS_drbg_init                          6382	1_1_0g	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+-X509_set_sm2_id                         6383	1_1_1m	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+-X509_get0_sm2_id                        6384	1_1_1m	EXIST::FUNCTION:
++X509_set_sm2_id                         6383	1_1_1m	EXIST::FUNCTION:SM2
++X509_get0_sm2_id                        6384	1_1_1m	EXIST::FUNCTION:SM2
+-- 
+2.20.1 (Apple Git-117)
+

dependency/openssl/Backport-Make-X509_set_sm2_id-consistent-with-other-setters.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,320 @@
+From 0717cc33d72b011cce4f53661c58d628b684275c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
+Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 10:21:53 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH 09/15] Make X509_set_sm2_id consistent with other setters
+
+This commit makes the X509_set_sm2_id to 'set0' behaviour, which means
+the memory management is passed to X509 and user doesn't need to free
+the sm2_id parameter later. API name also changes to X509_set0_sm2_id.
+
+Document and test case are also updated.
+
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8626)
+---
+ apps/verify.c                 | 40 +++++++++++++++++++-----------
+ crypto/x509/x_all.c           |  5 +++-
+ crypto/x509/x_x509.c          | 13 +++++++---
+ doc/man3/X509_get0_sm2_id.pod | 12 ++++++---
+ include/crypto/x509.h         |  2 +-
+ include/openssl/x509.h        |  2 +-
+ test/verify_extra_test.c      | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ util/libcrypto.num            |  2 +-
+ 8 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/apps/verify.c b/apps/verify.c
+index 5052d80..9000567 100644
+--- a/apps/verify.c
++++ b/apps/verify.c
+@@ -246,27 +246,37 @@ static int check(X509_STORE *ctx, const char *file,
+ 
+     if (sm2id != NULL) {
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
+-        ASN1_OCTET_STRING v;
++        ASN1_OCTET_STRING *v;
+ 
+-        v.data = sm2id;
+-        v.length = sm2idlen;
++        v = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
++        if (v == NULL) {
++            BIO_printf(bio_err, "error: SM2 ID allocation failed\n");
++            goto end;
++        }
+ 
+-        X509_set_sm2_id(x, &v);
++        if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(v, sm2id, sm2idlen)) {
++            BIO_printf(bio_err, "error: setting SM2 ID failed\n");
++            ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(v);
++            goto end;
++        }
++
++        X509_set0_sm2_id(x, v);
+ #endif
+     }
+ 
+     csc = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+     if (csc == NULL) {
+-        printf("error %s: X.509 store context allocation failed\n",
+-               (file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file);
++        BIO_printf(bio_err, "error %s: X.509 store context allocation failed\n",
++                   (file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file);
+         goto end;
+     }
+ 
+     X509_STORE_set_flags(ctx, vflags);
+     if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(csc, ctx, x, uchain)) {
+         X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc);
+-        printf("error %s: X.509 store context initialization failed\n",
+-               (file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file);
++        BIO_printf(bio_err,
++                   "error %s: X.509 store context initialization failed\n",
++                   (file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file);
+         goto end;
+     }
+     if (tchain != NULL)
+@@ -275,28 +285,30 @@ static int check(X509_STORE *ctx, const char *file,
+         X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(csc, crls);
+     i = X509_verify_cert(csc);
+     if (i > 0 && X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(csc) == X509_V_OK) {
+-        printf("%s: OK\n", (file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file);
++        BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s: OK\n", (file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file);
+         ret = 1;
+         if (show_chain) {
+             int j;
+ 
+             chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(csc);
+             num_untrusted = X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(csc);
+-            printf("Chain:\n");
++            BIO_printf(bio_out, "Chain:\n");
+             for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_num(chain); j++) {
+                 X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(chain, j);
+-                printf("depth=%d: ", j);
++                BIO_printf(bio_out, "depth=%d: ", j);
+                 X509_NAME_print_ex_fp(stdout,
+                                       X509_get_subject_name(cert),
+                                       0, get_nameopt());
+                 if (j < num_untrusted)
+-                    printf(" (untrusted)");
+-                printf("\n");
++                    BIO_printf(bio_out, " (untrusted)");
++                BIO_printf(bio_out, "\n");
+             }
+             sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
+         }
+     } else {
+-        printf("error %s: verification failed\n", (file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file);
++        BIO_printf(bio_err,
++                   "error %s: verification failed\n",
++                   (file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file);
+     }
+     X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc);
+ 
+diff --git a/crypto/x509/x_all.c b/crypto/x509/x_all.c
+index 60a2892..9c8aea5 100644
+--- a/crypto/x509/x_all.c
++++ b/crypto/x509/x_all.c
+@@ -72,7 +72,10 @@ static int x509_verify_sm2(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, int mdnid, int pknid)
+         ret = 0;
+         goto err;
+     }
+-    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_id(pctx, x->sm2_id.data, x->sm2_id.length) != 1) {
++    /* NOTE: we tolerate no actual ID, to provide maximum flexibility */
++    if (x->sm2_id != NULL
++            && EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_id(pctx, x->sm2_id->data,
++                                    x->sm2_id->length) != 1) {
+         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_SM2, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+         ret = 0;
+         goto err;
+diff --git a/crypto/x509/x_x509.c b/crypto/x509/x_x509.c
+index 1beab78..fb03bb2 100644
+--- a/crypto/x509/x_x509.c
++++ b/crypto/x509/x_x509.c
+@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ static int x509_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+         ret->rfc3779_addr = NULL;
+         ret->rfc3779_asid = NULL;
++#endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
++        ret->sm2_id = NULL;
+ #endif
+         ret->aux = NULL;
+         ret->crldp = NULL;
+@@ -91,6 +94,9 @@ static int x509_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+         sk_IPAddressFamily_pop_free(ret->rfc3779_addr, IPAddressFamily_free);
+         ASIdentifiers_free(ret->rfc3779_asid);
++#endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
++        ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ret->sm2_id);
+ #endif
+         break;
+ 
+@@ -247,13 +253,14 @@ int X509_get_signature_nid(const X509 *x)
+ }
+ 
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
+-void X509_set_sm2_id(X509 *x, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *sm2_id)
++void X509_set0_sm2_id(X509 *x, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *sm2_id)
+ {
+-    x->sm2_id = *sm2_id;
++    ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(x->sm2_id);
++    x->sm2_id = sm2_id;
+ }
+ 
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_sm2_id(X509 *x)
+ {
+-    return &x->sm2_id;
++    return x->sm2_id;
+ }
+ #endif
+diff --git a/doc/man3/X509_get0_sm2_id.pod b/doc/man3/X509_get0_sm2_id.pod
+index 84da71e..9698c86 100644
+--- a/doc/man3/X509_get0_sm2_id.pod
++++ b/doc/man3/X509_get0_sm2_id.pod
+@@ -2,20 +2,24 @@
+ 
+ =head1 NAME
+ 
+-X509_get0_sm2_id, X509_set_sm2_id - get or set SM2 ID for certificate operations
++X509_get0_sm2_id, X509_set0_sm2_id - get or set SM2 ID for certificate operations
+ 
+ =head1 SYNOPSIS
+ 
+  #include <openssl/x509.h>
+ 
+  ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_sm2_id(X509 *x);
+- void X509_set_sm2_id(X509 *x, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *sm2_id);
++ void X509_set0_sm2_id(X509 *x, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *sm2_id);
+ 
+ =head1 DESCRIPTION
+ 
+ X509_get0_sm2_id() gets the ID value of an SM2 certificate B<x> by returning an
+ B<ASN1_OCTET_STRING> object which should not be freed by the caller.
+-X509_set_sm2_id() sets the B<sm2_id> value to an SM2 certificate B<x>.
++
++X509_set0_sm2_id() sets the B<sm2_id> value to an SM2 certificate B<x>. Calling
++this function transfers the memory management of the value to the X509 object,
++and therefore the value that has been passed in should not be freed by the
++caller after this function has been called.
+ 
+ =head1 NOTES
+ 
+@@ -25,7 +29,7 @@ ability to set and retrieve the SM2 ID value.
+ 
+ =head1 RETURN VALUES
+ 
+-X509_set_sm2_id() does not return a value.
++X509_set0_sm2_id() does not return a value.
+ 
+ =head1 SEE ALSO
+ 
+diff --git a/include/crypto/x509.h b/include/crypto/x509.h
+index 418c427..5c314a8 100644
+--- a/include/crypto/x509.h
++++ b/include/crypto/x509.h
+@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ struct x509_st {
+     CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+     volatile int ex_cached;
+ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
+-    ASN1_OCTET_STRING sm2_id;
++    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *sm2_id;
+ # endif
+ } /* X509 */ ;
+ 
+diff --git a/include/openssl/x509.h b/include/openssl/x509.h
+index 5c88251..a02cf50 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/x509.h
++++ b/include/openssl/x509.h
+@@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ void X509_get0_signature(const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig,
+ int X509_get_signature_nid(const X509 *x);
+ 
+ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
+-void X509_set_sm2_id(X509 *x, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *sm2_id);
++void X509_set0_sm2_id(X509 *x, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *sm2_id);
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_sm2_id(X509 *x);
+ # endif
+ 
+diff --git a/test/verify_extra_test.c b/test/verify_extra_test.c
+index b9959e0..763ea4f 100644
+--- a/test/verify_extra_test.c
++++ b/test/verify_extra_test.c
+@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
+  */
+ 
+ #include <stdio.h>
++#include <string.h>
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #include <openssl/bio.h>
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+@@ -231,6 +232,48 @@ static int test_self_signed_bad(void)
+     return test_self_signed(bad_f, 0);
+ }
+ 
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
++static int test_sm2_id(void)
++{
++    /* we only need an X509 structure, no matter if it's a real SM2 cert */
++    X509 *x = NULL;
++    BIO *bio = NULL;
++    int ret = 0;
++    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *v = NULL, *v2 = NULL;
++    char *sm2id = "this is an ID";
++
++    bio = BIO_new_file(bad_f, "r");
++    if (bio == NULL)
++        goto err;
++
++    x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, 0, NULL);
++    if (x == NULL)
++        goto err;
++
++    v = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
++    if (v == NULL)
++        goto err;
++
++    if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(v, (unsigned char *)sm2id, (int)strlen(sm2id))) {
++        ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(v);
++        goto err;
++    }
++
++    X509_set0_sm2_id(x, v);
++
++    v2 = X509_get0_sm2_id(x);
++    if (!TEST_ptr(v2)
++            || !TEST_int_eq(ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(v, v2), 0))
++        goto err;
++
++    ret = 1;
++ err:
++    X509_free(x);
++    BIO_free(bio);
++    return ret;
++}
++#endif
++
+ int setup_tests(void)
+ {
+     if (!TEST_ptr(roots_f = test_get_argument(0))
+@@ -245,5 +288,8 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+     ADD_TEST(test_store_ctx);
+     ADD_TEST(test_self_signed_good);
+     ADD_TEST(test_self_signed_bad);
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
++    ADD_TEST(test_sm2_id);
++#endif
+     return 1;
+ }
+diff --git a/util/libcrypto.num b/util/libcrypto.num
+index 233d1c7..d7abe91 100644
+--- a/util/libcrypto.num
++++ b/util/libcrypto.num
+@@ -4626,5 +4626,5 @@ FIPS_drbg_get_strength                  6379	1_1_0g	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ FIPS_rand_strength                      6380	1_1_0g	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ FIPS_drbg_get_blocklength               6381	1_1_0g	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ FIPS_drbg_init                          6382	1_1_0g	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+-X509_set_sm2_id                         6383	1_1_1m	EXIST::FUNCTION:SM2
++X509_set0_sm2_id                        6383	1_1_1m	EXIST::FUNCTION:SM2
+ X509_get0_sm2_id                        6384	1_1_1m	EXIST::FUNCTION:SM2
+-- 
+2.20.1 (Apple Git-117)
+

dependency/openssl/Backport-SM3-acceleration-with-SM3-hardware-instruction-on-aa.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,492 @@
+From 4d2e328357ac4b468d4762a5a5f615d7e7bf46a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Xu Yizhou <xuyizhou1@huawei.com>
+Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2022 20:49:34 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] SM3 acceleration with SM3 hardware instruction on aarch64
+
+This patch contains the following two PRs,
+
+1. SM3 acceleration with SM3 hardware instruction on aarch64
+
+SM3 hardware instruction is optional feature of crypto extension for
+aarch64. This implementation accelerates SM3 via SM3 instructions. For
+the platform not supporting SM3 instruction, the original C
+implementation still works. Thanks to AliBaba for testing and reporting
+the following perf numbers for Yitian710:
+
+Benchmark on T-Head Yitian-710 2.75GHz:
+
+Before:
+type  16 bytes     64 bytes    256 bytes    1024 bytes   8192 bytes   16384 bytes
+sm3   49297.82k   121062.63k   223106.05k   283371.52k   307574.10k   309400.92k
+
+After (33% - 74% faster):
+type  16 bytes     64 bytes    256 bytes    1024 bytes   8192 bytes   16384 bytes
+sm3   65640.01k   179121.79k   359854.59k   481448.96k   534055.59k   538274.47k
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17454)
+
+2. Fix sm3ss1 translation issue in sm3-armv8.pl
+
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17542)
+
+Signed-off-by: Xu Yizhou <xuyizhou1@huawei.com>
+---
+ Configurations/00-base-templates.conf |   1 +
+ Configure                             |   4 +
+ crypto/arm64cpuid.pl                  |   7 +
+ crypto/arm_arch.h                     |   1 +
+ crypto/armcap.c                       |  10 +
+ crypto/sm3/asm/sm3-armv8.pl           | 280 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ crypto/sm3/build.info                 |  15 +-
+ crypto/sm3/sm3_local.h                |  16 +-
+ 8 files changed, 332 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 crypto/sm3/asm/sm3-armv8.pl
+
+diff --git a/Configurations/00-base-templates.conf b/Configurations/00-base-templates.conf
+index 1d35012..a67ae65 100644
+--- a/Configurations/00-base-templates.conf
++++ b/Configurations/00-base-templates.conf
+@@ -322,6 +322,7 @@ my %targets=(
+ 	poly1305_asm_src=> "poly1305-armv8.S",
+ 	keccak1600_asm_src	=> "keccak1600-armv8.S",
+ 	sm4_asm_src     =>  "vpsm4_ex-armv8.S",
++	sm3_asm_src     =>  "sm3-armv8.S",
+     },
+     parisc11_asm => {
+ 	template	=> 1,
+diff --git a/Configure b/Configure
+index 3bfe360..fce460d 100755
+--- a/Configure
++++ b/Configure
+@@ -1423,6 +1423,9 @@ unless ($disabled{asm}) {
+     if ($target{sm4_asm_src} ne "") {
+         push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "VPSM4_EX_ASM";
+     }
++    if ($target{sm3_asm_src} ne "") {
++        push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "SM3_ASM";
++    }
+ }
+ 
+ my %predefined_C = compiler_predefined($config{CROSS_COMPILE}.$config{CC});
+@@ -3379,6 +3382,7 @@ sub print_table_entry
+         "multilib",
+         "build_scheme",
+         "sm4_asm_src",
++        "sm3_asm_src",
+         );
+ 
+     if ($type eq "TABLE") {
+diff --git a/crypto/arm64cpuid.pl b/crypto/arm64cpuid.pl
+index 319927e..1e9b167 100755
+--- a/crypto/arm64cpuid.pl
++++ b/crypto/arm64cpuid.pl
+@@ -78,6 +78,13 @@ _armv8_sha512_probe:
+ 	ret
+ .size	_armv8_sha512_probe,.-_armv8_sha512_probe
+ 
++.globl	_armv8_sm3_probe
++.type	_armv8_sm3_probe,%function
++_armv8_sm3_probe:
++	.long	0xce63c004	// sm3partw1 v4.4s, v0.4s, v3.4s
++	ret
++.size	_armv8_sm3_probe,.-_armv8_sm3_probe
++
+ .globl	OPENSSL_cleanse
+ .type	OPENSSL_cleanse,%function
+ .align	5
+diff --git a/crypto/arm_arch.h b/crypto/arm_arch.h
+index 8b71055..8839b21 100644
+--- a/crypto/arm_arch.h
++++ b/crypto/arm_arch.h
+@@ -80,5 +80,6 @@ extern unsigned int OPENSSL_armcap_P;
+ # define ARMV8_SHA256    (1<<4)
+ # define ARMV8_PMULL     (1<<5)
+ # define ARMV8_SHA512    (1<<6)
++# define ARMV8_SM3       (1<<9)
+ 
+ #endif
+diff --git a/crypto/armcap.c b/crypto/armcap.c
+index 48c5d4d..8b2f4a5 100644
+--- a/crypto/armcap.c
++++ b/crypto/armcap.c
+@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ void _armv8_sha1_probe(void);
+ void _armv8_sha256_probe(void);
+ void _armv8_pmull_probe(void);
+ # ifdef __aarch64__
++void _armv8_sm3_probe(void);
+ void _armv8_sha512_probe(void);
+ # endif
+ uint32_t _armv7_tick(void);
+@@ -130,6 +131,7 @@ static unsigned long getauxval(unsigned long key)
+ #  define HWCAP_CE_PMULL         (1 << 4)
+ #  define HWCAP_CE_SHA1          (1 << 5)
+ #  define HWCAP_CE_SHA256        (1 << 6)
++#  define HWCAP_CE_SM3           (1 << 18)
+ #  define HWCAP_CE_SHA512        (1 << 21)
+ # endif
+ 
+@@ -190,6 +192,9 @@ void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
+ #  ifdef __aarch64__
+         if (hwcap & HWCAP_CE_SHA512)
+             OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_SHA512;
++
++        if (hwcap & HWCAP_CE_SM3)
++            OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_SM3;
+ #  endif
+     }
+ # endif
+@@ -233,6 +238,11 @@ void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
+             _armv8_sha512_probe();
+             OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_SHA512;
+         }
++
++        if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) {
++            _armv8_sm3_probe();
++            OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_SM3;
++        }
+ #  endif
+     }
+ # endif
+diff --git a/crypto/sm3/asm/sm3-armv8.pl b/crypto/sm3/asm/sm3-armv8.pl
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..677ca52
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/crypto/sm3/asm/sm3-armv8.pl
+@@ -0,0 +1,280 @@
++#! /usr/bin/env perl
++# Copyright 2021-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
++#
++# Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
++# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
++# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
++# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
++#
++# This module implements support for Armv8 SM3 instructions
++
++# $output is the last argument if it looks like a file (it has an extension)
++# $flavour is the first argument if it doesn't look like a file
++$output = $#ARGV >= 0 && $ARGV[$#ARGV] =~ m|\.\w+$| ? pop : undef;
++$flavour = $#ARGV >= 0 && $ARGV[0] !~ m|\.| ? shift : undef;
++
++$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
++( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
++( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
++die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl";
++
++open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour \"$output\""
++    or die "can't call $xlate: $!";
++*STDOUT=*OUT;
++
++# Message expanding:
++#	Wj <- P1(W[j-16]^W[j-9]^(W[j-3]<<<15))^(W[j-13]<<<7)^W[j-6]
++# Input: s0, s1, s2, s3
++#	s0 = w0  | w1  | w2  | w3
++#	s1 = w4  | w5  | w6  | w7
++#	s2 = w8  | w9  | w10 | w11
++#	s3 = w12 | w13 | w14 | w15
++# Output: s4
++sub msg_exp () {
++my $s0 = shift;
++my $s1 = shift;
++my $s2 = shift;
++my $s3 = shift;
++my $s4 = shift;
++my $vtmp1 = shift;
++my $vtmp2 = shift;
++$code.=<<___;
++	// s4 = w7  | w8  | w9  | w10
++	ext     $s4.16b, $s1.16b, $s2.16b, #12
++	// vtmp1 = w3  | w4  | w5  | w6
++	ext	$vtmp1.16b, $s0.16b, $s1.16b, #12
++	// vtmp2 = w10 | w11 | w12 | w13
++	ext     $vtmp2.16b, $s2.16b, $s3.16b, #8
++	sm3partw1       $s4.4s, $s0.4s, $s3.4s
++	sm3partw2       $s4.4s, $vtmp2.4s, $vtmp1.4s
++___
++}
++
++# A round of compresson function
++# Input:
++# 	ab - choose instruction among sm3tt1a, sm3tt1b, sm3tt2a, sm3tt2b
++# 	vstate0 - vstate1, store digest status(A - H)
++# 	vconst0 - vconst1, interleaved used to store Tj <<< j
++# 	vtmp - temporary register
++# 	vw - for sm3tt1ab, vw = s0 eor s1
++# 	s0 - for sm3tt2ab, just be s0
++# 	i, choose wj' or wj from vw
++sub round () {
++my $ab = shift;
++my $vstate0 = shift;
++my $vstate1 = shift;
++my $vconst0 = shift;
++my $vconst1 = shift;
++my $vtmp = shift;
++my $vw = shift;
++my $s0 = shift;
++my $i = shift;
++$code.=<<___;
++	sm3ss1  $vtmp.4s, $vstate0.4s, $vconst0.4s, $vstate1.4s
++	shl     $vconst1.4s, $vconst0.4s, #1
++	sri     $vconst1.4s, $vconst0.4s, #31
++	sm3tt1$ab       $vstate0.4s, $vtmp.4s, $vw.4s[$i]
++	sm3tt2$ab       $vstate1.4s, $vtmp.4s, $s0.4s[$i]
++___
++}
++
++sub qround () {
++my $ab = shift;
++my $vstate0 = shift;
++my $vstate1 = shift;
++my $vconst0 = shift;
++my $vconst1 = shift;
++my $vtmp1 = shift;
++my $vtmp2 = shift;
++my $s0 = shift;
++my $s1 = shift;
++my $s2 = shift;
++my $s3 = shift;
++my $s4 = shift;
++	if($s4) {
++		&msg_exp($s0, $s1, $s2, $s3, $s4, $vtmp1, $vtmp2);
++	}
++$code.=<<___;
++	eor     $vtmp1.16b, $s0.16b, $s1.16b
++___
++	&round($ab, $vstate0, $vstate1, $vconst0, $vconst1, $vtmp2,
++               $vtmp1, $s0, 0);
++	&round($ab, $vstate0, $vstate1, $vconst1, $vconst0, $vtmp2,
++               $vtmp1, $s0, 1);
++	&round($ab, $vstate0, $vstate1, $vconst0, $vconst1, $vtmp2,
++               $vtmp1, $s0, 2);
++	&round($ab, $vstate0, $vstate1, $vconst1, $vconst0, $vtmp2,
++               $vtmp1, $s0, 3);
++}
++
++$code=<<___;
++#include "arm_arch.h"
++.arch	armv8.2-a
++.text
++___
++
++{{{
++my ($pstate,$pdata,$num)=("x0","x1","w2");
++my ($state1,$state2)=("v5","v6");
++my ($sconst1, $sconst2)=("s16","s17");
++my ($vconst1, $vconst2)=("v16","v17");
++my ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s4)=map("v$_",(0..4));
++my ($bkstate1,$bkstate2)=("v18","v19");
++my ($vconst_tmp1,$vconst_tmp2)=("v20","v21");
++my ($vtmp1,$vtmp2)=("v22","v23");
++my $constaddr="x8";
++# void ossl_hwsm3_block_data_order(SM3_CTX *c, const void *p, size_t num)
++$code.=<<___;
++.globl	ossl_hwsm3_block_data_order
++.type	ossl_hwsm3_block_data_order,%function
++.align	5
++ossl_hwsm3_block_data_order:
++	// load state
++	ld1     {$state1.4s-$state2.4s}, [$pstate]
++	rev64   $state1.4s, $state1.4s
++	rev64   $state2.4s, $state2.4s
++	ext     $state1.16b, $state1.16b, $state1.16b, #8
++	ext     $state2.16b, $state2.16b, $state2.16b, #8
++
++	adr     $constaddr, .Tj
++	ldp     $sconst1, $sconst2, [$constaddr]
++
++.Loop:
++	// load input
++	ld1     {$s0.16b-$s3.16b}, [$pdata], #64
++	sub     $num, $num, #1
++
++	mov     $bkstate1.16b, $state1.16b
++	mov     $bkstate2.16b, $state2.16b
++
++#ifndef __ARMEB__
++	rev32   $s0.16b, $s0.16b
++	rev32   $s1.16b, $s1.16b
++	rev32   $s2.16b, $s2.16b
++	rev32   $s3.16b, $s3.16b
++#endif
++
++	ext     $vconst_tmp1.16b, $vconst1.16b, $vconst1.16b, #4
++___
++	&qround("a",$state1,$state2,$vconst_tmp1,$vconst_tmp2,$vtmp1,$vtmp2,
++                $s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s4);
++	&qround("a",$state1,$state2,$vconst_tmp1,$vconst_tmp2,$vtmp1,$vtmp2,
++                $s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s0);
++	&qround("a",$state1,$state2,$vconst_tmp1,$vconst_tmp2,$vtmp1,$vtmp2,
++                $s2,$s3,$s4,$s0,$s1);
++	&qround("a",$state1,$state2,$vconst_tmp1,$vconst_tmp2,$vtmp1,$vtmp2,
++                $s3,$s4,$s0,$s1,$s2);
++
++$code.=<<___;
++	ext     $vconst_tmp1.16b, $vconst2.16b, $vconst2.16b, #4
++___
++
++	&qround("b",$state1,$state2,$vconst_tmp1,$vconst_tmp2,$vtmp1,$vtmp2,
++                $s4,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
++	&qround("b",$state1,$state2,$vconst_tmp1,$vconst_tmp2,$vtmp1,$vtmp2,
++                $s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s4);
++	&qround("b",$state1,$state2,$vconst_tmp1,$vconst_tmp2,$vtmp1,$vtmp2,
++                $s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s0);
++	&qround("b",$state1,$state2,$vconst_tmp1,$vconst_tmp2,$vtmp1,$vtmp2,
++                $s2,$s3,$s4,$s0,$s1);
++	&qround("b",$state1,$state2,$vconst_tmp1,$vconst_tmp2,$vtmp1,$vtmp2,
++                $s3,$s4,$s0,$s1,$s2);
++	&qround("b",$state1,$state2,$vconst_tmp1,$vconst_tmp2,$vtmp1,$vtmp2,
++                $s4,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
++	&qround("b",$state1,$state2,$vconst_tmp1,$vconst_tmp2,$vtmp1,$vtmp2,
++                $s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s4);
++	&qround("b",$state1,$state2,$vconst_tmp1,$vconst_tmp2,$vtmp1,$vtmp2,
++                $s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s0);
++	&qround("b",$state1,$state2,$vconst_tmp1,$vconst_tmp2,$vtmp1,$vtmp2,
++                $s2,$s3,$s4,$s0,$s1);
++	&qround("b",$state1,$state2,$vconst_tmp1,$vconst_tmp2,$vtmp1,$vtmp2,
++                $s3,$s4);
++	&qround("b",$state1,$state2,$vconst_tmp1,$vconst_tmp2,$vtmp1,$vtmp2,
++                $s4,$s0);
++	&qround("b",$state1,$state2,$vconst_tmp1,$vconst_tmp2,$vtmp1,$vtmp2,
++                $s0,$s1);
++
++$code.=<<___;
++	eor     $state1.16b, $state1.16b, $bkstate1.16b
++	eor     $state2.16b, $state2.16b, $bkstate2.16b
++
++	// any remained blocks?
++	cbnz    $num, .Loop
++
++	// save state
++	rev64   $state1.4s, $state1.4s
++	rev64   $state2.4s, $state2.4s
++	ext     $state1.16b, $state1.16b, $state1.16b, #8
++	ext     $state2.16b, $state2.16b, $state2.16b, #8
++	st1     {$state1.4s-$state2.4s}, [$pstate]
++	ret
++.size	ossl_hwsm3_block_data_order,.-ossl_hwsm3_block_data_order
++
++.align	3
++.Tj:
++.word	0x79cc4519, 0x9d8a7a87
++___
++}}}
++
++#########################################
++my %sm3partopcode = (
++	"sm3partw1"         =>   0xce60C000,
++        "sm3partw2"         =>   0xce60C400);
++
++my %sm3ss1opcode = (
++	"sm3ss1"            =>   0xce400000);
++
++my %sm3ttopcode = (
++	"sm3tt1a"           =>   0xce408000,
++	"sm3tt1b"           =>   0xce408400,
++	"sm3tt2a"           =>   0xce408800,
++	"sm3tt2b"           =>   0xce408C00);
++
++sub unsm3part {
++	my ($mnemonic,$arg)=@_;
++
++	$arg=~ m/[qv](\d+)[^,]*,\s*[qv](\d+)[^,]*,\s*[qv](\d+)/o
++	&&
++	sprintf ".inst\t0x%08x\t//%s %s",
++			$sm3partopcode{$mnemonic}|$1|($2<<5)|($3<<16),
++			$mnemonic,$arg;
++}
++
++sub unsm3ss1 {
++	my ($mnemonic,$arg)=@_;
++
++	$arg=~ m/[qv](\d+)[^,]*,\s*[qv](\d+)[^,]*,\s*[qv](\d+)[^,]*,\s*[qv](\d+)/o
++	&&
++	sprintf ".inst\t0x%08x\t//%s %s",
++			$sm3ss1opcode{$mnemonic}|$1|($2<<5)|($3<<16)|($4<<10),
++			$mnemonic,$arg;
++}
++
++sub unsm3tt {
++	my ($mnemonic,$arg)=@_;
++
++	$arg=~ m/[qv](\d+)[^,]*,\s*[qv](\d+)[^,]*,\s*[qv](\d+)[^,]*\[([0-3])\]/o
++	&&
++	sprintf ".inst\t0x%08x\t//%s %s",
++			$sm3ttopcode{$mnemonic}|$1|($2<<5)|($3<<16)|($4<<12),
++			$mnemonic,$arg;
++}
++
++open SELF,$0;
++while(<SELF>) {
++        next if (/^#!/);
++        last if (!s/^#/\/\// and !/^$/);
++        print;
++}
++close SELF;
++
++foreach(split("\n",$code)) {
++	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/ge;
++
++	s/\b(sm3partw[1-2])\s+([qv].*)/unsm3part($1,$2)/ge;
++	s/\b(sm3ss1)\s+([qv].*)/unsm3ss1($1,$2)/ge;
++	s/\b(sm3tt[1-2][a-b])\s+([qv].*)/unsm3tt($1,$2)/ge;
++	print $_,"\n";
++}
++
++close STDOUT or die "error closing STDOUT: $!";
+diff --git a/crypto/sm3/build.info b/crypto/sm3/build.info
+index 6009b19..e113729 100644
+--- a/crypto/sm3/build.info
++++ b/crypto/sm3/build.info
+@@ -1,2 +1,15 @@
+ LIBS=../../libcrypto
+-SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=sm3.c m_sm3.c
++SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
++        sm3.c m_sm3.c {- $target{sm3_asm_src} -}
++
++GENERATE[sm3-armv8.S]=asm/sm3-armv8.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
++INCLUDE[sm3-armv8.o]=..
++
++BEGINRAW[Makefile]
++##### SM3 assembler implementations
++
++# GNU make "catch all"
++{- $builddir -}/sm3-%.S:	{- $sourcedir -}/asm/sm3-%.pl
++	CC="$(CC)" $(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
++
++ENDRAW[Makefile]
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/crypto/sm3/sm3_local.h b/crypto/sm3/sm3_local.h
+index 7171de5..aafff63 100644
+--- a/crypto/sm3/sm3_local.h
++++ b/crypto/sm3/sm3_local.h
+@@ -32,7 +32,21 @@
+         ll=(c)->G; (void)HOST_l2c(ll, (s)); \
+         ll=(c)->H; (void)HOST_l2c(ll, (s)); \
+       } while (0)
+-#define HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER   sm3_block_data_order
++
++#if defined(SM3_ASM)
++# if defined(__aarch64__)
++#  include "crypto/arm_arch.h"
++#  define HWSM3_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV8_SM3)
++void ossl_hwsm3_block_data_order(SM3_CTX *c, const void *p, size_t num);
++# endif
++#endif
++
++#if defined(HWSM3_CAPABLE)
++# define HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER (HWSM3_CAPABLE ? ossl_hwsm3_block_data_order \
++                                              : sm3_block_data_order)
++#else
++# define HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER   sm3_block_data_order
++#endif
+ 
+ void sm3_transform(SM3_CTX *c, const unsigned char *data);
+ 
+-- 
+2.36.1
+

dependency/openssl/Backport-Skip-the-correct-number-of-tests-if-SM2-is-disabled.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From f0dd65378296590d87250bf2130bad567483ee3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 09:44:41 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 08/15] Skip the correct number of tests if SM2 is disabled
+
+Fixes no-sm2 (and also no-sm3 and no-ec)
+
+Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8650)
+---
+ test/recipes/25-test_verify.t | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
+index b340833..d254bd8 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
++++ b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
+@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ SKIP: {
+ }
+ 
+ SKIP: {
+-    skip "SM2 is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 1
++    skip "SM2 is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 2
+ 	      if disabled("sm2");
+ 
+    # Test '-sm2-id' and '-sm2-hex-id'  option
+-- 
+2.20.1 (Apple Git-117)
+

dependency/openssl/Backport-Support-SM2-certificate-verification.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,579 @@
+From 7d86ccd1282aeff8f6d564c5d37625ffcc048f2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?=E6=9D=A8=E6=B4=8B?= <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
+Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2018 21:34:08 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 03/15] Support SM2 certificate verification
+
+Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8321)
+---
+ apps/verify.c               |  45 +++++++++++++--
+ crypto/asn1/a_verify.c      |   3 +-
+ crypto/err/openssl.txt      |   2 +
+ crypto/objects/obj_dat.h    |  17 ++++--
+ crypto/objects/obj_mac.num  |   1 +
+ crypto/objects/obj_xref.h   |   4 +-
+ crypto/objects/obj_xref.txt |   2 +
+ crypto/objects/objects.txt  |   2 +
+ crypto/x509/x509_err.c      |   2 +
+ crypto/x509/x_all.c         | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ crypto/x509/x_x509.c        |  12 ++++
+ fuzz/oids.txt               |   1 +
+ include/crypto/x509.h       |   5 +-
+ include/openssl/obj_mac.h   |   7 ++-
+ include/openssl/x509.h      |   3 +
+ include/openssl/x509err.h   |   2 +
+ util/libcrypto.num          |   2 +
+ 17 files changed, 204 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/apps/verify.c b/apps/verify.c
+index 1f93856..09b31cf 100644
+--- a/apps/verify.c
++++ b/apps/verify.c
+@@ -21,7 +21,8 @@
+ static int cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ static int check(X509_STORE *ctx, const char *file,
+                  STACK_OF(X509) *uchain, STACK_OF(X509) *tchain,
+-                 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls, int show_chain);
++                 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls, int show_chain,
++                 unsigned char *sm2id, size_t sm2idlen);
+ static int v_verbose = 0, vflags = 0;
+ 
+ typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+@@ -29,7 +30,7 @@ typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+     OPT_ENGINE, OPT_CAPATH, OPT_CAFILE, OPT_NOCAPATH, OPT_NOCAFILE,
+     OPT_UNTRUSTED, OPT_TRUSTED, OPT_CRLFILE, OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD, OPT_SHOW_CHAIN,
+     OPT_V_ENUM, OPT_NAMEOPT,
+-    OPT_VERBOSE
++    OPT_VERBOSE, OPT_SM2ID, OPT_SM2HEXID
+ } OPTION_CHOICE;
+ 
+ const OPTIONS verify_options[] = {
+@@ -56,6 +57,12 @@ const OPTIONS verify_options[] = {
+     OPT_V_OPTIONS,
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+     {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"},
++#endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
++    {"sm2-id", OPT_SM2ID, 's',
++     "Specify an ID string to verify an SM2 certificate"},
++    {"sm2-hex-id", OPT_SM2HEXID, 's',
++     "Specify a hex ID string to verify an SM2 certificate"},
+ #endif
+     {NULL}
+ };
+@@ -71,6 +78,8 @@ int verify_main(int argc, char **argv)
+     int noCApath = 0, noCAfile = 0;
+     int vpmtouched = 0, crl_download = 0, show_chain = 0, i = 0, ret = 1;
+     OPTION_CHOICE o;
++    unsigned char *sm2_id = NULL;
++    size_t sm2_idlen = 0;
+ 
+     if ((vpm = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new()) == NULL)
+         goto end;
+@@ -158,6 +167,19 @@ int verify_main(int argc, char **argv)
+         case OPT_VERBOSE:
+             v_verbose = 1;
+             break;
++        case OPT_SM2ID:
++            /* we assume the input is not a hex string */
++            sm2_id = (unsigned char *)opt_arg();
++            sm2_idlen = strlen((const char *)sm2_id);
++            break;
++        case OPT_SM2HEXID:
++            /* try to parse the input as hex string first */
++            sm2_id = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(opt_arg(), (long *)&sm2_idlen);
++            if (sm2_id == NULL) {
++                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid hex string input\n");
++                goto end;
++            }
++            break;
+         }
+     }
+     argc = opt_num_rest();
+@@ -183,12 +205,13 @@ int verify_main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 
+     ret = 0;
+     if (argc < 1) {
+-        if (check(store, NULL, untrusted, trusted, crls, show_chain) != 1)
++        if (check(store, NULL, untrusted, trusted, crls, show_chain,
++                  sm2_id, sm2_idlen) != 1)
+             ret = -1;
+     } else {
+         for (i = 0; i < argc; i++)
+             if (check(store, argv[i], untrusted, trusted, crls,
+-                      show_chain) != 1)
++                      show_chain, sm2_id, sm2_idlen) != 1)
+                 ret = -1;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -204,7 +227,8 @@ int verify_main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 
+ static int check(X509_STORE *ctx, const char *file,
+                  STACK_OF(X509) *uchain, STACK_OF(X509) *tchain,
+-                 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls, int show_chain)
++                 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls, int show_chain,
++                 unsigned char *sm2id, size_t sm2idlen)
+ {
+     X509 *x = NULL;
+     int i = 0, ret = 0;
+@@ -216,6 +240,17 @@ static int check(X509_STORE *ctx, const char *file,
+     if (x == NULL)
+         goto end;
+ 
++    if (sm2id != NULL) {
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
++        ASN1_OCTET_STRING v;
++
++        v.data = sm2id;
++        v.length = sm2idlen;
++
++        X509_set_sm2_id(x, &v);
++#endif
++    }
++
+     csc = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+     if (csc == NULL) {
+         printf("error %s: X.509 store context allocation failed\n",
+diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c b/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
+index 4b5f542..f543aa1 100644
+--- a/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
++++ b/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
+@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a,
+     int mdnid, pknid;
+     size_t inll = 0;
+ 
+-    if (!pkey) {
++    if (pkey == NULL) {
+         ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+         return -1;
+     }
+@@ -150,7 +150,6 @@ int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a,
+             ret = 0;
+             goto err;
+         }
+-
+     }
+ 
+     inl = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &buf_in, it);
+diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+index 902e97b..5e71e65 100644
+--- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
++++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+@@ -1766,8 +1766,10 @@ X509_F_X509_STORE_NEW:158:X509_STORE_new
+ X509_F_X509_TO_X509_REQ:126:X509_to_X509_REQ
+ X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD:133:X509_TRUST_add
+ X509_F_X509_TRUST_SET:141:X509_TRUST_set
++X509_F_X509_VERIFY:161:X509_verify
+ X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT:127:X509_verify_cert
+ X509_F_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_NEW:159:X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new
++X509_F_X509_VERIFY_SM2:162:x509_verify_sm2
+ 
+ #Reason codes
+ ASN1_R_ADDING_OBJECT:171:adding object
+diff --git a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h
+index 24b49a2..eb4cce4 100644
+--- a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h
++++ b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h
+@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
+  * WARNING: do not edit!
+  * Generated by crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl
+  *
+- * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
++ * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+  * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
+  */
+ 
+ /* Serialized OID's */
+-static const unsigned char so[7762] = {
++static const unsigned char so[7770] = {
+     0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,                 /* [    0] OBJ_rsadsi */
+     0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,            /* [    6] OBJ_pkcs */
+     0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x02,       /* [   13] OBJ_md2 */
+@@ -1076,9 +1076,10 @@ static const unsigned char so[7762] = {
+     0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x01,0x01,0x04,  /* [ 7736] OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD */
+     0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x0C,       /* [ 7745] OBJ_hmacWithSHA512_224 */
+     0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x0D,       /* [ 7753] OBJ_hmacWithSHA512_256 */
++    0x2A,0x81,0x1C,0xCF,0x55,0x01,0x83,0x75,       /* [ 7761] OBJ_SM2_with_SM3 */
+ };
+ 
+-#define NUM_NID 1195
++#define NUM_NID 1196
+ static const ASN1_OBJECT nid_objs[NUM_NID] = {
+     {"UNDEF", "undefined", NID_undef},
+     {"rsadsi", "RSA Data Security, Inc.", NID_rsadsi, 6, &so[0]},
+@@ -2275,9 +2276,10 @@ static const ASN1_OBJECT nid_objs[NUM_NID] = {
+     {"magma-mac", "magma-mac", NID_magma_mac},
+     {"hmacWithSHA512-224", "hmacWithSHA512-224", NID_hmacWithSHA512_224, 8, &so[7745]},
+     {"hmacWithSHA512-256", "hmacWithSHA512-256", NID_hmacWithSHA512_256, 8, &so[7753]},
++    {"SM2-SM3", "SM2-with-SM3", NID_SM2_with_SM3, 8, &so[7761]},
+ };
+ 
+-#define NUM_SN 1186
++#define NUM_SN 1187
+ static const unsigned int sn_objs[NUM_SN] = {
+      364,    /* "AD_DVCS" */
+      419,    /* "AES-128-CBC" */
+@@ -2543,6 +2545,7 @@ static const unsigned int sn_objs[NUM_SN] = {
+     1100,    /* "SHAKE128" */
+     1101,    /* "SHAKE256" */
+     1172,    /* "SM2" */
++    1195,    /* "SM2-SM3" */
+     1143,    /* "SM3" */
+     1134,    /* "SM4-CBC" */
+     1137,    /* "SM4-CFB" */
+@@ -3467,7 +3470,7 @@ static const unsigned int sn_objs[NUM_SN] = {
+     1093,    /* "x509ExtAdmission" */
+ };
+ 
+-#define NUM_LN 1186
++#define NUM_LN 1187
+ static const unsigned int ln_objs[NUM_LN] = {
+      363,    /* "AD Time Stamping" */
+      405,    /* "ANSI X9.62" */
+@@ -3623,6 +3626,7 @@ static const unsigned int ln_objs[NUM_LN] = {
+     1119,    /* "RSA-SHA3-512" */
+      188,    /* "S/MIME" */
+      167,    /* "S/MIME Capabilities" */
++    1195,    /* "SM2-with-SM3" */
+     1006,    /* "SNILS" */
+      387,    /* "SNMPv2" */
+     1025,    /* "SSH Client" */
+@@ -4657,7 +4661,7 @@ static const unsigned int ln_objs[NUM_LN] = {
+      125,    /* "zlib compression" */
+ };
+ 
+-#define NUM_OBJ 1071
++#define NUM_OBJ 1072
+ static const unsigned int obj_objs[NUM_OBJ] = {
+        0,    /* OBJ_undef                        0 */
+      181,    /* OBJ_iso                          1 */
+@@ -5126,6 +5130,7 @@ static const unsigned int obj_objs[NUM_OBJ] = {
+     1139,    /* OBJ_sm4_ctr                      1 2 156 10197 1 104 7 */
+     1172,    /* OBJ_sm2                          1 2 156 10197 1 301 */
+     1143,    /* OBJ_sm3                          1 2 156 10197 1 401 */
++    1195,    /* OBJ_SM2_with_SM3                 1 2 156 10197 1 501 */
+     1144,    /* OBJ_sm3WithRSAEncryption         1 2 156 10197 1 504 */
+      776,    /* OBJ_seed_ecb                     1 2 410 200004 1 3 */
+      777,    /* OBJ_seed_cbc                     1 2 410 200004 1 4 */
+diff --git a/crypto/objects/obj_mac.num b/crypto/objects/obj_mac.num
+index 1b6a9c6..8b797b0 100644
+--- a/crypto/objects/obj_mac.num
++++ b/crypto/objects/obj_mac.num
+@@ -1192,3 +1192,4 @@ magma_cfb		1191
+ magma_mac		1192
+ hmacWithSHA512_224		1193
+ hmacWithSHA512_256		1194
++SM2_with_SM3		1195
+diff --git a/crypto/objects/obj_xref.h b/crypto/objects/obj_xref.h
+index 5c3561a..1acfcde 100644
+--- a/crypto/objects/obj_xref.h
++++ b/crypto/objects/obj_xref.h
+@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
+  * WARNING: do not edit!
+  * Generated by objxref.pl
+  *
+- * Copyright 1998-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
++ * Copyright 1998-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+  *
+  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ static const nid_triple sigoid_srt[] = {
+     {NID_RSA_SHA3_256, NID_sha3_256, NID_rsaEncryption},
+     {NID_RSA_SHA3_384, NID_sha3_384, NID_rsaEncryption},
+     {NID_RSA_SHA3_512, NID_sha3_512, NID_rsaEncryption},
++    {NID_SM2_with_SM3, NID_sm3, NID_sm2},
+ };
+ 
+ static const nid_triple *const sigoid_srt_xref[] = {
+@@ -125,4 +126,5 @@ static const nid_triple *const sigoid_srt_xref[] = {
+     &sigoid_srt[45],
+     &sigoid_srt[46],
+     &sigoid_srt[47],
++    &sigoid_srt[48],
+ };
+diff --git a/crypto/objects/obj_xref.txt b/crypto/objects/obj_xref.txt
+index ca3e744..f3dd8ed 100644
+--- a/crypto/objects/obj_xref.txt
++++ b/crypto/objects/obj_xref.txt
+@@ -64,3 +64,5 @@ dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha224kdf_scheme	sha224	dh_cofactor_kdf
+ dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha256kdf_scheme	sha256	dh_cofactor_kdf
+ dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha384kdf_scheme	sha384	dh_cofactor_kdf
+ dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha512kdf_scheme	sha512	dh_cofactor_kdf
++
++SM2_with_SM3		sm3	sm2
+diff --git a/crypto/objects/objects.txt b/crypto/objects/objects.txt
+index c49d4c5..be9da47 100644
+--- a/crypto/objects/objects.txt
++++ b/crypto/objects/objects.txt
+@@ -385,6 +385,8 @@ sm-scheme 301           : SM2                   : sm2
+ sm-scheme 401           : SM3                   : sm3
+ sm-scheme 504           : RSA-SM3		: sm3WithRSAEncryption
+ 
++sm-scheme 501           : SM2-SM3               : SM2-with-SM3
++
+ # From RFC4231
+ rsadsi 2 8		:			: hmacWithSHA224
+ rsadsi 2 9		:			: hmacWithSHA256
+diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_err.c b/crypto/x509/x509_err.c
+index bdd1e67..c91ad7c 100644
+--- a/crypto/x509/x509_err.c
++++ b/crypto/x509/x509_err.c
+@@ -105,9 +105,11 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA X509_str_functs[] = {
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_TO_X509_REQ, 0), "X509_to_X509_REQ"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, 0), "X509_TRUST_add"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_TRUST_SET, 0), "X509_TRUST_set"},
++    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_VERIFY, 0), "X509_verify"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, 0), "X509_verify_cert"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_NEW, 0),
+      "X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new"},
++    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_VERIFY_SM2, 0), "x509_verify_sm2"},
+     {0, NULL}
+ };
+ 
+diff --git a/crypto/x509/x_all.c b/crypto/x509/x_all.c
+index a4e9cda..60a2892 100644
+--- a/crypto/x509/x_all.c
++++ b/crypto/x509/x_all.c
+@@ -19,10 +19,120 @@
+ #include <openssl/dsa.h>
+ #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+ 
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
++
++# include "crypto/asn1.h"
++# include "crypto/evp.h"
++
++static int x509_verify_sm2(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, int mdnid, int pknid)
++{
++    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++    unsigned char *buf_in = NULL;
++    int ret = -1, inl = 0;
++    size_t inll = 0;
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
++    const EVP_MD *type = EVP_get_digestbynid(mdnid);
++
++    if (type == NULL) {
++        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_SM2,
++                ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
++        goto err;
++    }
++
++    if (pkey == NULL) {
++        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_SM2, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
++        return -1;
++    }
++
++    if (x->signature.type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING && x->signature.flags & 0x7) {
++        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_SM2, ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT);
++        return -1;
++    }
++
++    ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
++    if (ctx == NULL) {
++        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_SM2, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++        goto err;
++    }
++
++    /* Check public key OID matches public key type */
++    if (EVP_PKEY_type(pknid) != pkey->ameth->pkey_id) {
++        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_SM2, ASN1_R_WRONG_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE);
++        goto err;
++    }
++
++    if (!EVP_PKEY_set_alias_type(pkey, EVP_PKEY_SM2)) {
++        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_SM2, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
++        ret = 0;
++        goto err;
++    }
++    pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
++    if (pctx == NULL) {
++        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_SM2, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
++        ret = 0;
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_id(pctx, x->sm2_id.data, x->sm2_id.length) != 1) {
++        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_SM2, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
++        ret = 0;
++        goto err;
++    }
++    EVP_MD_CTX_set_pkey_ctx(ctx, pctx);
++
++    if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, NULL, type, NULL, pkey)) {
++        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_SM2, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
++        ret = 0;
++        goto err;
++    }
++
++    inl = ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)&x->cert_info, &buf_in,
++                        ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CINF));
++    if (inl <= 0) {
++        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_SM2, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (buf_in == NULL) {
++        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_SM2, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++        goto err;
++    }
++    inll = inl;
++
++    ret = EVP_DigestVerify(ctx, x->signature.data,
++                           (size_t)x->signature.length, buf_in, inl);
++    if (ret <= 0) {
++        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_SM2, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
++        goto err;
++    }
++    ret = 1;
++ err:
++    OPENSSL_clear_free(buf_in, inll);
++    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
++    return ret;
++}
++#endif
++
+ int X509_verify(X509 *a, EVP_PKEY *r)
+ {
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
++    int mdnid, pknid;
++#endif
++
+     if (X509_ALGOR_cmp(&a->sig_alg, &a->cert_info.signature))
+         return 0;
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
++    /* Convert signature OID into digest and public key OIDs */
++    if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(a->sig_alg.algorithm),
++                             &mdnid, &pknid)) {
++        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
++    if (pknid == NID_sm2)
++        return x509_verify_sm2(a, r, mdnid, pknid);
++#endif
++
+     return (ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CINF), &a->sig_alg,
+                              &a->signature, &a->cert_info, r));
+ }
+diff --git a/crypto/x509/x_x509.c b/crypto/x509/x_x509.c
+index 7aa8b77..1beab78 100644
+--- a/crypto/x509/x_x509.c
++++ b/crypto/x509/x_x509.c
+@@ -245,3 +245,15 @@ int X509_get_signature_nid(const X509 *x)
+ {
+     return OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg.algorithm);
+ }
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
++void X509_set_sm2_id(X509 *x, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *sm2_id)
++{
++    x->sm2_id = *sm2_id;
++}
++
++ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_sm2_id(X509 *x)
++{
++    return &x->sm2_id;
++}
++#endif
+diff --git a/fuzz/oids.txt b/fuzz/oids.txt
+index eda55e4..8dfdea9 100644
+--- a/fuzz/oids.txt
++++ b/fuzz/oids.txt
+@@ -1063,3 +1063,4 @@ OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC="\x2A\x85\x03\x07\x01\x02\x01\x01\x03"
+ OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD="\x2A\x85\x03\x07\x01\x02\x01\x01\x04"
+ OBJ_hmacWithSHA512_224="\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x02\x0C"
+ OBJ_hmacWithSHA512_256="\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x02\x0D"
++OBJ_SM2_with_SM3="\x2A\x81\x1C\xCF\x55\x01\x83\x75"
+diff --git a/include/crypto/x509.h b/include/crypto/x509.h
+index 243ea74..418c427 100644
+--- a/include/crypto/x509.h
++++ b/include/crypto/x509.h
+@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ struct x509_st {
+     STACK_OF(DIST_POINT) *crldp;
+     STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *altname;
+     NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc;
+-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
++# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+     STACK_OF(IPAddressFamily) *rfc3779_addr;
+     struct ASIdentifiers_st *rfc3779_asid;
+ # endif
+@@ -185,6 +185,9 @@ struct x509_st {
+     X509_CERT_AUX *aux;
+     CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+     volatile int ex_cached;
++# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
++    ASN1_OCTET_STRING sm2_id;
++# endif
+ } /* X509 */ ;
+ 
+ /*
+diff --git a/include/openssl/obj_mac.h b/include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+index eb812ed..9b125c1 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/obj_mac.h
++++ b/include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
+  * WARNING: do not edit!
+  * Generated by crypto/objects/objects.pl
+  *
+- * Copyright 2000-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
++ * Copyright 2000-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+  * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+@@ -1179,6 +1179,11 @@
+ #define NID_sm3WithRSAEncryption                1144
+ #define OBJ_sm3WithRSAEncryption                OBJ_sm_scheme,504L
+ 
++#define SN_SM2_with_SM3         "SM2-SM3"
++#define LN_SM2_with_SM3         "SM2-with-SM3"
++#define NID_SM2_with_SM3                1195
++#define OBJ_SM2_with_SM3                OBJ_sm_scheme,501L
++
+ #define LN_hmacWithSHA224               "hmacWithSHA224"
+ #define NID_hmacWithSHA224              798
+ #define OBJ_hmacWithSHA224              OBJ_rsadsi,2L,8L
+diff --git a/include/openssl/x509.h b/include/openssl/x509.h
+index 3ff86ec..5f17057 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/x509.h
++++ b/include/openssl/x509.h
+@@ -573,6 +573,9 @@ void X509_get0_signature(const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig,
+                          const X509_ALGOR **palg, const X509 *x);
+ int X509_get_signature_nid(const X509 *x);
+ 
++void X509_set_sm2_id(X509 *x, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *sm2_id);
++ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_sm2_id(X509 *x);
++
+ int X509_trusted(const X509 *x);
+ int X509_alias_set1(X509 *x, const unsigned char *name, int len);
+ int X509_keyid_set1(X509 *x, const unsigned char *id, int len);
+diff --git a/include/openssl/x509err.h b/include/openssl/x509err.h
+index cd08673..06d75f0 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/x509err.h
++++ b/include/openssl/x509err.h
+@@ -81,8 +81,10 @@ int ERR_load_X509_strings(void);
+ # define X509_F_X509_TO_X509_REQ                          126
+ # define X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD                            133
+ # define X509_F_X509_TRUST_SET                            141
++# define X509_F_X509_VERIFY                               161
+ # define X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT                          127
+ # define X509_F_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_NEW                     159
++# define X509_F_X509_VERIFY_SM2                           162
+ 
+ /*
+  * X509 reason codes.
+diff --git a/util/libcrypto.num b/util/libcrypto.num
+index 1566231..8635ac4 100644
+--- a/util/libcrypto.num
++++ b/util/libcrypto.num
+@@ -4626,3 +4626,5 @@ FIPS_drbg_get_strength                  6379	1_1_0g	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ FIPS_rand_strength                      6380	1_1_0g	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ FIPS_drbg_get_blocklength               6381	1_1_0g	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ FIPS_drbg_init                          6382	1_1_0g	EXIST::FUNCTION:
++X509_set_sm2_id                         6383	1_1_1m	EXIST::FUNCTION:
++X509_get0_sm2_id                        6384	1_1_1m	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+-- 
+2.20.1 (Apple Git-117)
+

dependency/openssl/Backport-Support-parsing-of-SM2-ID-in-hexdecimal.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+From 1d9e832e41858b13a96899d842afd183f1c66c48 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com>
+Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2019 23:05:44 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 11/15] Support parsing of SM2 ID in hexdecimal
+
+The current EVP_PEKY_ctrl for SM2 has no capability of parsing an ID
+input in hexdecimal.
+
+The newly added ctrl string is called: sm2_hex_id
+
+Test cases and documentation are updated.
+
+Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9584)
+---
+ crypto/sm2/sm2_pmeth.c     | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
+ doc/man1/pkeyutl.pod       |  7 +++++++
+ include/openssl/ec.h       |  1 -
+ test/recipes/25-test_req.t | 15 +++++++++++++--
+ 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/sm2/sm2_pmeth.c b/crypto/sm2/sm2_pmeth.c
+index 837bdc1..9551d70 100644
+--- a/crypto/sm2/sm2_pmeth.c
++++ b/crypto/sm2/sm2_pmeth.c
+@@ -232,6 +232,10 @@ static int pkey_sm2_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
+ static int pkey_sm2_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                              const char *type, const char *value)
+ {
++    uint8_t *hex_id;
++    long hex_len = 0;
++    int ret = 0;
++
+     if (strcmp(type, "ec_paramgen_curve") == 0) {
+         int nid = NID_undef;
+ 
+@@ -255,6 +259,21 @@ static int pkey_sm2_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+     } else if (strcmp(type, "sm2_id") == 0) {
+         return pkey_sm2_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET1_ID,
+                              (int)strlen(value), (void *)value);
++    } else if (strcmp(type, "sm2_hex_id") == 0) {
++        /*
++         * TODO(3.0): reconsider the name "sm2_hex_id", OR change
++         * OSSL_PARAM_construct_from_text() / OSSL_PARAM_allocate_from_text()
++         * to handle infix "_hex_"
++         */
++        hex_id = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf((const char *)value, &hex_len);
++        if (hex_id == NULL) {
++            SM2err(SM2_F_PKEY_SM2_CTRL_STR, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
++            return 0;
++        }
++        ret = pkey_sm2_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET1_ID, (int)hex_len,
++                            (void *)hex_id);
++        OPENSSL_free(hex_id);
++        return ret;
+     }
+ 
+     return -2;
+diff --git a/doc/man1/pkeyutl.pod b/doc/man1/pkeyutl.pod
+index f0f80af..1a742ab 100644
+--- a/doc/man1/pkeyutl.pod
++++ b/doc/man1/pkeyutl.pod
+@@ -329,6 +329,13 @@ This sets the ID string used in SM2 sign or verify operations. While verifying
+ an SM2 signature, the ID string must be the same one used when signing the data.
+ Otherwise the verification will fail.
+ 
++=item B<sm2_hex_id:hex_string>
++
++This sets the ID string used in SM2 sign or verify operations. While verifying
++an SM2 signature, the ID string must be the same one used when signing the data.
++Otherwise the verification will fail. The ID string provided with this option
++should be a valid hexadecimal value.
++
+ =back
+ 
+ =head1 EXAMPLES
+diff --git a/include/openssl/ec.h b/include/openssl/ec.h
+index 24baf53..e8c8869 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/ec.h
++++ b/include/openssl/ec.h
+@@ -1444,7 +1444,6 @@ void EC_KEY_METHOD_get_verify(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth,
+ # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_id(ctx, id, id_len) \
+         EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, -1, \
+                                 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET1_ID, (int)id_len, (void*)(id))
+-
+ # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get1_id(ctx, id) \
+         EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, -1, \
+                                 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET1_ID, 0, (void*)(id))
+diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_req.t b/test/recipes/25-test_req.t
+index 8289959..d53e577 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/25-test_req.t
++++ b/test/recipes/25-test_req.t
+@@ -182,10 +182,10 @@ subtest "generating certificate requests" => sub {
+ };
+ 
+ subtest "generating SM2 certificate requests" => sub {
+-    plan tests => 2;
++    plan tests => 4;
+ 
+     SKIP: {
+-        skip "SM2 is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 2
++        skip "SM2 is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 4
+         if disabled("sm2");
+         ok(run(app(["openssl", "req", "-config", srctop_file("test", "test.cnf"),
+                     "-new", "-key", srctop_file("test", "certs", "sm2.key"),
+@@ -197,6 +197,17 @@ subtest "generating SM2 certificate requests" => sub {
+                     "-verify", "-in", "testreq.pem", "-noout",
+                     "-sm2-id", "1234567812345678", "-sm3"])),
+            "Verifying signature on SM2 certificate request");
++
++        ok(run(app(["openssl", "req", "-config", srctop_file("test", "test.cnf"),
++                    "-new", "-key", srctop_file("test", "certs", "sm2.key"),
++                    "-sigopt", "sm2_hex_id:DEADBEEF",
++                    "-out", "testreq.pem", "-sm3"])),
++           "Generating SM2 certificate request with hex id");
++
++        ok(run(app(["openssl", "req", "-config", srctop_file("test", "test.cnf"),
++                    "-verify", "-in", "testreq.pem", "-noout",
++                    "-sm2-hex-id", "DEADBEEF", "-sm3"])),
++           "Verifying signature on SM2 certificate request");
+     }
+ };
+ 
+-- 
+2.20.1 (Apple Git-117)
+

dependency/openssl/Backport-Support-raw-input-data-in-apps-pkeyutl.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,482 @@
+From b14bf717ccb166cce13173a817106effb02f6c2e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
+Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 16:16:28 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 01/15] Support raw input data in apps/pkeyutl
+
+Some signature algorithms require special treatment for digesting, such
+as SM2. This patch adds the ability of handling raw input data in
+apps/pkeyutl other than accepting only pre-hashed input data.
+
+Beside, SM2 requries an ID string when signing or verifying a piece of data,
+this patch also adds the ability for apps/pkeyutil to specify that ID
+string.
+
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8186)
+---
+ apps/pkeyutl.c                 | 168 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
+ crypto/sm2/sm2_pmeth.c         |   3 +
+ doc/man1/pkeyutl.pod           |  45 +++++++++
+ test/certs/sm2.crt             |  13 +++
+ test/certs/sm2.key             |   5 +
+ test/recipes/20-test_pkeyutl.t |  43 +++++++++
+ 6 files changed, 260 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 test/certs/sm2.crt
+ create mode 100644 test/certs/sm2.key
+ create mode 100644 test/recipes/20-test_pkeyutl.t
+
+diff --git a/apps/pkeyutl.c b/apps/pkeyutl.c
+index 831e14d..bca0464 100644
+--- a/apps/pkeyutl.c
++++ b/apps/pkeyutl.c
+@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
+ static EVP_PKEY_CTX *init_ctx(const char *kdfalg, int *pkeysize,
+                               const char *keyfile, int keyform, int key_type,
+                               char *passinarg, int pkey_op, ENGINE *e,
+-                              const int impl);
++                              const int impl, EVP_PKEY **ppkey);
+ 
+ static int setup_peer(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int peerform, const char *file,
+                       ENGINE *e);
+@@ -31,6 +31,11 @@ static int do_keyop(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pkey_op,
+                     unsigned char *out, size_t *poutlen,
+                     const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen);
+ 
++static int do_raw_keyop(int pkey_op, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
++                        const EVP_MD *md, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in,
++                        unsigned char *sig, int siglen,
++                        unsigned char **out, size_t *poutlen);
++
+ typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+     OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+     OPT_ENGINE, OPT_ENGINE_IMPL, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT,
+@@ -38,12 +43,15 @@ typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+     OPT_VERIFY, OPT_VERIFYRECOVER, OPT_REV, OPT_ENCRYPT, OPT_DECRYPT,
+     OPT_DERIVE, OPT_SIGFILE, OPT_INKEY, OPT_PEERKEY, OPT_PASSIN,
+     OPT_PEERFORM, OPT_KEYFORM, OPT_PKEYOPT, OPT_KDF, OPT_KDFLEN,
+-    OPT_R_ENUM
++    OPT_R_ENUM, OPT_RAWIN, OPT_DIGEST
+ } OPTION_CHOICE;
+ 
+ const OPTIONS pkeyutl_options[] = {
+     {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+     {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file - default stdin"},
++    {"rawin", OPT_RAWIN, '-', "Indicate the input data is in raw form"},
++    {"digest", OPT_DIGEST, 's',
++     "Specify the digest algorithm when signing the raw input data"},
+     {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file - default stdout"},
+     {"pubin", OPT_PUBIN, '-', "Input is a public key"},
+     {"certin", OPT_CERTIN, '-', "Input is a cert with a public key"},
+@@ -80,6 +88,7 @@ int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv)
+     BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
+     ENGINE *e = NULL;
+     EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+     char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *sigfile = NULL, *passinarg = NULL;
+     char hexdump = 0, asn1parse = 0, rev = 0, *prog;
+     unsigned char *buf_in = NULL, *buf_out = NULL, *sig = NULL;
+@@ -94,6 +103,8 @@ int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv)
+     const char *kdfalg = NULL;
+     int kdflen = 0;
+     STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *pkeyopts = NULL;
++    int rawin = 0;
++    const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+ 
+     prog = opt_init(argc, argv, pkeyutl_options);
+     while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+@@ -192,12 +203,39 @@ int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv)
+                 goto end;
+             }
+             break;
++        case OPT_RAWIN:
++            rawin = 1;
++            break;
++        case OPT_DIGEST:
++            if (!opt_md(opt_arg(), &md))
++                goto end;
++            break;
+         }
+     }
+     argc = opt_num_rest();
+     if (argc != 0)
+         goto opthelp;
+ 
++    if (rawin && pkey_op != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN && pkey_op != EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
++        BIO_printf(bio_err,
++                   "%s: -rawin can only be used with -sign or -verify\n",
++                   prog);
++        goto opthelp;
++    }
++
++    if (md != NULL && !rawin) {
++        BIO_printf(bio_err,
++                   "%s: -digest can only be used with -rawin\n",
++                   prog);
++        goto opthelp;
++    }
++
++    if (rawin && rev) {
++        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: -rev cannot be used with raw input\n",
++                   prog);
++        goto opthelp;
++    }
++
+     if (kdfalg != NULL) {
+         if (kdflen == 0) {
+             BIO_printf(bio_err,
+@@ -214,7 +252,7 @@ int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv)
+         goto opthelp;
+     }
+     ctx = init_ctx(kdfalg, &keysize, inkey, keyform, key_type,
+-                   passinarg, pkey_op, e, engine_impl);
++                   passinarg, pkey_op, e, engine_impl, &pkey);
+     if (ctx == NULL) {
+         BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Error initializing context\n", prog);
+         ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+@@ -277,7 +315,8 @@ int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv)
+         }
+     }
+ 
+-    if (in != NULL) {
++    /* Raw input data is handled elsewhere */
++    if (in != NULL && !rawin) {
+         /* Read the input data */
+         buf_inlen = bio_to_mem(&buf_in, keysize * 10, in);
+         if (buf_inlen < 0) {
+@@ -296,8 +335,9 @@ int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv)
+         }
+     }
+ 
+-    /* Sanity check the input */
+-    if (buf_inlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
++    /* Sanity check the input if the input is not raw */
++    if (!rawin
++            && buf_inlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+             && (pkey_op == EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN
+                 || pkey_op == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)) {
+         BIO_printf(bio_err,
+@@ -306,8 +346,13 @@ int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv)
+     }
+ 
+     if (pkey_op == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
+-        rv = EVP_PKEY_verify(ctx, sig, (size_t)siglen,
+-                             buf_in, (size_t)buf_inlen);
++        if (rawin) {
++            rv = do_raw_keyop(pkey_op, ctx, md, pkey, in, sig, siglen,
++                              NULL, 0);
++        } else {
++            rv = EVP_PKEY_verify(ctx, sig, (size_t)siglen,
++                                 buf_in, (size_t)buf_inlen);
++        }
+         if (rv == 1) {
+             BIO_puts(out, "Signature Verified Successfully\n");
+             ret = 0;
+@@ -320,14 +365,20 @@ int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv)
+         buf_outlen = kdflen;
+         rv = 1;
+     } else {
+-        rv = do_keyop(ctx, pkey_op, NULL, (size_t *)&buf_outlen,
+-                      buf_in, (size_t)buf_inlen);
+-    }
+-    if (rv > 0 && buf_outlen != 0) {
+-        buf_out = app_malloc(buf_outlen, "buffer output");
+-        rv = do_keyop(ctx, pkey_op,
+-                      buf_out, (size_t *)&buf_outlen,
+-                      buf_in, (size_t)buf_inlen);
++        if (rawin) {
++            /* rawin allocates the buffer in do_raw_keyop() */
++            rv = do_raw_keyop(pkey_op, ctx, md, pkey, in, NULL, 0,
++                              &buf_out, (size_t *)&buf_outlen);
++        } else {
++            rv = do_keyop(ctx, pkey_op, NULL, (size_t *)&buf_outlen,
++                          buf_in, (size_t)buf_inlen);
++            if (rv > 0 && buf_outlen != 0) {
++                buf_out = app_malloc(buf_outlen, "buffer output");
++                rv = do_keyop(ctx, pkey_op,
++                              buf_out, (size_t *)&buf_outlen,
++                              buf_in, (size_t)buf_inlen);
++            }
++        }
+     }
+     if (rv <= 0) {
+         if (pkey_op != EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE) {
+@@ -364,7 +415,7 @@ int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv)
+ static EVP_PKEY_CTX *init_ctx(const char *kdfalg, int *pkeysize,
+                               const char *keyfile, int keyform, int key_type,
+                               char *passinarg, int pkey_op, ENGINE *e,
+-                              const int engine_impl)
++                              const int engine_impl, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
+ {
+     EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+     EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+@@ -422,10 +473,25 @@ static EVP_PKEY_CTX *init_ctx(const char *kdfalg, int *pkeysize,
+         }
+         ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(kdfnid, impl);
+     } else {
++        EC_KEY *eckey = NULL;
++        const EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
++        int nid;
++
+         if (pkey == NULL)
+             goto end;
++        /* SM2 needs a special treatment */
++        if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
++            if ((eckey = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)) == NULL
++                    || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL
++                    || (nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)) == 0)
++                goto end;
++            if (nid == NID_sm2)
++                EVP_PKEY_set_alias_type(pkey, EVP_PKEY_SM2);
++        }
+         *pkeysize = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+         ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, impl);
++        if (ppkey != NULL)
++            *ppkey = pkey;
+         EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+     }
+ 
+@@ -522,3 +588,71 @@ static int do_keyop(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pkey_op,
+     }
+     return rv;
+ }
++
++#define TBUF_MAXSIZE 2048
++
++static int do_raw_keyop(int pkey_op, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
++                        const EVP_MD *md, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in,
++                        unsigned char *sig, int siglen,
++                        unsigned char **out, size_t *poutlen)
++{
++    int rv = 0;
++    EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
++    unsigned char tbuf[TBUF_MAXSIZE];
++    int tbuf_len = 0;
++
++    if ((mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
++        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error: out of memory\n");
++        return rv;
++    }
++    EVP_MD_CTX_set_pkey_ctx(mctx, ctx);
++
++    switch(pkey_op) {
++    case EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY:
++        if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey) != 1)
++            goto end;
++        for (;;) {
++            tbuf_len = BIO_read(in, tbuf, TBUF_MAXSIZE);
++            if (tbuf_len == 0)
++                break;
++            if (tbuf_len < 0) {
++                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading raw input data\n");
++                goto end;
++            }
++            rv = EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, tbuf, (size_t)tbuf_len);
++            if (rv != 1) {
++                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error verifying raw input data\n");
++                goto end;
++            }
++        }
++        rv = EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, sig, (size_t)siglen);
++        break;
++    case EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN:
++        if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey) != 1)
++            goto end;
++        for (;;) {
++            tbuf_len = BIO_read(in, tbuf, TBUF_MAXSIZE);
++            if (tbuf_len == 0)
++                break;
++            if (tbuf_len < 0) {
++                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading raw input data\n");
++                goto end;
++            }
++            rv = EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, tbuf, (size_t)tbuf_len);
++            if (rv != 1) {
++                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error signing raw input data\n");
++                goto end;
++            }
++        }
++        rv = EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, NULL, poutlen);
++        if (rv == 1 && out != NULL) {
++            *out = app_malloc(*poutlen, "buffer output");
++            rv = EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, *out, poutlen);
++        }
++        break;
++    }
++
++ end:
++    EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
++    return rv;
++}
+diff --git a/crypto/sm2/sm2_pmeth.c b/crypto/sm2/sm2_pmeth.c
+index 0e722b9..837bdc1 100644
+--- a/crypto/sm2/sm2_pmeth.c
++++ b/crypto/sm2/sm2_pmeth.c
+@@ -252,6 +252,9 @@ static int pkey_sm2_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+         else
+             return -2;
+         return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_param_enc(ctx, param_enc);
++    } else if (strcmp(type, "sm2_id") == 0) {
++        return pkey_sm2_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET1_ID,
++                             (int)strlen(value), (void *)value);
+     }
+ 
+     return -2;
+diff --git a/doc/man1/pkeyutl.pod b/doc/man1/pkeyutl.pod
+index f6fd48d..f0f80af 100644
+--- a/doc/man1/pkeyutl.pod
++++ b/doc/man1/pkeyutl.pod
+@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ pkeyutl - public key algorithm utility
+ B<openssl> B<pkeyutl>
+ [B<-help>]
+ [B<-in file>]
++[B<-rawin>]
++[B<-digest algorithm>]
+ [B<-out file>]
+ [B<-sigfile file>]
+ [B<-inkey file>]
+@@ -54,6 +56,23 @@ Print out a usage message.
+ This specifies the input filename to read data from or standard input
+ if this option is not specified.
+ 
++=item B<-rawin>
++
++This indicates that the input data is raw data, which is not hashed by any
++message digest algorithm. The user can specify a digest algorithm by using
++the B<-digest> option. This option can only be used with B<-sign> and
++B<-verify>.
++
++=item B<-digest algorithm>
++
++This specifies the digest algorithm which is used to hash the input data before
++signing or verifying it with the input key. This option could be omitted if the
++signature algorithm does not require one (for instance, EdDSA). If this option
++is omitted but the signature algorithm requires one, a default value will be
++used. For signature algorithms like RSA, DSA and ECDSA, SHA-256 will be the
++default digest algorithm. For SM2, it will be SM3. If this option is present,
++then the B<-rawin> option must be also specified to B<pkeyutl>.
++
+ =item B<-out filename>
+ 
+ Specifies the output filename to write to or standard output by
+@@ -296,6 +315,22 @@ the B<-pkeyopt> B<digest> option.
+ The X25519 and X448 algorithms support key derivation only. Currently there are
+ no additional options.
+ 
++=head1 SM2
++
++The SM2 algorithm supports sign, verify, encrypt and decrypt operations. For
++the sign and verify operations, SM2 requires an ID string to be passed in. The
++following B<pkeyopt> value is supported:
++
++=over 4
++
++=item B<sm2_id:string>
++
++This sets the ID string used in SM2 sign or verify operations. While verifying
++an SM2 signature, the ID string must be the same one used when signing the data.
++Otherwise the verification will fail.
++
++=back
++
+ =head1 EXAMPLES
+ 
+ Sign some data using a private key:
+@@ -329,6 +364,16 @@ Decrypt some data using a private key with OAEP padding using SHA256:
+  openssl pkeyutl -decrypt -in file -inkey key.pem -out secret \
+     -pkeyopt rsa_padding_mode:oaep -pkeyopt rsa_oaep_md:sha256
+ 
++Sign some data using an L<SM2(7)> private key and a specific ID:
++
++ openssl pkeyutl -sign -in file -inkey sm2.key -out sig -rawin -digest sm3 \
++    -pkeyopt sm2_id:someid
++
++Verify some data using an L<SM2(7)> certificate and a specific ID:
++
++ openssl pkeyutl -verify -certin -in file -inkey sm2.cert -sigfile sig \
++    -rawin -digest sm3 -pkeyopt sm2_id:someid
++
+ =head1 SEE ALSO
+ 
+ L<genpkey(1)>, L<pkey(1)>, L<rsautl(1)>
+diff --git a/test/certs/sm2.crt b/test/certs/sm2.crt
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..189abb1
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/certs/sm2.crt
+@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
++-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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++-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+diff --git a/test/certs/sm2.key b/test/certs/sm2.key
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..1efd364
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/certs/sm2.key
+@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
++-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
++MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqBHM9VAYItBG0wawIBAQQgSKhk+4xGyDI+IS2H
++WVfFPDxh1qv5+wtrddaIsGNXGZihRANCAAQwqeNkWp7fiu1KZnuDkAucpM8piEzE
++TL1ymrcrOBvv8mhNNkeb20asbWgFQI2zOrSM99/sXGn9rM2/usM/Mlca
++-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+diff --git a/test/recipes/20-test_pkeyutl.t b/test/recipes/20-test_pkeyutl.t
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..a051138
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/recipes/20-test_pkeyutl.t
+@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
++#! /usr/bin/env perl
++# Copyright 2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
++#
++# Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
++# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
++# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
++# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
++
++use strict;
++use warnings;
++
++use File::Spec;
++use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
++use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
++
++setup("test_pkeyutl");
++
++plan tests => 2;
++
++sub sign
++{
++    # Utilize the sm2.crt as the TBS file
++    return run(app(([ 'openssl', 'pkeyutl', '-sign',
++                      '-in', srctop_file('test', 'certs', 'sm2.crt'),
++                      '-inkey', srctop_file('test', 'certs', 'sm2.key'),
++                      '-out', 'signature.sm2', '-rawin',
++                      '-digest', 'sm3', '-pkeyopt', 'sm2_id:someid'])));
++}
++
++sub verify
++{
++    # Utilize the sm2.crt as the TBS file
++    return run(app(([ 'openssl', 'pkeyutl', '-verify', '-certin',
++                      '-in', srctop_file('test', 'certs', 'sm2.crt'),
++                      '-inkey', srctop_file('test', 'certs', 'sm2.crt'),
++                      '-sigfile', 'signature.sm2', '-rawin',
++                      '-digest', 'sm3', '-pkeyopt', 'sm2_id:someid'])));
++}
++
++ok(sign, "Sign a piece of data using SM2");
++ok(verify, "Verify an SM2 signature against a piece of data");
++
++unlink 'signature.sm2';
+-- 
+2.20.1 (Apple Git-117)
+

dependency/openssl/CVE-2022-0778-Add-a-negative-testcase-for-BN_mod_sqrt.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+From 3ef5c3034e5c545f34d6929568f3f2b10ac4bdf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 18:26:35 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Add a negative testcase for BN_mod_sqrt
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+---
+ test/bntest.c                          | 11 ++++++++++-
+ test/recipes/10-test_bn_data/bnmod.txt | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/test/bntest.c b/test/bntest.c
+index 390dd80073..1cab660bca 100644
+--- a/test/bntest.c
++++ b/test/bntest.c
+@@ -1729,8 +1729,17 @@ static int file_modsqrt(STANZA *s)
+             || !TEST_ptr(ret2 = BN_new()))
+         goto err;
+ 
++    if (BN_is_negative(mod_sqrt)) {
++        /* A negative testcase */
++        if (!TEST_ptr_null(BN_mod_sqrt(ret, a, p, ctx)))
++            goto err;
++
++        st = 1;
++        goto err;
++    }
++
+     /* There are two possible answers. */
+-    if (!TEST_true(BN_mod_sqrt(ret, a, p, ctx))
++    if (!TEST_ptr(BN_mod_sqrt(ret, a, p, ctx))
+             || !TEST_true(BN_sub(ret2, p, ret)))
+         goto err;
+ 
+diff --git a/test/recipes/10-test_bn_data/bnmod.txt b/test/recipes/10-test_bn_data/bnmod.txt
+index 5ea4d031f2..e28cc6bfb0 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/10-test_bn_data/bnmod.txt
++++ b/test/recipes/10-test_bn_data/bnmod.txt
+@@ -2799,3 +2799,15 @@ P = 9df9d6cc20b8540411af4e5357ef2b0353cb1f2ab5ffc3e246b41c32f71e951f
+ ModSqrt = a1d52989f12f204d3d2167d9b1e6c8a6174c0c786a979a5952383b7b8bd186
+ A = 2eee37cf06228a387788188e650bc6d8a2ff402931443f69156a29155eca07dcb45f3aac238d92943c0c25c896098716baa433f25bd696a142f5a69d5d937e81
+ P = 9df9d6cc20b8540411af4e5357ef2b0353cb1f2ab5ffc3e246b41c32f71e951f
++
++# Negative testcases for BN_mod_sqrt()
++
++# This one triggers an infinite loop with unfixed implementation
++# It should just fail.
++ModSqrt = -1
++A = 20a7ee
++P = 460201
++
++ModSqrt = -1
++A = 65bebdb00a96fc814ec44b81f98b59fba3c30203928fa5214c51e0a97091645280c947b005847f239758482b9bfc45b066fde340d1fe32fc9c1bf02e1b2d0ed
++P = 9df9d6cc20b8540411af4e5357ef2b0353cb1f2ab5ffc3e246b41c32f71e951f
+-- 
+2.27.0
+

dependency/openssl/CVE-2022-0778-Fix-possible-infinite-loop-in-BN_mod_sqrt.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+From 3118eb64934499d93db3230748a452351d1d9a65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 18:26:21 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix possible infinite loop in BN_mod_sqrt()
+
+The calculation in some cases does not finish for non-prime p.
+
+This fixes CVE-2022-0778.
+
+Based on patch by David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>.
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+---
+ crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++------------
+ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c b/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c
+index 1723d5ded5..53b0f55985 100644
+--- a/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c
++++ b/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c
+@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
+ /*
+  * Returns 'ret' such that ret^2 == a (mod p), using the Tonelli/Shanks
+  * algorithm (cf. Henri Cohen, "A Course in Algebraic Computational Number
+- * Theory", algorithm 1.5.1). 'p' must be prime!
++ * Theory", algorithm 1.5.1). 'p' must be prime, otherwise an error or
++ * an incorrect "result" will be returned.
+  */
+ {
+     BIGNUM *ret = in;
+@@ -301,18 +302,23 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
+             goto vrfy;
+         }
+ 
+-        /* find smallest  i  such that  b^(2^i) = 1 */
+-        i = 1;
+-        if (!BN_mod_sqr(t, b, p, ctx))
+-            goto end;
+-        while (!BN_is_one(t)) {
+-            i++;
+-            if (i == e) {
+-                BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE);
+-                goto end;
++        /* Find the smallest i, 0 < i < e, such that b^(2^i) = 1. */
++        for (i = 1; i < e; i++) {
++            if (i == 1) {
++                if (!BN_mod_sqr(t, b, p, ctx))
++                    goto end;
++
++            } else {
++                if (!BN_mod_mul(t, t, t, p, ctx))
++                    goto end;
+             }
+-            if (!BN_mod_mul(t, t, t, p, ctx))
+-                goto end;
++            if (BN_is_one(t))
++                break;
++        }
++        /* If not found, a is not a square or p is not prime. */
++        if (i >= e) {
++            BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE);
++            goto end;
+         }
+ 
+         /* t := y^2^(e - i - 1) */
+-- 
+2.27.0
+

dependency/openssl/CVE-2022-1292.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+From e5fd1728ef4c7a5bf7c7a7163ca60370460a6e23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2022 12:40:24 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] c_rehash: Do not use shell to invoke openssl
+
+Except on VMS where it is safe.
+
+This fixes CVE-2022-1292.
+
+Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+---
+ tools/c_rehash.in | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/c_rehash.in b/tools/c_rehash.in
+index fa7c6c9..83c1cc8 100644
+--- a/tools/c_rehash.in
++++ b/tools/c_rehash.in
+@@ -152,6 +152,23 @@ sub check_file {
+ 	return ($is_cert, $is_crl);
+ }
+ 
++sub compute_hash {
++    my $fh;
++    if ( $^O eq "VMS" ) {
++        # VMS uses the open through shell
++        # The file names are safe there and list form is unsupported
++        if (!open($fh, "-|", join(' ', @_))) {
++            print STDERR "Cannot compute hash on '$fname'\n";
++            return;
++        }
++    } else {
++        if (!open($fh, "-|", @_)) {
++            print STDERR "Cannot compute hash on '$fname'\n";
++            return;
++        }
++    }
++    return (<$fh>, <$fh>);
++}
+ 
+ # Link a certificate to its subject name hash value, each hash is of
+ # the form <hash>.<n> where n is an integer. If the hash value already exists
+@@ -161,10 +178,12 @@ sub check_file {
+ 
+ sub link_hash_cert {
+ 		my $fname = $_[0];
+-		$fname =~ s/\"/\\\"/g;
+-		my ($hash, $fprint) = `"$openssl" x509 $x509hash -fingerprint -noout -in "$fname"`;
++		my ($hash, $fprint) = compute_hash($openssl, "x509", $x509hash,
++						   "-fingerprint", "-noout",
++						   "-in", $fname);
+ 		chomp $hash;
+ 		chomp $fprint;
++		return if !$hash;
+ 		$fprint =~ s/^.*=//;
+ 		$fprint =~ tr/://d;
+ 		my $suffix = 0;
+@@ -202,10 +221,12 @@ sub link_hash_cert {
+ 
+ sub link_hash_crl {
+ 		my $fname = $_[0];
+-		$fname =~ s/'/'\\''/g;
+-		my ($hash, $fprint) = `"$openssl" crl $crlhash -fingerprint -noout -in '$fname'`;
++		my ($hash, $fprint) = compute_hash($openssl, "crl", $crlhash,
++						   "-fingerprint", "-noout",
++						   "-in", $fname);
+ 		chomp $hash;
+ 		chomp $fprint;
++		return if !$hash;
+ 		$fprint =~ s/^.*=//;
+ 		$fprint =~ tr/://d;
+ 		my $suffix = 0;
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+

dependency/openssl/CVE-2022-2068-Fix-file-operations-in-c_rehash.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
+From 9639817dac8bbbaa64d09efad7464ccc405527c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Fiala <daniel@openssl.org>
+Date: Sun, 29 May 2022 20:11:24 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix file operations in c_rehash.
+
+CVE-2022-2068
+
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+---
+ tools/c_rehash.in | 216 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 107 insertions(+), 109 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/c_rehash.in b/tools/c_rehash.in
+index cfd18f5..9d2a6f6 100644
+--- a/tools/c_rehash.in
++++ b/tools/c_rehash.in
+@@ -104,52 +104,78 @@ foreach (@dirlist) {
+ }
+ exit($errorcount);
+ 
++sub copy_file {
++    my ($src_fname, $dst_fname) = @_;
++
++    if (open(my $in, "<", $src_fname)) {
++        if (open(my $out, ">", $dst_fname)) {
++            print $out $_ while (<$in>);
++            close $out;
++        } else {
++            warn "Cannot open $dst_fname for write, $!";
++        }
++        close $in;
++    } else {
++        warn "Cannot open $src_fname for read, $!";
++    }
++}
++
+ sub hash_dir {
+-	my %hashlist;
+-	print "Doing $_[0]\n";
+-	chdir $_[0];
+-	opendir(DIR, ".");
+-	my @flist = sort readdir(DIR);
+-	closedir DIR;
+-	if ( $removelinks ) {
+-		# Delete any existing symbolic links
+-		foreach (grep {/^[\da-f]+\.r{0,1}\d+$/} @flist) {
+-			if (-l $_) {
+-				print "unlink $_" if $verbose;
+-				unlink $_ || warn "Can't unlink $_, $!\n";
+-			}
+-		}
+-	}
+-	FILE: foreach $fname (grep {/\.(pem)|(crt)|(cer)|(crl)$/} @flist) {
+-		# Check to see if certificates and/or CRLs present.
+-		my ($cert, $crl) = check_file($fname);
+-		if (!$cert && !$crl) {
+-			print STDERR "WARNING: $fname does not contain a certificate or CRL: skipping\n";
+-			next;
+-		}
+-		link_hash_cert($fname) if ($cert);
+-		link_hash_crl($fname) if ($crl);
+-	}
++    my $dir = shift;
++    my %hashlist;
++
++    print "Doing $dir\n";
++
++    if (!chdir $dir) {
++        print STDERR "WARNING: Cannot chdir to '$dir', $!\n";
++        return;
++    }
++
++    opendir(DIR, ".") || print STDERR "WARNING: Cannot opendir '.', $!\n";
++    my @flist = sort readdir(DIR);
++    closedir DIR;
++    if ( $removelinks ) {
++        # Delete any existing symbolic links
++        foreach (grep {/^[\da-f]+\.r{0,1}\d+$/} @flist) {
++            if (-l $_) {
++                print "unlink $_\n" if $verbose;
++                unlink $_ || warn "Can't unlink $_, $!\n";
++            }
++        }
++    }
++    FILE: foreach $fname (grep {/\.(pem)|(crt)|(cer)|(crl)$/} @flist) {
++        # Check to see if certificates and/or CRLs present.
++        my ($cert, $crl) = check_file($fname);
++        if (!$cert && !$crl) {
++            print STDERR "WARNING: $fname does not contain a certificate or CRL: skipping\n";
++            next;
++        }
++        link_hash_cert($fname) if ($cert);
++        link_hash_crl($fname) if ($crl);
++    }
++
++    chdir $pwd;
+ }
+ 
+ sub check_file {
+-	my ($is_cert, $is_crl) = (0,0);
+-	my $fname = $_[0];
+-	open IN, $fname;
+-	while(<IN>) {
+-		if (/^-----BEGIN (.*)-----/) {
+-			my $hdr = $1;
+-			if ($hdr =~ /^(X509 |TRUSTED |)CERTIFICATE$/) {
+-				$is_cert = 1;
+-				last if ($is_crl);
+-			} elsif ($hdr eq "X509 CRL") {
+-				$is_crl = 1;
+-				last if ($is_cert);
+-			}
+-		}
+-	}
+-	close IN;
+-	return ($is_cert, $is_crl);
++    my ($is_cert, $is_crl) = (0,0);
++    my $fname = $_[0];
++
++    open(my $in, "<", $fname);
++    while(<$in>) {
++        if (/^-----BEGIN (.*)-----/) {
++            my $hdr = $1;
++            if ($hdr =~ /^(X509 |TRUSTED |)CERTIFICATE$/) {
++                $is_cert = 1;
++                last if ($is_crl);
++            } elsif ($hdr eq "X509 CRL") {
++                $is_crl = 1;
++                last if ($is_cert);
++            }
++        }
++    }
++    close $in;
++    return ($is_cert, $is_crl);
+ }
+ 
+ sub compute_hash {
+@@ -177,76 +203,48 @@ sub compute_hash {
+ # certificate fingerprints
+ 
+ sub link_hash_cert {
+-		my $fname = $_[0];
+-		my ($hash, $fprint) = compute_hash($openssl, "x509", $x509hash,
+-						   "-fingerprint", "-noout",
+-						   "-in", $fname);
+-		chomp $hash;
+-		chomp $fprint;
+-		return if !$hash;
+-		$fprint =~ s/^.*=//;
+-		$fprint =~ tr/://d;
+-		my $suffix = 0;
+-		# Search for an unused hash filename
+-		while(exists $hashlist{"$hash.$suffix"}) {
+-			# Hash matches: if fingerprint matches its a duplicate cert
+-			if ($hashlist{"$hash.$suffix"} eq $fprint) {
+-				print STDERR "WARNING: Skipping duplicate certificate $fname\n";
+-				return;
+-			}
+-			$suffix++;
+-		}
+-		$hash .= ".$suffix";
+-		if ($symlink_exists) {
+-			print "link $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
+-			symlink $fname, $hash || warn "Can't symlink, $!";
+-		} else {
+-			print "copy $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
+-                        if (open($in, "<", $fname)) {
+-                            if (open($out,">", $hash)) {
+-                                print $out $_ while (<$in>);
+-                                close $out;
+-                            } else {
+-                                warn "can't open $hash for write, $!";
+-                            }
+-                            close $in;
+-                        } else {
+-                            warn "can't open $fname for read, $!";
+-                        }
+-		}
+-		$hashlist{$hash} = $fprint;
++    link_hash($_[0], 'cert');
+ }
+ 
+ # Same as above except for a CRL. CRL links are of the form <hash>.r<n>
+ 
+ sub link_hash_crl {
+-		my $fname = $_[0];
+-		my ($hash, $fprint) = compute_hash($openssl, "crl", $crlhash,
+-						   "-fingerprint", "-noout",
+-						   "-in", $fname);
+-		chomp $hash;
+-		chomp $fprint;
+-		return if !$hash;
+-		$fprint =~ s/^.*=//;
+-		$fprint =~ tr/://d;
+-		my $suffix = 0;
+-		# Search for an unused hash filename
+-		while(exists $hashlist{"$hash.r$suffix"}) {
+-			# Hash matches: if fingerprint matches its a duplicate cert
+-			if ($hashlist{"$hash.r$suffix"} eq $fprint) {
+-				print STDERR "WARNING: Skipping duplicate CRL $fname\n";
+-				return;
+-			}
+-			$suffix++;
+-		}
+-		$hash .= ".r$suffix";
+-		if ($symlink_exists) {
+-			print "link $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
+-			symlink $fname, $hash || warn "Can't symlink, $!";
+-		} else {
+-			print "cp $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
+-			system ("cp", $fname, $hash);
+-                        warn "Can't copy, $!" if ($? >> 8) != 0;
+-		}
+-		$hashlist{$hash} = $fprint;
++    link_hash($_[0], 'crl');
++}
++
++sub link_hash {
++    my ($fname, $type) = @_;
++    my $is_cert = $type eq 'cert';
++
++    my ($hash, $fprint) = compute_hash($openssl,
++                                       $is_cert ? "x509" : "crl",
++                                       $is_cert ? $x509hash : $crlhash,
++                                       "-fingerprint", "-noout",
++                                       "-in", $fname);
++    chomp $hash;
++    chomp $fprint;
++    return if !$hash;
++    $fprint =~ s/^.*=//;
++    $fprint =~ tr/://d;
++    my $suffix = 0;
++    # Search for an unused hash filename
++    my $crlmark = $is_cert ? "" : "r";
++    while(exists $hashlist{"$hash.$crlmark$suffix"}) {
++        # Hash matches: if fingerprint matches its a duplicate cert
++        if ($hashlist{"$hash.$crlmark$suffix"} eq $fprint) {
++            my $what = $is_cert ? 'certificate' : 'CRL';
++            print STDERR "WARNING: Skipping duplicate $what $fname\n";
++            return;
++        }
++        $suffix++;
++    }
++    $hash .= ".$crlmark$suffix";
++    if ($symlink_exists) {
++        print "link $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
++        symlink $fname, $hash || warn "Can't symlink, $!";
++    } else {
++        print "copy $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
++        copy_file($fname, $hash);
++    }
++    $hashlist{$hash} = $fprint;
+ }
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+

dependency/openssl/CVE-2022-2097-Fix-AES-OCB-encrypt-decrypt-for-x86-AES-NI.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+From 919925673d6c9cfed3c1085497f5dfbbed5fc431 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alex Chernyakhovsky <achernya@google.com>
+Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2022 12:00:22 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix AES OCB encrypt/decrypt for x86 AES-NI
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+aesni_ocb_encrypt and aesni_ocb_decrypt operate by having a fast-path
+that performs operations on 6 16-byte blocks concurrently (the
+"grandloop") and then proceeds to handle the "short" tail (which can
+be anywhere from 0 to 5 blocks) that remain.
+
+As part of initialization, the assembly initializes $len to the true
+length, less 96 bytes and converts it to a pointer so that the $inp
+can be compared to it. Each iteration of "grandloop" checks to see if
+there's a full 96-byte chunk to process, and if so, continues. Once
+this has been exhausted, it falls through to "short", which handles
+the remaining zero to five blocks.
+
+Unfortunately, the jump at the end of "grandloop" had a fencepost
+error, doing a `jb` ("jump below") rather than `jbe` (jump below or
+equal). This should be `jbe`, as $inp is pointing to the *end* of the
+chunk currently being handled. If $inp == $len, that means that
+there's a whole 96-byte chunk waiting to be handled. If $inp > $len,
+then there's 5 or fewer 16-byte blocks left to be handled, and the
+fall-through is intended.
+
+The net effect of `jb` instead of `jbe` is that the last 16-byte block
+of the last 96-byte chunk was completely omitted. The contents of
+`out` in this position were never written to. Additionally, since
+those bytes were never processed, the authentication tag generated is
+also incorrect.
+
+The same fencepost error, and identical logic, exists in both
+aesni_ocb_encrypt and aesni_ocb_decrypt.
+
+This addresses CVE-2022-2097.
+
+Co-authored-by: Alejandro Sedeño <asedeno@google.com>
+Co-authored-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+---
+ crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
+index fe2b265..812758e 100644
+--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
++++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
+@@ -2027,7 +2027,7 @@ my ($l_,$block,$i1,$i3,$i5) = ($rounds_,$key_,$rounds,$len,$out);
+ 	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16*2,$out,$inp),$inout4);
+ 	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16*1,$out,$inp),$inout5);
+ 	&cmp		($inp,$len);			# done yet?
+-	&jb		(&label("grandloop"));
++	&jbe		(&label("grandloop"));
+ 
+ &set_label("short");
+ 	&add		($len,16*6);
+@@ -2453,7 +2453,7 @@ my ($l_,$block,$i1,$i3,$i5) = ($rounds_,$key_,$rounds,$len,$out);
+ 	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout5);
+ 	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16*1,$out,$inp),$inout5);
+ 	&cmp		($inp,$len);			# done yet?
+-	&jb		(&label("grandloop"));
++	&jbe		(&label("grandloop"));
+ 
+ &set_label("short");
+ 	&add		($len,16*6);
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+

dependency/openssl/CVE-2022-2097.patch

@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
-commit 919925673d6c9cfed3c1085497f5dfbbed5fc431
-Author: Alex Chernyakhovsky <achernya@google.com>
-Date:   Thu Jun 16 12:00:22 2022 +1000
-
-    Fix AES OCB encrypt/decrypt for x86 AES-NI
-    
-    aesni_ocb_encrypt and aesni_ocb_decrypt operate by having a fast-path
-    that performs operations on 6 16-byte blocks concurrently (the
-    "grandloop") and then proceeds to handle the "short" tail (which can
-    be anywhere from 0 to 5 blocks) that remain.
-    
-    As part of initialization, the assembly initializes $len to the true
-    length, less 96 bytes and converts it to a pointer so that the $inp
-    can be compared to it. Each iteration of "grandloop" checks to see if
-    there's a full 96-byte chunk to process, and if so, continues. Once
-    this has been exhausted, it falls through to "short", which handles
-    the remaining zero to five blocks.
-    
-    Unfortunately, the jump at the end of "grandloop" had a fencepost
-    error, doing a `jb` ("jump below") rather than `jbe` (jump below or
-    equal). This should be `jbe`, as $inp is pointing to the *end* of the
-    chunk currently being handled. If $inp == $len, that means that
-    there's a whole 96-byte chunk waiting to be handled. If $inp > $len,
-    then there's 5 or fewer 16-byte blocks left to be handled, and the
-    fall-through is intended.
-    
-    The net effect of `jb` instead of `jbe` is that the last 16-byte block
-    of the last 96-byte chunk was completely omitted. The contents of
-    `out` in this position were never written to. Additionally, since
-    those bytes were never processed, the authentication tag generated is
-    also incorrect.
-    
-    The same fencepost error, and identical logic, exists in both
-    aesni_ocb_encrypt and aesni_ocb_decrypt.
-    
-    This addresses CVE-2022-2097.
-    
-    Co-authored-by: Alejandro Sedeño <asedeno@google.com>
-    Co-authored-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
-    
-    Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
-    Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
-
-diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
-index fe2b26542a..812758e02e 100644
---- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
-+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
-@@ -2027,7 +2027,7 @@ my ($l_,$block,$i1,$i3,$i5) = ($rounds_,$key_,$rounds,$len,$out);
- 	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16*2,$out,$inp),$inout4);
- 	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16*1,$out,$inp),$inout5);
- 	&cmp		($inp,$len);			# done yet?
--	&jb		(&label("grandloop"));
-+	&jbe		(&label("grandloop"));
- 
- &set_label("short");
- 	&add		($len,16*6);
-@@ -2453,7 +2453,7 @@ my ($l_,$block,$i1,$i3,$i5) = ($rounds_,$key_,$rounds,$len,$out);
- 	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout5);
- 	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16*1,$out,$inp),$inout5);
- 	&cmp		($inp,$len);			# done yet?
--	&jb		(&label("grandloop"));
-+	&jbe		(&label("grandloop"));
- 
- &set_label("short");
- 	&add		($len,16*6);

dependency/openssl/CVE-2022-4304.patch

@@ -1,804 +0,0 @@
-From 43d8f88511991533f53680a751e9326999a6a31f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2023 15:26:54 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix Timing Oracle in RSA decryption
-
-A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption
-implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across
-a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful
-decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number
-of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA
-padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.
-
-Patch written by Dmitry Belyavsky and Hubert Kario
-
-CVE-2022-4304
-
-Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
----
- crypto/bn/bn_blind.c    |  14 -
- crypto/bn/bn_err.c      |   2 +
- crypto/bn/bn_local.h    |  14 +
- crypto/bn/build.info    |   3 +-
- crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c | 614 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- crypto/err/openssl.txt  |   3 +-
- crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c   |  17 +-
- include/crypto/bn.h     |   5 +
- include/openssl/bnerr.h |   1 +
- 9 files changed, 653 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
- create mode 100644 crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c
-
-diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c b/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
-index 76fc7ebcff..6e9d239321 100644
---- a/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
-+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
-@@ -13,20 +13,6 @@
- 
- #define BN_BLINDING_COUNTER     32
- 
--struct bn_blinding_st {
--    BIGNUM *A;
--    BIGNUM *Ai;
--    BIGNUM *e;
--    BIGNUM *mod;                /* just a reference */
--    CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
--    int counter;
--    unsigned long flags;
--    BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx;
--    int (*bn_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
--                       const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
--    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
--};
--
- BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, BIGNUM *mod)
- {
-     BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
-diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_err.c b/crypto/bn/bn_err.c
-index dd87c152cf..3dd8d9a568 100644
---- a/crypto/bn/bn_err.c
-+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_err.c
-@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA BN_str_functs[] = {
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_F_BN_SET_WORDS, 0), "bn_set_words"},
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_F_BN_STACK_PUSH, 0), "BN_STACK_push"},
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_F_BN_USUB, 0), "BN_usub"},
-+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_F_OSSL_BN_RSA_DO_UNBLIND, 0),
-+    "ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind"},
-     {0, NULL}
- };
- 
-diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_local.h b/crypto/bn/bn_local.h
-index 62a969b134..4d8cb64675 100644
---- a/crypto/bn/bn_local.h
-+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_local.h
-@@ -283,6 +283,20 @@ struct bn_gencb_st {
-     } cb;
- };
- 
-+struct bn_blinding_st {
-+    BIGNUM *A;
-+    BIGNUM *Ai;
-+    BIGNUM *e;
-+    BIGNUM *mod;                /* just a reference */
-+    CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
-+    int counter;
-+    unsigned long flags;
-+    BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx;
-+    int (*bn_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
-+                       const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
-+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
-+};
-+
- /*-
-  * BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size -- macro for sliding window mod_exp functions
-  *
-diff --git a/crypto/bn/build.info b/crypto/bn/build.info
-index b9ed5322fa..c9fe2fdada 100644
---- a/crypto/bn/build.info
-+++ b/crypto/bn/build.info
-@@ -5,7 +5,8 @@ SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
-         bn_kron.c bn_sqrt.c bn_gcd.c bn_prime.c bn_err.c bn_sqr.c \
-         {- $target{bn_asm_src} -} \
-         bn_recp.c bn_mont.c bn_mpi.c bn_exp2.c bn_gf2m.c bn_nist.c \
--        bn_depr.c bn_const.c bn_x931p.c bn_intern.c bn_dh.c bn_srp.c
-+        bn_depr.c bn_const.c bn_x931p.c bn_intern.c bn_dh.c bn_srp.c \
-+        rsa_sup_mul.c
- 
- INCLUDE[bn_exp.o]=..
- 
-diff --git a/crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c b/crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000000..acafefd5fe
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,614 @@
-+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-+#include <stddef.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/rsaerr.h>
-+#include "internal/numbers.h"
-+#include "internal/constant_time.h"
-+#include "bn_local.h"
-+
-+# if BN_BYTES == 8
-+typedef uint64_t limb_t;
-+#  if defined(__SIZEOF_INT128__) && __SIZEOF_INT128__ == 16
-+/* nonstandard; implemented by gcc on 64-bit platforms */
-+typedef __uint128_t limb2_t;
-+#   define HAVE_LIMB2_T
-+#  endif
-+#  define LIMB_BIT_SIZE 64
-+#  define LIMB_BYTE_SIZE 8
-+# elif BN_BYTES == 4
-+typedef uint32_t limb_t;
-+typedef uint64_t limb2_t;
-+#  define LIMB_BIT_SIZE 32
-+#  define LIMB_BYTE_SIZE 4
-+#  define HAVE_LIMB2_T
-+# else
-+#  error "Not supported"
-+# endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * For multiplication we're using schoolbook multiplication,
-+ * so if we have two numbers, each with 6 "digits" (words)
-+ * the multiplication is calculated as follows:
-+ *                        A B C D E F
-+ *                     x  I J K L M N
-+ *                     --------------
-+ *                                N*F
-+ *                              N*E
-+ *                            N*D
-+ *                          N*C
-+ *                        N*B
-+ *                      N*A
-+ *                              M*F
-+ *                            M*E
-+ *                          M*D
-+ *                        M*C
-+ *                      M*B
-+ *                    M*A
-+ *                            L*F
-+ *                          L*E
-+ *                        L*D
-+ *                      L*C
-+ *                    L*B
-+ *                  L*A
-+ *                          K*F
-+ *                        K*E
-+ *                      K*D
-+ *                    K*C
-+ *                  K*B
-+ *                K*A
-+ *                        J*F
-+ *                      J*E
-+ *                    J*D
-+ *                  J*C
-+ *                J*B
-+ *              J*A
-+ *                      I*F
-+ *                    I*E
-+ *                  I*D
-+ *                I*C
-+ *              I*B
-+ *         +  I*A
-+ *         ==========================
-+ *                        N*B N*D N*F
-+ *                    + N*A N*C N*E
-+ *                    + M*B M*D M*F
-+ *                  + M*A M*C M*E
-+ *                  + L*B L*D L*F
-+ *                + L*A L*C L*E
-+ *                + K*B K*D K*F
-+ *              + K*A K*C K*E
-+ *              + J*B J*D J*F
-+ *            + J*A J*C J*E
-+ *            + I*B I*D I*F
-+ *          + I*A I*C I*E
-+ *
-+ *                1+1 1+3 1+5
-+ *              1+0 1+2 1+4
-+ *              0+1 0+3 0+5
-+ *            0+0 0+2 0+4
-+ *
-+ *            0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-+ * which requires n^2 multiplications and 2n full length additions
-+ * as we can keep every other result of limb multiplication in two separate
-+ * limbs
-+ */
-+
-+#if defined HAVE_LIMB2_T
-+static ossl_inline void _mul_limb(limb_t *hi, limb_t *lo, limb_t a, limb_t b)
-+{
-+    limb2_t t;
-+    /*
-+     * this is idiomatic code to tell compiler to use the native mul
-+     * those three lines will actually compile to single instruction
-+     */
-+
-+    t = (limb2_t)a * b;
-+    *hi = t >> LIMB_BIT_SIZE;
-+    *lo = (limb_t)t;
-+}
-+#elif (BN_BYTES == 8) && (defined _MSC_VER)
-+/* https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/intrinsics/umul128?view=msvc-170 */
-+#pragma intrinsic(_umul128)
-+static ossl_inline void _mul_limb(limb_t *hi, limb_t *lo, limb_t a, limb_t b)
-+{
-+    *lo = _umul128(a, b, hi);
-+}
-+#else
-+/*
-+ * if the compiler doesn't have either a 128bit data type nor a "return
-+ * high 64 bits of multiplication"
-+ */
-+static ossl_inline void _mul_limb(limb_t *hi, limb_t *lo, limb_t a, limb_t b)
-+{
-+    limb_t a_low = (limb_t)(uint32_t)a;
-+    limb_t a_hi = a >> 32;
-+    limb_t b_low = (limb_t)(uint32_t)b;
-+    limb_t b_hi = b >> 32;
-+
-+    limb_t p0 = a_low * b_low;
-+    limb_t p1 = a_low * b_hi;
-+    limb_t p2 = a_hi * b_low;
-+    limb_t p3 = a_hi * b_hi;
-+
-+    uint32_t cy = (uint32_t)(((p0 >> 32) + (uint32_t)p1 + (uint32_t)p2) >> 32);
-+
-+    *lo = p0 + (p1 << 32) + (p2 << 32);
-+    *hi = p3 + (p1 >> 32) + (p2 >> 32) + cy;
-+}
-+#endif
-+
-+/* add two limbs with carry in, return carry out */
-+static ossl_inline limb_t _add_limb(limb_t *ret, limb_t a, limb_t b, limb_t carry)
-+{
-+    limb_t carry1, carry2, t;
-+    /*
-+     * `c = a + b; if (c < a)` is idiomatic code that makes compilers
-+     * use add with carry on assembly level
-+     */
-+
-+    *ret = a + carry;
-+    if (*ret < a)
-+        carry1 = 1;
-+    else
-+        carry1 = 0;
-+
-+    t = *ret;
-+    *ret = t + b;
-+    if (*ret < t)
-+        carry2 = 1;
-+    else
-+        carry2 = 0;
-+
-+    return carry1 + carry2;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * add two numbers of the same size, return overflow
-+ *
-+ * add a to b, place result in ret; all arrays need to be n limbs long
-+ * return overflow from addition (0 or 1)
-+ */
-+static ossl_inline limb_t add(limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, limb_t *b, size_t n)
-+{
-+    limb_t c = 0;
-+    ossl_ssize_t i;
-+
-+    for(i = n - 1; i > -1; i--)
-+        c = _add_limb(&ret[i], a[i], b[i], c);
-+
-+    return c;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * return number of limbs necessary for temporary values
-+ * when multiplying numbers n limbs large
-+ */
-+static ossl_inline size_t mul_limb_numb(size_t n)
-+{
-+    return  2 * n * 2;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * multiply two numbers of the same size
-+ *
-+ * multiply a by b, place result in ret; a and b need to be n limbs long
-+ * ret needs to be 2*n limbs long, tmp needs to be mul_limb_numb(n) limbs
-+ * long
-+ */
-+static void limb_mul(limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, limb_t *b, size_t n, limb_t *tmp)
-+{
-+    limb_t *r_odd, *r_even;
-+    size_t i, j, k;
-+
-+    r_odd = tmp;
-+    r_even = &tmp[2 * n];
-+
-+    memset(ret, 0, 2 * n * sizeof(limb_t));
-+
-+    for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
-+        for (k = 0; k < i + n + 1; k++) {
-+            r_even[k] = 0;
-+            r_odd[k] = 0;
-+        }
-+        for (j = 0; j < n; j++) {
-+            /*
-+             * place results from even and odd limbs in separate arrays so that
-+             * we don't have to calculate overflow every time we get individual
-+             * limb multiplication result
-+             */
-+            if (j % 2 == 0)
-+                _mul_limb(&r_even[i + j], &r_even[i + j + 1], a[i], b[j]);
-+            else
-+                _mul_limb(&r_odd[i + j], &r_odd[i + j + 1], a[i], b[j]);
-+        }
-+        /*
-+         * skip the least significant limbs when adding multiples of
-+         * more significant limbs (they're zero anyway)
-+         */
-+        add(ret, ret, r_even, n + i + 1);
-+        add(ret, ret, r_odd, n + i + 1);
-+    }
-+}
-+
-+/* modifies the value in place by performing a right shift by one bit */
-+static ossl_inline void rshift1(limb_t *val, size_t n)
-+{
-+    limb_t shift_in = 0, shift_out = 0;
-+    size_t i;
-+
-+    for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
-+        shift_out = val[i] & 1;
-+        val[i] = shift_in << (LIMB_BIT_SIZE - 1) | (val[i] >> 1);
-+        shift_in = shift_out;
-+    }
-+}
-+
-+/* extend the LSB of flag to all bits of limb */
-+static ossl_inline limb_t mk_mask(limb_t flag)
-+{
-+    flag |= flag << 1;
-+    flag |= flag << 2;
-+    flag |= flag << 4;
-+    flag |= flag << 8;
-+    flag |= flag << 16;
-+#if (LIMB_BYTE_SIZE == 8)
-+    flag |= flag << 32;
-+#endif
-+    return flag;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * copy from either a or b to ret based on flag
-+ * when flag == 0, then copies from b
-+ * when flag == 1, then copies from a
-+ */
-+static ossl_inline void cselect(limb_t flag, limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, limb_t *b, size_t n)
-+{
-+    /*
-+     * would be more efficient with non volatile mask, but then gcc
-+     * generates code with jumps
-+     */
-+    volatile limb_t mask;
-+    size_t i;
-+
-+    mask = mk_mask(flag);
-+    for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
-+#if (LIMB_BYTE_SIZE == 8)
-+        ret[i] = constant_time_select_64(mask, a[i], b[i]);
-+#else
-+        ret[i] = constant_time_select_32(mask, a[i], b[i]);
-+#endif
-+    }
-+}
-+
-+static limb_t _sub_limb(limb_t *ret, limb_t a, limb_t b, limb_t borrow)
-+{
-+    limb_t borrow1, borrow2, t;
-+    /*
-+     * while it doesn't look constant-time, this is idiomatic code
-+     * to tell compilers to use the carry bit from subtraction
-+     */
-+
-+    *ret = a - borrow;
-+    if (*ret > a)
-+        borrow1 = 1;
-+    else
-+        borrow1 = 0;
-+
-+    t = *ret;
-+    *ret = t - b;
-+    if (*ret > t)
-+        borrow2 = 1;
-+    else
-+        borrow2 = 0;
-+
-+    return borrow1 + borrow2;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * place the result of a - b into ret, return the borrow bit.
-+ * All arrays need to be n limbs long
-+ */
-+static limb_t sub(limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, limb_t *b, size_t n)
-+{
-+    limb_t borrow = 0;
-+    ossl_ssize_t i;
-+
-+    for (i = n - 1; i > -1; i--)
-+        borrow = _sub_limb(&ret[i], a[i], b[i], borrow);
-+
-+    return borrow;
-+}
-+
-+/* return the number of limbs necessary to allocate for the mod() tmp operand */
-+static ossl_inline size_t mod_limb_numb(size_t anum, size_t modnum)
-+{
-+    return (anum + modnum) * 3;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * calculate a % mod, place the result in ret
-+ * size of a is defined by anum, size of ret and mod is modnum,
-+ * size of tmp is returned by mod_limb_numb()
-+ */
-+static void mod(limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, size_t anum, limb_t *mod,
-+               size_t modnum, limb_t *tmp)
-+{
-+    limb_t *atmp, *modtmp, *rettmp;
-+    limb_t res;
-+    size_t i;
-+
-+    memset(tmp, 0, mod_limb_numb(anum, modnum) * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
-+
-+    atmp = tmp;
-+    modtmp = &tmp[anum + modnum];
-+    rettmp = &tmp[(anum + modnum) * 2];
-+
-+    for (i = modnum; i <modnum + anum; i++)
-+        atmp[i] = a[i-modnum];
-+
-+    for (i = 0; i < modnum; i++)
-+        modtmp[i] = mod[i];
-+
-+    for (i = 0; i < anum * LIMB_BIT_SIZE; i++) {
-+        rshift1(modtmp, anum + modnum);
-+        res = sub(rettmp, atmp, modtmp, anum+modnum);
-+        cselect(res, atmp, atmp, rettmp, anum+modnum);
-+    }
-+
-+    memcpy(ret, &atmp[anum], sizeof(limb_t) * modnum);
-+}
-+
-+/* necessary size of tmp for a _mul_add_limb() call with provided anum */
-+static ossl_inline size_t _mul_add_limb_numb(size_t anum)
-+{
-+    return 2 * (anum + 1);
-+}
-+
-+/* multiply a by m, add to ret, return carry */
-+static limb_t _mul_add_limb(limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, size_t anum,
-+                           limb_t m, limb_t *tmp)
-+{
-+    limb_t carry = 0;
-+    limb_t *r_odd, *r_even;
-+    size_t i;
-+
-+    memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(limb_t) * (anum + 1) * 2);
-+
-+    r_odd = tmp;
-+    r_even = &tmp[anum + 1];
-+
-+    for (i = 0; i < anum; i++) {
-+        /*
-+         * place the results from even and odd limbs in separate arrays
-+         * so that we have to worry about carry just once
-+         */
-+        if (i % 2 == 0)
-+            _mul_limb(&r_even[i], &r_even[i + 1], a[i], m);
-+        else
-+            _mul_limb(&r_odd[i], &r_odd[i + 1], a[i], m);
-+    }
-+    /* assert: add() carry here will be equal zero */
-+    add(r_even, r_even, r_odd, anum + 1);
-+    /*
-+     * while here it will not overflow as the max value from multiplication
-+     * is -2 while max overflow from addition is 1, so the max value of
-+     * carry is -1 (i.e. max int)
-+     */
-+    carry = add(ret, ret, &r_even[1], anum) + r_even[0];
-+
-+    return carry;
-+}
-+
-+static ossl_inline size_t mod_montgomery_limb_numb(size_t modnum)
-+{
-+    return modnum * 2 + _mul_add_limb_numb(modnum);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * calculate a % mod, place result in ret
-+ * assumes that a is in Montgomery form with the R (Montgomery modulus) being
-+ * smallest power of two big enough to fit mod and that's also a power
-+ * of the count of number of bits in limb_t (B).
-+ * For calculation, we also need n', such that mod * n' == -1 mod B.
-+ * anum must be <= 2 * modnum
-+ * ret needs to be modnum words long
-+ * tmp needs to be mod_montgomery_limb_numb(modnum) limbs long
-+ */
-+static void mod_montgomery(limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, size_t anum, limb_t *mod,
-+                          size_t modnum, limb_t ni0, limb_t *tmp)
-+{
-+    limb_t carry, v;
-+    limb_t *res, *rp, *tmp2;
-+    ossl_ssize_t i;
-+
-+    res = tmp;
-+    /*
-+     * for intermediate result we need an integer twice as long as modulus
-+     * but keep the input in the least significant limbs
-+     */
-+    memset(res, 0, sizeof(limb_t) * (modnum * 2));
-+    memcpy(&res[modnum * 2 - anum], a, sizeof(limb_t) * anum);
-+    rp = &res[modnum];
-+    tmp2 = &res[modnum * 2];
-+
-+    carry = 0;
-+
-+    /* add multiples of the modulus to the value until R divides it cleanly */
-+    for (i = modnum; i > 0; i--, rp--) {
-+        v = _mul_add_limb(rp, mod, modnum, rp[modnum - 1] * ni0, tmp2);
-+        v = v + carry + rp[-1];
-+        carry |= (v != rp[-1]);
-+        carry &= (v <= rp[-1]);
-+        rp[-1] = v;
-+    }
-+
-+    /* perform the final reduction by mod... */
-+    carry -= sub(ret, rp, mod, modnum);
-+
-+    /* ...conditionally */
-+    cselect(carry, ret, rp, ret, modnum);
-+}
-+
-+/* allocated buffer should be freed afterwards */
-+static void BN_to_limb(const BIGNUM *bn, limb_t *buf, size_t limbs)
-+{
-+    int i;
-+    int real_limbs = (BN_num_bytes(bn) + LIMB_BYTE_SIZE - 1) / LIMB_BYTE_SIZE;
-+    limb_t *ptr = buf + (limbs - real_limbs);
-+
-+    for (i = 0; i < real_limbs; i++)
-+         ptr[i] = bn->d[real_limbs - i - 1];
-+}
-+
-+#if LIMB_BYTE_SIZE == 8
-+static ossl_inline uint64_t be64(uint64_t host)
-+{
-+    const union {
-+        long one;
-+        char little;
-+    } is_endian = { 1 };
-+
-+    if (is_endian.little) {
-+        uint64_t big = 0;
-+
-+        big |= (host & 0xff00000000000000) >> 56;
-+        big |= (host & 0x00ff000000000000) >> 40;
-+        big |= (host & 0x0000ff0000000000) >> 24;
-+        big |= (host & 0x000000ff00000000) >>  8;
-+        big |= (host & 0x00000000ff000000) <<  8;
-+        big |= (host & 0x0000000000ff0000) << 24;
-+        big |= (host & 0x000000000000ff00) << 40;
-+        big |= (host & 0x00000000000000ff) << 56;
-+        return big;
-+    } else {
-+        return host;
-+    }
-+}
-+
-+#else
-+/* Not all platforms have htobe32(). */
-+static ossl_inline uint32_t be32(uint32_t host)
-+{
-+    const union {
-+        long one;
-+        char little;
-+    } is_endian = { 1 };
-+
-+    if (is_endian.little) {
-+        uint32_t big = 0;
-+
-+        big |= (host & 0xff000000) >> 24;
-+        big |= (host & 0x00ff0000) >> 8;
-+        big |= (host & 0x0000ff00) << 8;
-+        big |= (host & 0x000000ff) << 24;
-+        return big;
-+    } else {
-+        return host;
-+    }
-+}
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * We assume that intermediate, possible_arg2, blinding, and ctx are used
-+ * similar to BN_BLINDING_invert_ex() arguments.
-+ * to_mod is RSA modulus.
-+ * buf and num is the serialization buffer and its length.
-+ *
-+ * Here we use classic/Montgomery multiplication and modulo. After the calculation finished
-+ * we serialize the new structure instead of BIGNUMs taking endianness into account.
-+ */
-+int ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind(const BIGNUM *intermediate,
-+                           const BN_BLINDING *blinding,
-+                           const BIGNUM *possible_arg2,
-+                           const BIGNUM *to_mod, BN_CTX *ctx,
-+                           unsigned char *buf, int num)
-+{
-+    limb_t *l_im = NULL, *l_mul = NULL, *l_mod = NULL;
-+    limb_t *l_ret = NULL, *l_tmp = NULL, l_buf;
-+    size_t l_im_count = 0, l_mul_count = 0, l_size = 0, l_mod_count = 0;
-+    size_t l_tmp_count = 0;
-+    int ret = 0;
-+    size_t i;
-+    unsigned char *tmp;
-+    const BIGNUM *arg1 = intermediate;
-+    const BIGNUM *arg2 = (possible_arg2 == NULL) ? blinding->Ai : possible_arg2;
-+
-+    l_im_count  = (BN_num_bytes(arg1)   + LIMB_BYTE_SIZE - 1) / LIMB_BYTE_SIZE;
-+    l_mul_count = (BN_num_bytes(arg2)   + LIMB_BYTE_SIZE - 1) / LIMB_BYTE_SIZE;
-+    l_mod_count = (BN_num_bytes(to_mod) + LIMB_BYTE_SIZE - 1) / LIMB_BYTE_SIZE;
-+
-+    l_size = l_im_count > l_mul_count ? l_im_count : l_mul_count;
-+    l_im  = OPENSSL_zalloc(l_size * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
-+    l_mul = OPENSSL_zalloc(l_size * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
-+    l_mod = OPENSSL_zalloc(l_mod_count * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
-+
-+    if ((l_im == NULL) || (l_mul == NULL) || (l_mod == NULL))
-+        goto err;
-+
-+    BN_to_limb(arg1,   l_im,  l_size);
-+    BN_to_limb(arg2,   l_mul, l_size);
-+    BN_to_limb(to_mod, l_mod, l_mod_count);
-+
-+    l_ret = OPENSSL_malloc(2 * l_size * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
-+
-+    if (blinding->m_ctx != NULL) {
-+        l_tmp_count = mul_limb_numb(l_size) > mod_montgomery_limb_numb(l_mod_count) ?
-+                      mul_limb_numb(l_size) : mod_montgomery_limb_numb(l_mod_count);
-+        l_tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(l_tmp_count * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
-+    } else {
-+        l_tmp_count = mul_limb_numb(l_size) > mod_limb_numb(2 * l_size, l_mod_count) ?
-+                      mul_limb_numb(l_size) : mod_limb_numb(2 * l_size, l_mod_count);
-+        l_tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(l_tmp_count * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
-+    }
-+
-+    if ((l_ret == NULL) || (l_tmp == NULL))
-+        goto err;
-+
-+    if (blinding->m_ctx != NULL) {
-+        limb_mul(l_ret, l_im, l_mul, l_size, l_tmp);
-+        mod_montgomery(l_ret, l_ret, 2 * l_size, l_mod, l_mod_count,
-+                       blinding->m_ctx->n0[0], l_tmp);
-+    } else {
-+        limb_mul(l_ret, l_im, l_mul, l_size, l_tmp);
-+        mod(l_ret, l_ret, 2 * l_size, l_mod, l_mod_count, l_tmp);
-+    }
-+
-+    /* modulus size in bytes can be equal to num but after limbs conversion it becomes bigger */
-+    if (num < BN_num_bytes(to_mod)) {
-+        BNerr(BN_F_OSSL_BN_RSA_DO_UNBLIND, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
-+        goto err;
-+    }
-+
-+    memset(buf, 0, num);
-+    tmp = buf + num - BN_num_bytes(to_mod);
-+    for (i = 0; i < l_mod_count; i++) {
-+#if LIMB_BYTE_SIZE == 8
-+        l_buf = be64(l_ret[i]);
-+#else
-+        l_buf = be32(l_ret[i]);
-+#endif
-+        if (i == 0) {
-+            int delta = LIMB_BYTE_SIZE - ((l_mod_count * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE) - num);
-+
-+            memcpy(tmp, ((char *)&l_buf) + LIMB_BYTE_SIZE - delta, delta);
-+            tmp += delta;
-+        } else {
-+            memcpy(tmp, &l_buf, LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
-+            tmp += LIMB_BYTE_SIZE;
-+        }
-+    }
-+    ret = num;
-+
-+ err:
-+    OPENSSL_free(l_im);
-+    OPENSSL_free(l_mul);
-+    OPENSSL_free(l_mod);
-+    OPENSSL_free(l_tmp);
-+    OPENSSL_free(l_ret);
-+
-+    return ret;
-+}
-diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
-index 9f91a4a811..ba3a46d5b9 100644
---- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
-+++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
-@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
--# Copyright 1999-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
-+# Copyright 1999-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- #
- # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
- # this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
-@@ -232,6 +232,7 @@ BN_F_BN_RSHIFT:146:BN_rshift
- BN_F_BN_SET_WORDS:144:bn_set_words
- BN_F_BN_STACK_PUSH:148:BN_STACK_push
- BN_F_BN_USUB:115:BN_usub
-+BN_F_OSSL_BN_RSA_DO_UNBLIND:151:ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind
- BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW:100:BUF_MEM_grow
- BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW_CLEAN:105:BUF_MEM_grow_clean
- BUF_F_BUF_MEM_NEW:101:BUF_MEM_new
-diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
-index b52a66f6a6..6c3c0cf78d 100644
---- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
-+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
-@@ -465,11 +465,20 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-         BN_free(d);
-     }
- 
--    if (blinding)
--        if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
-+    if (blinding) {
-+        /*
-+         * ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind() combines blinding inversion and
-+         * 0-padded BN BE serialization
-+         */
-+        j = ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind(ret, blinding, unblind, rsa->n, ctx,
-+                                   buf, num);
-+        if (j == 0)
-             goto err;
--
--    j = BN_bn2binpad(ret, buf, num);
-+    } else {
-+        j = BN_bn2binpad(ret, buf, num);
-+        if (j < 0)
-+            goto err;
-+    }
- 
-     switch (padding) {
-     case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-diff --git a/include/crypto/bn.h b/include/crypto/bn.h
-index 60afda1dad..b5f36fb25a 100644
---- a/include/crypto/bn.h
-+++ b/include/crypto/bn.h
-@@ -86,5 +86,10 @@ int bn_lshift_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n);
- int bn_rshift_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n);
- int bn_div_fixed_top(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m,
-                      const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx);
-+int ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind(const BIGNUM *intermediate,
-+                           const BN_BLINDING *blinding,
-+                           const BIGNUM *possible_arg2,
-+                           const BIGNUM *to_mod, BN_CTX *ctx,
-+                           unsigned char *buf, int num);
- 
- #endif
-diff --git a/include/openssl/bnerr.h b/include/openssl/bnerr.h
-index 9f3c7cfaab..a0752cea52 100644
---- a/include/openssl/bnerr.h
-+++ b/include/openssl/bnerr.h
-@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ int ERR_load_BN_strings(void);
- # define BN_F_BN_SET_WORDS                                144
- # define BN_F_BN_STACK_PUSH                               148
- # define BN_F_BN_USUB                                     115
-+# define BN_F_OSSL_BN_RSA_DO_UNBLIND                      151
- 
- /*
-  * BN reason codes.
--- 
-2.34.1

dependency/openssl/CVE-2023-3446.patch

@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-diff -Naur a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
---- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c	2023-07-25 19:25:47.628975754 +0800
-+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c	2023-07-25 19:22:41.934923083 +0800
-@@ -101,6 +101,12 @@
-     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-     BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL;
- 
-+    /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
-+    if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
-+        DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
-+        return 0;
-+    }
-+
-     if (!DH_check_params(dh, ret))
-         return 0;
- 
-diff -Naur a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
---- a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c	2023-07-25 19:25:47.628975754 +0800
-+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c	2023-07-25 19:22:41.934923083 +0800
-@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
- /*
-  * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
-- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
-+ * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
-  *
-  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
-  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
-@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DHPARAMS_PRINT_FP, 0), "DHparams_print_fp"},
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS, 0),
-      "dh_builtin_genparams"},
-+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_CHECK, 0), "DH_check"},
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX, 0), "DH_check_ex"},
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_CHECK_PARAMS_EX, 0), "DH_check_params_ex"},
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_CHECK_PUB_KEY_EX, 0), "DH_check_pub_key_ex"},
-diff -Naur a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
---- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt	2023-07-25 19:25:47.632975799 +0800
-+++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt	2023-07-25 19:22:41.938923126 +0800
-@@ -402,6 +402,7 @@
- DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY:102:compute_key
- DH_F_DHPARAMS_PRINT_FP:101:DHparams_print_fp
- DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS:106:dh_builtin_genparams
-+DH_F_DH_CHECK:126:DH_check
- DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX:121:DH_check_ex
- DH_F_DH_CHECK_PARAMS_EX:122:DH_check_params_ex
- DH_F_DH_CHECK_PUB_KEY_EX:123:DH_check_pub_key_ex
-diff -Naur a/include/openssl/dherr.h b/include/openssl/dherr.h
---- a/include/openssl/dherr.h	2023-07-25 19:25:47.668976201 +0800
-+++ b/include/openssl/dherr.h	2023-07-25 19:22:41.978923558 +0800
-@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
- /*
-  * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
-- * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
-+ * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
-  *
-  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
-  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
-@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
- #  define DH_F_DHPARAMS_PRINT_FP                           101
- #  define DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS                        106
- #  define DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX                                 121
-+#  define DH_F_DH_CHECK                                    126
- #  define DH_F_DH_CHECK_PARAMS_EX                          122
- #  define DH_F_DH_CHECK_PUB_KEY_EX                         123
- #  define DH_F_DH_CMS_DECRYPT                              114
-diff -Naur a/include/openssl/dh.h b/include/openssl/dh.h
---- a/include/openssl/dh.h	2023-07-25 19:25:47.668976201 +0800
-+++ b/include/openssl/dh.h	2023-07-25 19:22:41.978923558 +0800
-@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@
- # ifndef OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
- #  define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS    10000
- # endif
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
-+#  define OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS  32768
-+# endif
- 
- # define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024

dependency/openssl/CVE-2023-3817.patch

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-diff -Naur a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
---- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c	2023-09-01 14:52:09.746018434 +0800
-+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c	2023-09-01 15:06:12.055519115 +0800
-@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@
- 
- int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
- {
--    int ok = 0, r;
-+    int ok = 0, r, q_good = 0;
-     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-     BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL;
- 
-@@ -113,7 +113,14 @@
-     if (t2 == NULL)
-         goto err;
- 
--    if (dh->q) {
-+    if (dh->q != NULL) {
-+        if (BN_ucmp(dh->p, dh->q) > 0)
-+            q_good = 1;
-+        else
-+            *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE;
-+    }
-+
-+    if (q_good) {
-         if (BN_cmp(dh->g, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
-             *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
-         else if (BN_cmp(dh->g, dh->p) >= 0)

dependency/openssl/CVE-2024-0727.patch

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 diff -Naur a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
---- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c	2024-02-04 10:55:19.252070922 +0800
-+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c	2024-02-04 10:53:27.906106687 +0800
+--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c	2024-02-02 15:39:27.287368573 +0800
++++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c	2024-02-02 15:38:30.271860109 +0800
 @@ -76,6 +76,12 @@
                    PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
          return NULL;
@@ -14,20 +14,19 @@ diff -Naur a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
      return ASN1_item_unpack(p7->d.data, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS));
  }
  
-@@ -132,6 +138,12 @@
+@@ -132,6 +138,11 @@
  {
      if (!PKCS7_type_is_encrypted(p7))
          return NULL;
 +
-+    if (p7->d.data == NULL) {
-+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_UNPACK_P7DATA, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
++    if (p7->d.encrypted == NULL) {
 +        return NULL;
 +    }
 +
      return PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
                                     ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS),
                                     pass, passlen,
-@@ -159,6 +171,11 @@
+@@ -159,6 +170,11 @@
                    PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
          return NULL;
      }
@@ -40,8 +39,8 @@ diff -Naur a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
                              ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_AUTHSAFES));
  }
 diff -Naur a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
---- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c	2024-02-04 10:55:19.252070922 +0800
-+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c	2024-02-04 10:53:27.906106687 +0800
+--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c	2024-02-02 15:39:27.287368573 +0800
++++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c	2024-02-02 15:38:30.271860109 +0800
 @@ -93,6 +93,11 @@
          return 0;
      }
@@ -55,8 +54,8 @@ diff -Naur a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
      saltlen = p12->mac->salt->length;
      if (!p12->mac->iter)
 diff -Naur a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c
---- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c	2024-02-04 10:55:19.252070922 +0800
-+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c	2024-02-04 10:53:27.906106687 +0800
+--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c	2024-02-02 15:39:27.287368573 +0800
++++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c	2024-02-02 15:38:30.271860109 +0800
 @@ -78,8 +78,9 @@
              bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7);
          } else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
@@ -70,9 +69,9 @@ diff -Naur a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c
          } else {
              continue;
 diff -Naur a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c
---- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c	2024-02-04 10:55:19.245070861 +0800
-+++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c	2024-02-04 10:53:27.898106618 +0800
-@@ -30,11 +30,14 @@
+--- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c	2024-02-02 15:39:27.280368511 +0800
++++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c	2024-02-02 15:38:30.263860038 +0800
+@@ -30,10 +30,14 @@
  {
      STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *mdalgs;
      int ctype_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
@@ -85,8 +84,7 @@ diff -Naur a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c
 -    else
 +    } else {
          mdalgs = NULL;
--
 +    }
-     flags ^= SMIME_OLDMIME;
  
-     return SMIME_write_ASN1(bio, (ASN1_VALUE *)p7, data, flags,
+     flags ^= SMIME_OLDMIME;
+

dependency/openssl/Feature-PKCS7-sign-and-verify-support-SM2-algorithm.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+From fa3d5b8af929c296f4d684345dedf1e2b4b390e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: gaoyusong <gaoyusong2@huawei.com>
+Date: Fri, 30 Sep 2022 12:10:15 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] PKCS7 sign and verify support SM2 algorithm
+
+Signed-off-by: Huaxin Lu <luhuaxin1@huawei.com>
+---
+ crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
+ crypto/sm2/sm2_pmeth.c  |  1 +
+ 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
+index f63fbc5..916a35a 100644
+--- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
++++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
+@@ -946,6 +946,9 @@ int PKCS7_signatureVerify(BIO *bio, PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si,
+     STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk;
+     BIO *btmp;
+     EVP_PKEY *pkey;
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
++#endif
+ 
+     mdc_tmp = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+     if (mdc_tmp == NULL) {
+@@ -1013,7 +1016,19 @@ int PKCS7_signatureVerify(BIO *bio, PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si,
+             goto err;
+         }
+ 
+-        if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mdc_tmp, EVP_get_digestbynid(md_type), NULL))
++        pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x509);
++        if (!pkey) {
++            ret = -1;
++            goto err;
++        }
++
++        ret =
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
++        EVP_PKEY_is_sm2(pkey) ?
++        EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mdc_tmp, &pctx, EVP_get_digestbynid(md_type), NULL, pkey) :
++#endif
++        EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mdc_tmp, EVP_get_digestbynid(md_type), NULL);
++        if (!ret)
+             goto err;
+ 
+         alen = ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)sk, &abuf,
+@@ -1036,7 +1051,11 @@ int PKCS7_signatureVerify(BIO *bio, PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si,
+         goto err;
+     }
+ 
+-    i = EVP_VerifyFinal(mdc_tmp, os->data, os->length, pkey);
++    i =
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
++    EVP_PKEY_is_sm2(pkey) ? EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mdc_tmp, os->data, os->length) :
++#endif
++    EVP_VerifyFinal(mdc_tmp, os->data, os->length, pkey);
+     if (i <= 0) {
+         PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY, PKCS7_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
+         ret = -1;
+diff --git a/crypto/sm2/sm2_pmeth.c b/crypto/sm2/sm2_pmeth.c
+index 1998812..53cdbe9 100644
+--- a/crypto/sm2/sm2_pmeth.c
++++ b/crypto/sm2/sm2_pmeth.c
+@@ -221,6 +221,7 @@ static int pkey_sm2_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
+         return 1;
+ 
+     case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
++    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
+         /* nothing to be inited, this is to suppress the error... */
+         return 1;
+ 
+-- 
+2.33.0
+

dependency/openssl/Feature-SM4-XTS-optimization-for-ARM-by-HW-instruction.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,621 @@
+From 3f0898b2aea424f18f58a182803478f25548674e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Xu Yizhou <xuyizhou1@huawei.com>
+Date: Wed, 2 Nov 2022 11:13:07 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] SM4 XTS optimization for ARM by HW instruction
+
+This patch implements the SM4 XTS optimization for ARM processor,
+using SM4 HW instruction, which is an optional feature of
+crypto extension for aarch64 V8.
+
+Signed-off-by: Xu Yizhou <xuyizhou1@huawei.com>
+---
+ crypto/evp/e_sm4.c            |  28 ++
+ crypto/sm4/asm/sm4-armv8.pl   | 498 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ include/crypto/sm4_platform.h |  14 +
+ 3 files changed, 537 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_sm4.c b/crypto/evp/e_sm4.c
+index eaa5ba0..da4dbd3 100644
+--- a/crypto/evp/e_sm4.c
++++ b/crypto/evp/e_sm4.c
+@@ -281,6 +281,34 @@ static int sm4_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+             const int bytes = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2;
+             xctx->stream_gb = NULL;
+             xctx->stream = NULL;
++#ifdef HWSM4_CAPABLE
++            if (HWSM4_CAPABLE) {
++                if (enc) {
++                    HWSM4_set_encrypt_key(key, &xctx->ks1.ks);
++                    xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) HWSM4_encrypt;
++# ifdef HWSM4_xts_encrypt_gb
++                    xctx->stream_gb = HWSM4_xts_encrypt_gb;
++# endif
++# ifdef HWSM4_xts_encrypt
++                    xctx->stream = HWSM4_xts_encrypt;
++# endif
++                } else {
++                    HWSM4_set_decrypt_key(key, &xctx->ks1.ks);
++                    xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) HWSM4_decrypt;
++# ifdef HWSM4_xts_decrypt_gb
++                    xctx->stream_gb = HWSM4_xts_decrypt_gb;
++# endif
++# ifdef HWSM4_xts_decrypt
++                    xctx->stream = HWSM4_xts_decrypt;
++# endif
++                }
++                HWSM4_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, &xctx->ks2.ks);
++                xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) HWSM4_encrypt;
++
++                xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
++                break;
++            } else
++#endif
+ #ifdef VPSM4_EX_CAPABLE
+             if (VPSM4_EX_CAPABLE) {
+                 if (enc) {
+diff --git a/crypto/sm4/asm/sm4-armv8.pl b/crypto/sm4/asm/sm4-armv8.pl
+index dbacad2..923c1c0 100644
+--- a/crypto/sm4/asm/sm4-armv8.pl
++++ b/crypto/sm4/asm/sm4-armv8.pl
+@@ -11,9 +11,9 @@
+ # Oct 2021
+ #
+ 
+-# $output is the last argument if it looks like a file (it has an extension)
++# $outut is the last argument if it looks like a file (it has an extension)
+ # $flavour is the first argument if it doesn't look like a file
+-$output = $#ARGV >= 0 && $ARGV[$#ARGV] =~ m|\.\w+$| ? pop : undef;
++$outut = $#ARGV >= 0 && $ARGV[$#ARGV] =~ m|\.\w+$| ? pop : undef;
+ $flavour = $#ARGV >= 0 && $ARGV[0] !~ m|\.| ? shift : undef;
+ 
+ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+ ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+ die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl";
+ 
+-open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour \"$output\""
++open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour \"$outut\""
+     or die "can't call $xlate: $!";
+ *STDOUT=*OUT;
+ 
+@@ -110,6 +110,120 @@ $code.=<<___;
+ ___
+ }
+ 
++sub mov_reg_to_vec() {
++    my $src0 = shift;
++    my $src1 = shift;
++    my $desv = shift;
++$code.=<<___;
++    mov $desv.d[0],$src0
++    mov $desv.d[1],$src1
++#ifdef __ARMEB__
++    rev32  $desv.16b,$desv.16b
++#endif
++___
++}
++
++sub mov_vec_to_reg() {
++    my $srcv = shift;
++    my $des0 = shift;
++    my $des1 = shift;
++$code.=<<___;
++    mov $des0,$srcv.d[0]
++    mov $des1,$srcv.d[1]
++___
++}
++
++sub compute_tweak() {
++    my $src0 = shift;
++    my $src1 = shift;
++    my $des0 = shift;
++    my $des1 = shift;
++    my $tmp0 = shift;
++    my $tmp1 = shift;
++    my $magic = shift;
++$code.=<<___;
++    extr    x$tmp1,$src1,$src1,#32
++    extr    $des1,$src1,$src0,#63
++    and    w$tmp0,w$magic,w$tmp1,asr#31
++    eor    $des0,x$tmp0,$src0,lsl#1
++___
++}
++
++sub compute_tweak_vec() {
++    my $src = shift;
++    my $des = shift;
++    my $tmp0 = shift;
++    my $tmp1 = shift;
++    my $magic = shift;
++    &rbit($tmp1,$src);
++$code.=<<___;
++    shl  $des.16b, $tmp1.16b, #1
++    ext  $tmp0.16b, $tmp1.16b, $tmp1.16b,#15
++    ushr $tmp0.16b, $tmp0.16b, #7
++    mul  $tmp0.16b, $tmp0.16b, $magic.16b
++    eor  $des.16b, $des.16b, $tmp0.16b
++___
++    &rbit($des,$des);
++}
++
++sub mov_en_to_enc(){
++    my $en = shift;
++    my $enc = shift;
++    if ($en eq "en") {
++$code.=<<___;
++        mov   $enc,1
++___
++    } else {
++$code.=<<___;
++        mov   $enc,0
++___
++    }
++}
++
++sub rbit() {
++    my $dst = shift;
++    my $src = shift;
++
++    if ($src and ("$src" ne "$dst")) {
++        if ($standard eq "_gb") {
++$code.=<<___;
++            rbit $dst.16b,$src.16b
++___
++        } else {
++$code.=<<___;
++            mov $dst.16b,$src.16b
++___
++        }
++    } else {
++        if ($standard eq "_gb") {
++$code.=<<___;
++            rbit $dst.16b,$src.16b
++___
++        }
++    }
++}
++
++sub rev32_armeb() {
++    my $dst = shift;
++    my $src = shift;
++
++    if ($src and ("$src" ne "$dst")) {
++$code.=<<___;
++#ifdef __ARMEB__
++    rev32    $dst.16b,$src.16b
++#else
++    mov    $dst.16b,$src.16b
++#endif
++___
++    } else {
++$code.=<<___;
++#ifdef __ARMEB__
++    rev32    $dst.16b,$dst.16b
++#endif
++___
++    }
++}
++
+ $code=<<___;
+ #include "arm_arch.h"
+ .arch	armv8-a+crypto
+@@ -595,6 +709,384 @@ $code.=<<___;
+ .size	${prefix}_ctr32_encrypt_blocks,.-${prefix}_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
+ ___
+ }}}
++
++
++{{{
++my ($inp,$out,$len,$rk1,$rk2,$ivp)=map("x$_",(0..5));
++my ($blocks)=("x2");
++my ($enc)=("x6");
++my ($remain)=("x7");
++my @twx=map("x$_",(9..24));
++my $lastBlk=("x25");
++
++my @tweak=map("v$_",(8..15));
++my @dat=map("v$_",(16..23));
++my $lastTweak=("v24");
++
++# x/w/v/q registers for compute tweak
++my ($magic)=("8");
++my ($tmp0,$tmp1)=("26","27");
++my ($qMagic,$vMagic)=("q25","v25");
++my ($vTmp0,$vTmp1)=("v26","v27");
++
++sub gen_xts_do_cipher() {
++$code.=<<___;
++.globl    ${prefix}_xts_do_cipher${standard}
++.type    ${prefix}_xts_do_cipher${standard},%function
++.align    5
++${prefix}_xts_do_cipher${standard}:
++	mov w$magic,0x87
++    ldr $qMagic, =0x01010101010101010101010101010187
++	// used to encrypt the XORed plaintext blocks
++	ld1	{@rks[0].4s,@rks[1].4s,@rks[2].4s,@rks[3].4s},[$rk2],#64
++	ld1	{@rks[4].4s,@rks[5].4s,@rks[6].4s,@rks[7].4s},[$rk2]
++    ld1    {@tweak[0].4s}, [$ivp]
++___
++    &rev32(@tweak[0],@tweak[0]);
++    &enc_blk(@tweak[0]);
++	&rev32(@tweak[0],@tweak[0]);
++$code.=<<___;
++	// used to encrypt the initial vector to yield the initial tweak
++	ld1	{@rks[0].4s,@rks[1].4s,@rks[2].4s,@rks[3].4s},[$rk1],#64
++	ld1	{@rks[4].4s,@rks[5].4s,@rks[6].4s,@rks[7].4s},[$rk1]
++
++    and    $remain,$len,#0x0F
++    // convert length into blocks
++    lsr	$blocks,$len,4
++    cmp	$blocks,#1						// $len must be at least 16
++    b.lt	99f
++
++    cmp $remain,0						// if $len is a multiple of 16
++    b.eq .xts_encrypt_blocks${standard}
++										// if $len is not a multiple of 16
++    subs $blocks,$blocks,#1
++    b.eq .only_2blks_tweak${standard}	// if $len is less than 32
++
++.xts_encrypt_blocks${standard}:
++___
++    &rbit(@tweak[0],@tweak[0]);
++	&rev32_armeb(@tweak[0],@tweak[0]);
++    &mov_vec_to_reg(@tweak[0],@twx[0],@twx[1]);
++	&compute_tweak(@twx[0],@twx[1],@twx[2],@twx[3],$tmp0,$tmp1,$magic);
++    &compute_tweak(@twx[2],@twx[3],@twx[4],@twx[5],$tmp0,$tmp1,$magic);
++    &compute_tweak(@twx[4],@twx[5],@twx[6],@twx[7],$tmp0,$tmp1,$magic);
++	&compute_tweak(@twx[6],@twx[7],@twx[8],@twx[9],$tmp0,$tmp1,$magic);
++    &compute_tweak(@twx[8],@twx[9],@twx[10],@twx[11],$tmp0,$tmp1,$magic);
++    &compute_tweak(@twx[10],@twx[11],@twx[12],@twx[13],$tmp0,$tmp1,$magic);
++    &compute_tweak(@twx[12],@twx[13],@twx[14],@twx[15],$tmp0,$tmp1,$magic);
++$code.=<<___;
++1:
++    cmp    $blocks,#8
++___
++    &mov_reg_to_vec(@twx[0],@twx[1],@tweak[0]);
++    &compute_tweak(@twx[14],@twx[15],@twx[0],@twx[1],$tmp0,$tmp1,$magic);
++    &mov_reg_to_vec(@twx[2],@twx[3],@tweak[1]);
++	&compute_tweak(@twx[0],@twx[1],@twx[2],@twx[3],$tmp0,$tmp1,$magic);
++    &mov_reg_to_vec(@twx[4],@twx[5],@tweak[2]);
++    &compute_tweak(@twx[2],@twx[3],@twx[4],@twx[5],$tmp0,$tmp1,$magic);
++    &mov_reg_to_vec(@twx[6],@twx[7],@tweak[3]);
++    &compute_tweak(@twx[4],@twx[5],@twx[6],@twx[7],$tmp0,$tmp1,$magic);
++    &mov_reg_to_vec(@twx[8],@twx[9],@tweak[4]);
++	&compute_tweak(@twx[6],@twx[7],@twx[8],@twx[9],$tmp0,$tmp1,$magic);
++    &mov_reg_to_vec(@twx[10],@twx[11],@tweak[5]);
++    &compute_tweak(@twx[8],@twx[9],@twx[10],@twx[11],$tmp0,$tmp1,$magic);
++    &mov_reg_to_vec(@twx[12],@twx[13],@tweak[6]);
++    &compute_tweak(@twx[10],@twx[11],@twx[12],@twx[13],$tmp0,$tmp1,$magic);
++    &mov_reg_to_vec(@twx[14],@twx[15],@tweak[7]);
++    &compute_tweak(@twx[12],@twx[13],@twx[14],@twx[15],$tmp0,$tmp1,$magic);
++$code.=<<___;
++    b.lt    2f
++    ld1	{@dat[0].4s,@dat[1].4s,@dat[2].4s,@dat[3].4s},[$inp],#64
++___
++    &rbit(@tweak[0],@tweak[0]);
++    &rbit(@tweak[1],@tweak[1]);
++    &rbit(@tweak[2],@tweak[2]);
++    &rbit(@tweak[3],@tweak[3]);
++$code.=<<___;
++    eor @dat[0].16b, @dat[0].16b, @tweak[0].16b
++    eor @dat[1].16b, @dat[1].16b, @tweak[1].16b
++    eor @dat[2].16b, @dat[2].16b, @tweak[2].16b
++    eor @dat[3].16b, @dat[3].16b, @tweak[3].16b
++    ld1	{@dat[4].4s,@dat[5].4s,@dat[6].4s,@dat[7].4s},[$inp],#64
++___
++    &rbit(@tweak[4],@tweak[4]);
++    &rbit(@tweak[5],@tweak[5]);
++    &rbit(@tweak[6],@tweak[6]);
++    &rbit(@tweak[7],@tweak[7]);
++$code.=<<___;
++    eor @dat[4].16b, @dat[4].16b, @tweak[4].16b
++    eor @dat[5].16b, @dat[5].16b, @tweak[5].16b
++    eor @dat[6].16b, @dat[6].16b, @tweak[6].16b
++    eor @dat[7].16b, @dat[7].16b, @tweak[7].16b
++___
++	&rev32(@dat[0],@dat[0]);
++	&rev32(@dat[1],@dat[1]);
++	&rev32(@dat[2],@dat[2]);
++	&rev32(@dat[3],@dat[3]);
++	&rev32(@dat[4],@dat[4]);
++	&rev32(@dat[5],@dat[5]);
++	&rev32(@dat[6],@dat[6]);
++	&rev32(@dat[7],@dat[7]);
++	&enc_4blks(@dat[0],@dat[1],@dat[2],@dat[3]);
++	&enc_4blks(@dat[4],@dat[5],@dat[6],@dat[7]);
++	&rev32(@dat[0],@dat[0]);
++	&rev32(@dat[1],@dat[1]);
++	&rev32(@dat[2],@dat[2]);
++	&rev32(@dat[3],@dat[3]);
++	&rev32(@dat[4],@dat[4]);
++	&rev32(@dat[5],@dat[5]);
++	&rev32(@dat[6],@dat[6]);
++	&rev32(@dat[7],@dat[7]);
++$code.=<<___;
++    eor @dat[0].16b, @dat[0].16b, @tweak[0].16b
++    eor @dat[1].16b, @dat[1].16b, @tweak[1].16b
++    eor @dat[2].16b, @dat[2].16b, @tweak[2].16b
++    eor @dat[3].16b, @dat[3].16b, @tweak[3].16b
++    eor @dat[4].16b, @dat[4].16b, @tweak[4].16b
++    eor @dat[5].16b, @dat[5].16b, @tweak[5].16b
++    eor @dat[6].16b, @dat[6].16b, @tweak[6].16b
++    eor @dat[7].16b, @dat[7].16b, @tweak[7].16b
++
++    // save the last tweak
++    mov $lastTweak.16b,@tweak[7].16b
++	st1	{@dat[0].4s,@dat[1].4s,@dat[2].4s,@dat[3].4s},[$out],#64
++	st1	{@dat[4].4s,@dat[5].4s,@dat[6].4s,@dat[7].4s},[$out],#64
++    subs    $blocks,$blocks,#8
++    b.eq    100f
++    b    1b
++2:
++    // process 4 blocks
++    cmp    $blocks,#4
++    b.lt    1f
++    ld1	{@dat[0].4s,@dat[1].4s,@dat[2].4s,@dat[3].4s},[$inp],#64
++___
++    &rbit(@tweak[0],@tweak[0]);
++    &rbit(@tweak[1],@tweak[1]);
++    &rbit(@tweak[2],@tweak[2]);
++    &rbit(@tweak[3],@tweak[3]);
++$code.=<<___;
++    eor @dat[0].16b, @dat[0].16b, @tweak[0].16b
++    eor @dat[1].16b, @dat[1].16b, @tweak[1].16b
++    eor @dat[2].16b, @dat[2].16b, @tweak[2].16b
++    eor @dat[3].16b, @dat[3].16b, @tweak[3].16b
++___
++	&rev32(@dat[0],@dat[0]);
++	&rev32(@dat[1],@dat[1]);
++	&rev32(@dat[2],@dat[2]);
++	&rev32(@dat[3],@dat[3]);
++	&enc_4blks(@dat[0],@dat[1],@dat[2],@dat[3]);
++	&rev32(@dat[0],@dat[0]);
++	&rev32(@dat[1],@dat[1]);
++	&rev32(@dat[2],@dat[2]);
++	&rev32(@dat[3],@dat[3]);
++$code.=<<___;
++    eor @dat[0].16b, @dat[0].16b, @tweak[0].16b
++    eor @dat[1].16b, @dat[1].16b, @tweak[1].16b
++    eor @dat[2].16b, @dat[2].16b, @tweak[2].16b
++    eor @dat[3].16b, @dat[3].16b, @tweak[3].16b
++	st1	{@dat[0].4s,@dat[1].4s,@dat[2].4s,@dat[3].4s},[$out],#64
++    sub    $blocks,$blocks,#4
++    mov @tweak[0].16b,@tweak[4].16b
++    mov @tweak[1].16b,@tweak[5].16b
++    mov @tweak[2].16b,@tweak[6].16b
++    // save the last tweak
++    mov $lastTweak.16b,@tweak[3].16b
++1:
++    // process last block
++    cmp    $blocks,#1
++    b.lt    100f
++    b.gt    1f
++    ld1	{@dat[0].4s},[$inp],#16
++___
++    &rbit(@tweak[0],@tweak[0]);
++$code.=<<___;
++    eor @dat[0].16b, @dat[0].16b, @tweak[0].16b
++___
++	&rev32(@dat[0],@dat[0]);
++	&enc_blk(@dat[0]);
++	&rev32(@dat[0],@dat[0]);
++$code.=<<___;
++    eor @dat[0].16b, @dat[0].16b, @tweak[0].16b
++    st1    {@dat[0].4s},[$out],#16
++    // save the last tweak
++    mov $lastTweak.16b,@tweak[0].16b
++    b    100f
++1:  // process last 2 blocks
++    cmp    $blocks,#2
++    b.gt    1f
++    ld1    {@dat[0].4s,@dat[1].4s},[$inp],#32
++___
++    &rbit(@tweak[0],@tweak[0]);
++    &rbit(@tweak[1],@tweak[1]);
++$code.=<<___;
++    eor @dat[0].16b, @dat[0].16b, @tweak[0].16b
++    eor @dat[1].16b, @dat[1].16b, @tweak[1].16b
++___
++    &rev32(@dat[0],@dat[0]);
++    &rev32(@dat[1],@dat[1]);
++	&enc_4blks(@dat[0],@dat[1],@dat[2],@dat[3]);
++    &rev32(@dat[0],@dat[0]);
++    &rev32(@dat[1],@dat[1]);
++$code.=<<___;
++    eor @dat[0].16b, @dat[0].16b, @tweak[0].16b
++    eor @dat[1].16b, @dat[1].16b, @tweak[1].16b
++	st1    {@dat[0].4s,@dat[1].4s},[$out],#32
++    // save the last tweak
++    mov $lastTweak.16b,@tweak[1].16b
++    b    100f
++1:  // process last 3 blocks
++    ld1    {@dat[0].4s,@dat[1].4s,@dat[2].4s},[$inp],#48
++___
++    &rbit(@tweak[0],@tweak[0]);
++    &rbit(@tweak[1],@tweak[1]);
++    &rbit(@tweak[2],@tweak[2]);
++$code.=<<___;
++    eor @dat[0].16b, @dat[0].16b, @tweak[0].16b
++    eor @dat[1].16b, @dat[1].16b, @tweak[1].16b
++    eor @dat[2].16b, @dat[2].16b, @tweak[2].16b
++___
++	&rev32(@dat[0],@dat[0]);
++	&rev32(@dat[1],@dat[1]);
++	&rev32(@dat[2],@dat[2]);
++	&enc_4blks(@dat[0],@dat[1],@dat[2],@dat[3]);
++	&rev32(@dat[0],@dat[0]);
++	&rev32(@dat[1],@dat[1]);
++	&rev32(@dat[2],@dat[2]);
++$code.=<<___;
++    eor @dat[0].16b, @dat[0].16b, @tweak[0].16b
++    eor @dat[1].16b, @dat[1].16b, @tweak[1].16b
++    eor @dat[2].16b, @dat[2].16b, @tweak[2].16b
++    st1    {@dat[0].4s,@dat[1].4s,@dat[2].4s},[$out],#48
++    // save the last tweak
++    mov $lastTweak.16b,@tweak[2].16b
++100:
++    cmp $remain,0
++    b.eq 99f
++
++// This brance calculates the last two tweaks, 
++// while the encryption/decryption length is larger than 32
++.last_2blks_tweak${standard}:
++___
++    &rev32_armeb($lastTweak,$lastTweak);
++    &compute_tweak_vec($lastTweak,@tweak[1],$vTmp0,$vTmp1,$vMagic);
++    &compute_tweak_vec(@tweak[1],@tweak[2],$vTmp0,$vTmp1,$vMagic);
++$code.=<<___;
++    b .check_dec${standard}
++
++
++// This brance calculates the last two tweaks, 
++// while the encryption/decryption length is less than 32, who only need two tweaks
++.only_2blks_tweak${standard}:
++    mov @tweak[1].16b,@tweak[0].16b
++___
++    &rev32_armeb(@tweak[1],@tweak[1]);
++    &compute_tweak_vec(@tweak[1],@tweak[2],$vTmp0,$vTmp1,$vMagic);
++$code.=<<___;
++    b .check_dec${standard}
++
++
++// Determine whether encryption or decryption is required.
++// The last two tweaks need to be swapped for decryption.
++.check_dec${standard}:
++	// encryption:1 decryption:0
++    cmp $enc,1
++    b.eq .prcess_last_2blks${standard}
++    mov $vTmp0.16B,@tweak[1].16b
++    mov @tweak[1].16B,@tweak[2].16b
++    mov @tweak[2].16B,$vTmp0.16b
++
++.prcess_last_2blks${standard}:
++___
++    &rev32_armeb(@tweak[1],@tweak[1]);
++    &rev32_armeb(@tweak[2],@tweak[2]);
++$code.=<<___;
++    ld1    {@dat[0].4s},[$inp],#16
++    eor @dat[0].16b, @dat[0].16b, @tweak[1].16b
++___
++	&rev32(@dat[0],@dat[0]);
++	&enc_blk(@dat[0]);
++	&rev32(@dat[0],@dat[0]);
++$code.=<<___;
++    eor @dat[0].16b, @dat[0].16b, @tweak[1].16b
++    st1    {@dat[0].4s},[$out],#16
++
++    sub $lastBlk,$out,16
++    .loop${standard}:
++        subs $remain,$remain,1
++        ldrb    w$tmp0,[$lastBlk,$remain]
++        ldrb    w$tmp1,[$inp,$remain]
++        strb    w$tmp1,[$lastBlk,$remain]
++        strb    w$tmp0,[$out,$remain]
++    b.gt .loop${standard}
++    ld1        {@dat[0].4s}, [$lastBlk]    
++    eor @dat[0].16b, @dat[0].16b, @tweak[2].16b
++___
++	&rev32(@dat[0],@dat[0]);
++	&enc_blk(@dat[0]);
++	&rev32(@dat[0],@dat[0]);
++$code.=<<___;
++    eor @dat[0].16b, @dat[0].16b, @tweak[2].16b
++    st1        {@dat[0].4s}, [$lastBlk]
++99:
++    ret
++.size    ${prefix}_xts_do_cipher${standard},.-${prefix}_xts_do_cipher${standard}
++___
++} #end of gen_xts_do_cipher
++
++}}}
++
++{{{
++my ($enc)=("w6");
++
++sub gen_xts_cipher() {
++	my $en = shift;
++$code.=<<___;
++.globl    ${prefix}_xts_${en}crypt${standard}
++.type    ${prefix}_xts_${en}crypt${standard},%function
++.align    5
++${prefix}_xts_${en}crypt${standard}:
++    stp        x15, x16, [sp, #-0x10]!
++    stp        x17, x18, [sp, #-0x10]!
++    stp        x19, x20, [sp, #-0x10]!
++    stp        x21, x22, [sp, #-0x10]!
++    stp        x23, x24, [sp, #-0x10]!
++    stp        x25, x26, [sp, #-0x10]!
++    stp        x27, x28, [sp, #-0x10]!
++    stp        x29, x30, [sp, #-0x10]!
++    stp        d8, d9, [sp, #-0x10]!
++    stp        d10, d11, [sp, #-0x10]!
++    stp        d12, d13, [sp, #-0x10]!
++    stp        d14, d15, [sp, #-0x10]!
++___
++    &mov_en_to_enc($en,$enc);
++$code.=<<___;
++    bl    ${prefix}_xts_do_cipher${standard}
++    ldp        d14, d15, [sp], #0x10
++    ldp        d12, d13, [sp], #0x10
++    ldp        d10, d11, [sp], #0x10
++    ldp        d8, d9, [sp], #0x10
++    ldp        x29, x30, [sp], #0x10
++    ldp        x27, x28, [sp], #0x10
++    ldp        x25, x26, [sp], #0x10
++    ldp        x23, x24, [sp], #0x10
++    ldp        x21, x22, [sp], #0x10
++    ldp        x19, x20, [sp], #0x10
++    ldp        x17, x18, [sp], #0x10
++    ldp        x15, x16, [sp], #0x10
++    ret
++.size    ${prefix}_xts_${en}crypt${standard},.-${prefix}_xts_${en}crypt${standard}
++___
++
++} # end of gen_xts_cipher
++$standard="_gb";
++&gen_xts_do_cipher();
++&gen_xts_cipher("en");
++&gen_xts_cipher("de");
++$standard="";
++&gen_xts_do_cipher();
++&gen_xts_cipher("en");
++&gen_xts_cipher("de");
++}}}
+ ########################################
+ {   my  %opcode = (
+         "sm4e"          => 0xcec08400,
+diff --git a/include/crypto/sm4_platform.h b/include/crypto/sm4_platform.h
+index 2f5a6cf..0bde96f 100644
+--- a/include/crypto/sm4_platform.h
++++ b/include/crypto/sm4_platform.h
+@@ -26,6 +26,10 @@
+ #     define HWSM4_cbc_encrypt sm4_v8_cbc_encrypt
+ #     define HWSM4_ecb_encrypt sm4_v8_ecb_encrypt
+ #     define HWSM4_ctr32_encrypt_blocks sm4_v8_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
++#     define HWSM4_xts_encrypt_gb sm4_v8_xts_encrypt_gb
++#     define HWSM4_xts_decrypt_gb sm4_v8_xts_decrypt_gb
++#     define HWSM4_xts_encrypt sm4_v8_xts_encrypt
++#     define HWSM4_xts_decrypt sm4_v8_xts_decrypt
+ #   endif
+ #  endif
+ # endif /* OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ */
+@@ -46,6 +50,16 @@ void HWSM4_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+ void HWSM4_ctr32_encrypt_blocks(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                                 size_t len, const void *key,
+                                 const unsigned char ivec[16]);
++/* xts mode in GB/T 17964-2021 */
++void HWSM4_xts_encrypt_gb(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const SM4_KEY *key1,
++    const SM4_KEY *key2, const uint8_t iv[16]);
++void HWSM4_xts_decrypt_gb(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const SM4_KEY *key1,
++    const SM4_KEY *key2, const uint8_t iv[16]);
++/* xts mode in IEEE Std 1619-2007 */
++void HWSM4_xts_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const SM4_KEY *key1,
++    const SM4_KEY *key2, const uint8_t iv[16]);
++void HWSM4_xts_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const SM4_KEY *key1,
++    const SM4_KEY *key2, const uint8_t iv[16]);
+ # endif /* HWSM4_CAPABLE */
+ 
+ #ifdef VPSM4_EX_CAPABLE
+-- 
+2.36.1
+

dependency/openssl/Feature-X509-command-supports-SM2-certificate-signing-with-default-sm2id.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+From d3e1106ea296a2ec94d27dd34692c34ad543ad04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: s_c_c <shichuchao@huawei.com>
+Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2022 17:54:50 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] X509 command supports SM2 certificate signing with default
+ sm2id
+
+---
+ apps/x509.c                |  4 ++++
+ include/openssl/sm2.h      |  9 +++++++++
+ test/recipes/25-test_req.t | 13 ++++++++++---
+ 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/apps/x509.c b/apps/x509.c
+index 1043eba..2669894 100644
+--- a/apps/x509.c
++++ b/apps/x509.c
+@@ -1078,6 +1078,10 @@ static int sign(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, int days, int clrext,
+         if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(conf, &ctx, section, x))
+             goto err;
+     }
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
++    if (EVP_PKEY_is_sm2(pkey) && !EVP_PKEY_set_alias_type(pkey, EVP_PKEY_SM2))
++        goto err;
++#endif
+     if (!X509_sign(x, pkey, digest))
+         goto err;
+     return 1;
+diff --git a/include/openssl/sm2.h b/include/openssl/sm2.h
+index 505ebfc..cc517bc 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/sm2.h
++++ b/include/openssl/sm2.h
+@@ -1,3 +1,12 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright 2022 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. All Rights Reserved.
++ *
++ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
++ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
++ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
++ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
++ */
++
+ #ifndef HEADER_SM2_H
+ # define HEADER_SM2_H
+ 
+diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_req.t b/test/recipes/25-test_req.t
+index d53e577..2b0c08c 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/25-test_req.t
++++ b/test/recipes/25-test_req.t
+@@ -182,10 +182,10 @@ subtest "generating certificate requests" => sub {
+ };
+ 
+ subtest "generating SM2 certificate requests" => sub {
+-    plan tests => 4;
++    plan tests => 5;
+ 
+     SKIP: {
+-        skip "SM2 is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 4
++        skip "SM2 is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 5
+         if disabled("sm2");
+         ok(run(app(["openssl", "req", "-config", srctop_file("test", "test.cnf"),
+                     "-new", "-key", srctop_file("test", "certs", "sm2.key"),
+@@ -198,6 +198,13 @@ subtest "generating SM2 certificate requests" => sub {
+                     "-sm2-id", "1234567812345678", "-sm3"])),
+            "Verifying signature on SM2 certificate request");
+ 
++        # Use default sm2 id
++        ok(run(app(["openssl", "x509", "-req", "-extfile", srctop_file("test", "CAss.cnf"),
++                    "-extensions", "v3_ca", "-sm3", "-days", "365",
++                    "-in", "testreq.pem", "-signkey", srctop_file("test", "certs", "sm2.key"),
++                    "-out", "testsign.pem"])),
++           "Signing SM2 certificate request");
++
+         ok(run(app(["openssl", "req", "-config", srctop_file("test", "test.cnf"),
+                     "-new", "-key", srctop_file("test", "certs", "sm2.key"),
+                     "-sigopt", "sm2_hex_id:DEADBEEF",
+@@ -218,7 +225,7 @@ run_conversion('req conversions',
+ run_conversion('req conversions -- testreq2',
+                srctop_file("test", "testreq2.pem"));
+ 
+-unlink "testkey.pem", "testreq.pem", "testreq_withattrs_pem.pem", "testreq_withattrs_der.pem";
++unlink "testkey.pem", "testreq.pem", "testreq_withattrs_pem.pem", "testreq_withattrs_der.pem", "testsign.pem";
+ 
+ sub run_conversion {
+     my $title = shift;
+-- 
+2.20.1 (Apple Git-117)
+

dependency/openssl/Fix-FIPS-getenv-build-failure.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+diff --git a/crypto/o_init.c b/crypto/o_init.c
+index b1eef43..4fbb0e5 100644
+--- a/crypto/o_init.c
++++ b/crypto/o_init.c
+@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
+  * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+  */
+ 
+-/* for secure_getenv */
++/* for ossl_safe_getenv */
+ #define _GNU_SOURCE
+ #include "e_os.h"
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
+ # include <openssl/rand.h>
+ # include <openssl/fips.h>
+ # include "crypto/fips.h"
++# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+ 
+ # define FIPS_MODE_SWITCH_FILE "/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled"
+ 
+@@ -29,7 +30,7 @@ static void init_fips_mode(void)
+     char buf[2] = "0";
+     int fd;
+ 
+-    if (secure_getenv("OPENSSL_FORCE_FIPS_MODE") != NULL) {
++    if (ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_FORCE_FIPS_MODE") != NULL) {
+         buf[0] = '1';
+     } else if ((fd = open(FIPS_MODE_SWITCH_FILE, O_RDONLY)) >= 0) {
+         while (read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0 && errno == EINTR) ;

dependency/openssl/Fix-SM4-XTS-build-failure-using-clang.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+From 80835d048cb2a241605beb49d17bf129ab2f5ae5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Xu Yizhou <xuyizhou1@huawei.com>
+Date: Mon, 15 May 2023 11:41:59 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix SM4-XTS build failure using clang
+
+The OpenSSL community also has similar issues, and the corresponding
+solutions can be found in this [PR]
+(https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20202). Moreover, the
+community has added restrictions in the arm-xlate.pl file to recognize
+the 'LDR REG, =VALUE' pseudo instruction on Neon, as shown in this [PR]
+(https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20222).
+
+Signed-off-by: Xu Yizhou <xuyizhou1@huawei.com>
+---
+ crypto/perlasm/arm-xlate.pl      | 10 ++++++++++
+ crypto/sm4/asm/sm4-armv8.pl      | 12 ++++++-----
+ crypto/sm4/asm/vpsm4_ex-armv8.pl | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++------------
+ 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/perlasm/arm-xlate.pl b/crypto/perlasm/arm-xlate.pl
+index 48819be..a2f3838 100755
+--- a/crypto/perlasm/arm-xlate.pl
++++ b/crypto/perlasm/arm-xlate.pl
+@@ -170,6 +170,16 @@ while(my $line=<>) {
+ 	}
+     }
+ 
++    # ldr REG, #VALUE psuedo-instruction - avoid clang issue with Neon registers
++    #
++    if ($line =~ /^\s*ldr\s+([qd]\d\d?)\s*,\s*=(\w+)/i) {
++        # Immediate load via literal pool into qN or DN - clang max is 2^32-1
++        my ($reg, $value) = ($1, $2);
++        # If $value is hex, 0x + 8 hex chars = 10 chars total will be okay
++        # If $value is decimal, 2^32 - 1 = 4294967295 will be okay (also 10 chars)
++        die("$line: immediate load via literal pool into $reg: value too large for clang - redo manually") if length($value) > 10;
++    }
++
+     print $line if ($line);
+     print "\n";
+ }
+diff --git a/crypto/sm4/asm/sm4-armv8.pl b/crypto/sm4/asm/sm4-armv8.pl
+index 923c1c0..07ba53a 100644
+--- a/crypto/sm4/asm/sm4-armv8.pl
++++ b/crypto/sm4/asm/sm4-armv8.pl
+@@ -244,6 +244,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
+ 	.long 0x10171E25, 0x2C333A41, 0x484F565D, 0x646B7279
+ .Lfk:
+ 	.long 0xa3b1bac6, 0x56aa3350, 0x677d9197, 0xb27022dc
++.Lxts_magic:
++	.dword 0x0101010101010187,0x0101010101010101
+ ___
+ }}}
+ 
+@@ -604,7 +606,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
+ .globl	${prefix}_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
+ .type	${prefix}_ctr32_encrypt_blocks,%function
+ .align	5
+-${prefix}_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:	
++${prefix}_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
+ 	stp	d8,d9,[sp, #-16]!
+ 
+ 	ld1	{$ivec.4s},[$ivp]
+@@ -736,7 +738,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
+ .align    5
+ ${prefix}_xts_do_cipher${standard}:
+ 	mov w$magic,0x87
+-    ldr $qMagic, =0x01010101010101010101010101010187
++    ldr $qMagic, .Lxts_magic
+ 	// used to encrypt the XORed plaintext blocks
+ 	ld1	{@rks[0].4s,@rks[1].4s,@rks[2].4s,@rks[3].4s},[$rk2],#64
+ 	ld1	{@rks[4].4s,@rks[5].4s,@rks[6].4s,@rks[7].4s},[$rk2]
+@@ -963,7 +965,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
+     cmp $remain,0
+     b.eq 99f
+ 
+-// This brance calculates the last two tweaks, 
++// This brance calculates the last two tweaks,
+ // while the encryption/decryption length is larger than 32
+ .last_2blks_tweak${standard}:
+ ___
+@@ -974,7 +976,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
+     b .check_dec${standard}
+ 
+ 
+-// This brance calculates the last two tweaks, 
++// This brance calculates the last two tweaks,
+ // while the encryption/decryption length is less than 32, who only need two tweaks
+ .only_2blks_tweak${standard}:
+     mov @tweak[1].16b,@tweak[0].16b
+@@ -1018,7 +1020,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
+         strb    w$tmp1,[$lastBlk,$remain]
+         strb    w$tmp0,[$out,$remain]
+     b.gt .loop${standard}
+-    ld1        {@dat[0].4s}, [$lastBlk]    
++    ld1        {@dat[0].4s}, [$lastBlk]
+     eor @dat[0].16b, @dat[0].16b, @tweak[2].16b
+ ___
+ 	&rev32(@dat[0],@dat[0]);
+diff --git a/crypto/sm4/asm/vpsm4_ex-armv8.pl b/crypto/sm4/asm/vpsm4_ex-armv8.pl
+index 86a6f89..4fd2975 100644
+--- a/crypto/sm4/asm/vpsm4_ex-armv8.pl
++++ b/crypto/sm4/asm/vpsm4_ex-armv8.pl
+@@ -108,12 +108,12 @@ ___
+ 
+ sub load_sbox_matrix () {
+ $code.=<<___;
+-    ldr $MaskQ,       =0x0306090c0f0205080b0e0104070a0d00
+-    ldr $TAHMatQ,    =0x22581a6002783a4062185a2042387a00
+-    ldr $TALMatQ,    =0xc10bb67c4a803df715df62a89e54e923
+-    ldr $ATAHMatQ,   =0x1407c6d56c7fbeadb9aa6b78c1d21300
+-    ldr $ATALMatQ,   =0xe383c1a1fe9edcbc6404462679195b3b
+-    ldr $ANDMaskQ,    =0x0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f
++	ldr $MaskQ, .Lsbox_magic
++	ldr $TAHMatQ, .Lsbox_magic+16
++	ldr $TALMatQ, .Lsbox_magic+32
++	ldr $ATAHMatQ, .Lsbox_magic+48
++	ldr $ATALMatQ, .Lsbox_magic+64
++	ldr $ANDMaskQ, .Lsbox_magic+80
+ ___
+ }
+ # matrix multiplication Mat*x = (lowerMat*x) ^ (higherMat*x)
+@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ sub compute_tweak_vec() {
+     my $des = shift;
+     &rbit(@vtmp[2],$src);
+ $code.=<<___;
+-    ldr  @qtmp[0], =0x01010101010101010101010101010187
++    ldr  @qtmp[0], .Lxts_magic
+     shl  $des.16b, @vtmp[2].16b, #1
+     ext  @vtmp[1].16b, @vtmp[2].16b, @vtmp[2].16b,#15
+     ushr @vtmp[1].16b, @vtmp[1].16b, #7
+@@ -569,10 +569,18 @@ ${prefix}_consts:
+ 	.long 0xA0A7AEB5, 0xBCC3CAD1, 0xD8DFE6ED, 0xF4FB0209
+ 	.long 0x10171E25, 0x2C333A41, 0x484F565D, 0x646B7279
+ .Lfk:
+-    .long 0xa3b1bac6, 0x56aa3350, 0x677d9197, 0xb27022dc
++	.long 0xa3b1bac6, 0x56aa3350, 0x677d9197, 0xb27022dc
+ .Lshuffles:
+-    .long 0x07060504, 0x0B0A0908, 0x0F0E0D0C, 0x03020100
+- 
++	.long 0x07060504, 0x0B0A0908, 0x0F0E0D0C, 0x03020100
++.Lxts_magic:
++	.dword 0x0101010101010187,0x0101010101010101
++.Lsbox_magic:
++	.dword 0x0b0e0104070a0d00,0x0306090c0f020508
++	.dword 0x62185a2042387a00,0x22581a6002783a40
++	.dword 0x15df62a89e54e923,0xc10bb67c4a803df7
++	.dword 0xb9aa6b78c1d21300,0x1407c6d56c7fbead
++	.dword 0x6404462679195b3b,0xe383c1a1fe9edcbc
++	.dword 0x0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f,0x0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f
+ .size	${prefix}_consts,.-${prefix}_consts
+ ___
+ 
+@@ -1033,7 +1041,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
+     cmp $remain,0
+     b.eq .return${standard}
+ 
+-// This brance calculates the last two tweaks, 
++// This brance calculates the last two tweaks,
+ // while the encryption/decryption length is larger than 32
+ .last_2blks_tweak${standard}:
+ ___
+@@ -1044,7 +1052,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
+     b .check_dec${standard}
+ 
+ 
+-// This brance calculates the last two tweaks, 
++// This brance calculates the last two tweaks,
+ // while the encryption/decryption length is equal to 32, who only need two tweaks
+ .only_2blks_tweak${standard}:
+     mov @tweak[1].16b,@tweak[0].16b
+@@ -1087,7 +1095,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
+         strb    $wtmp1,[$lastBlk,$remain]
+         strb    $wtmp0,[$outp,$remain]
+     b.gt .loop${standard}
+-    ld1        {@data[0].4s}, [$lastBlk]    
++    ld1        {@data[0].4s}, [$lastBlk]
+     eor @data[0].16b, @data[0].16b, @tweak[2].16b
+ ___
+     &rev32(@data[0],@data[0]);
+-- 
+2.36.1
+

dependency/openssl/Fix-reported-performance-degradation-on-aarch64.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+From a8f6d73fda64d514171e99a50d1483c0c0b8d968 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
+Date: Sun, 12 Jun 2022 09:37:26 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix reported performance degradation on aarch64
+
+This restores the implementation prior to
+commit 2621751 ("aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl: avoid 32-bit lane assignment in CTR mode")
+for 64bit targets only, since it is reportedly 2-17% slower,
+and the silicon errata only affects 32bit targets.
+Only for 32bit targets the new algorithm is used.
+
+Fixes #18445
+
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18539)
+---
+ crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 62 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl
+index 2b0e982..1856d99 100755
+--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl
++++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl
+@@ -740,6 +740,21 @@ $code.=<<___;
+ #ifndef __ARMEB__
+ 	rev		$ctr, $ctr
+ #endif
++___
++$code.=<<___	if ($flavour =~ /64/);
++	vorr		$dat1,$dat0,$dat0
++	add		$tctr1, $ctr, #1
++	vorr		$dat2,$dat0,$dat0
++	add		$ctr, $ctr, #2
++	vorr		$ivec,$dat0,$dat0
++	rev		$tctr1, $tctr1
++	vmov.32		${dat1}[3],$tctr1
++	b.ls		.Lctr32_tail
++	rev		$tctr2, $ctr
++	sub		$len,$len,#3		// bias
++	vmov.32		${dat2}[3],$tctr2
++___
++$code.=<<___	if ($flavour !~ /64/);
+ 	add		$tctr1, $ctr, #1
+ 	vorr		$ivec,$dat0,$dat0
+ 	rev		$tctr1, $tctr1
+@@ -751,6 +766,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
+ 	vmov.32		${ivec}[3],$tctr2
+ 	sub		$len,$len,#3		// bias
+ 	vorr		$dat2,$ivec,$ivec
++___
++$code.=<<___;
+ 	b		.Loop3x_ctr32
+ 
+ .align	4
+@@ -777,11 +794,25 @@ $code.=<<___;
+ 	aese		$dat1,q8
+ 	aesmc		$tmp1,$dat1
+ 	 vld1.8		{$in0},[$inp],#16
++___
++$code.=<<___	if ($flavour =~ /64/);
++	 vorr		$dat0,$ivec,$ivec
++___
++$code.=<<___	if ($flavour !~ /64/);
+ 	 add		$tctr0,$ctr,#1
++___
++$code.=<<___;
+ 	aese		$dat2,q8
+ 	aesmc		$dat2,$dat2
+ 	 vld1.8		{$in1},[$inp],#16
++___
++$code.=<<___	if ($flavour =~ /64/);
++	 vorr		$dat1,$ivec,$ivec
++___
++$code.=<<___	if ($flavour !~ /64/);
+ 	 rev		$tctr0,$tctr0
++___
++$code.=<<___;
+ 	aese		$tmp0,q9
+ 	aesmc		$tmp0,$tmp0
+ 	aese		$tmp1,q9
+@@ -790,6 +821,12 @@ $code.=<<___;
+ 	 mov		$key_,$key
+ 	aese		$dat2,q9
+ 	aesmc		$tmp2,$dat2
++___
++$code.=<<___	if ($flavour =~ /64/);
++	 vorr		$dat2,$ivec,$ivec
++	 add		$tctr0,$ctr,#1
++___
++$code.=<<___;
+ 	aese		$tmp0,q12
+ 	aesmc		$tmp0,$tmp0
+ 	aese		$tmp1,q12
+@@ -805,22 +842,47 @@ $code.=<<___;
+ 	aese		$tmp1,q13
+ 	aesmc		$tmp1,$tmp1
+ 	 veor		$in2,$in2,$rndlast
++___
++$code.=<<___	if ($flavour =~ /64/);
++	 rev		$tctr0,$tctr0
++	aese		$tmp2,q13
++	aesmc		$tmp2,$tmp2
++	 vmov.32	${dat0}[3], $tctr0
++___
++$code.=<<___	if ($flavour !~ /64/);
+ 	 vmov.32	${ivec}[3], $tctr0
+ 	aese		$tmp2,q13
+ 	aesmc		$tmp2,$tmp2
+ 	 vorr		$dat0,$ivec,$ivec
++___
++$code.=<<___;
+ 	 rev		$tctr1,$tctr1
+ 	aese		$tmp0,q14
+ 	aesmc		$tmp0,$tmp0
++___
++$code.=<<___	if ($flavour !~ /64/);
+ 	 vmov.32	${ivec}[3], $tctr1
+ 	 rev		$tctr2,$ctr
++___
++$code.=<<___;
+ 	aese		$tmp1,q14
+ 	aesmc		$tmp1,$tmp1
++___
++$code.=<<___	if ($flavour =~ /64/);
++	 vmov.32	${dat1}[3], $tctr1
++	 rev		$tctr2,$ctr
++	aese		$tmp2,q14
++	aesmc		$tmp2,$tmp2
++	 vmov.32	${dat2}[3], $tctr2
++___
++$code.=<<___	if ($flavour !~ /64/);
+ 	 vorr		$dat1,$ivec,$ivec
+ 	 vmov.32	${ivec}[3], $tctr2
+ 	aese		$tmp2,q14
+ 	aesmc		$tmp2,$tmp2
+ 	 vorr		$dat2,$ivec,$ivec
++___
++$code.=<<___;
+ 	 subs		$len,$len,#3
+ 	aese		$tmp0,q15
+ 	aese		$tmp1,q15
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+

dependency/openssl/Makefile.certificate

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+UTF8 := $(shell locale -c LC_CTYPE -k | grep -q charmap.*UTF-8 && echo -utf8)
+DAYS=365
+KEYLEN=2048
+TYPE=rsa:$(KEYLEN)
+EXTRA_FLAGS=
+ifdef SERIAL
+	EXTRA_FLAGS+=-set_serial $(SERIAL)
+endif
+
+.PHONY: usage
+.SUFFIXES: .key .csr .crt .pem
+.PRECIOUS: %.key %.csr %.crt %.pem
+
+usage:
+	@echo "This makefile allows you to create:"
+	@echo "  o public/private key pairs"
+	@echo "  o SSL certificate signing requests (CSRs)"
+	@echo "  o self-signed SSL test certificates"
+	@echo
+	@echo "To create a key pair, run \"make SOMETHING.key\"."
+	@echo "To create a CSR, run \"make SOMETHING.csr\"."
+	@echo "To create a test certificate, run \"make SOMETHING.crt\"."
+	@echo "To create a key and a test certificate in one file, run \"make SOMETHING.pem\"."
+	@echo
+	@echo "To create a key for use with Apache, run \"make genkey\"."
+	@echo "To create a CSR for use with Apache, run \"make certreq\"."
+	@echo "To create a test certificate for use with Apache, run \"make testcert\"."
+	@echo
+	@echo "To create a test certificate with serial number other than random, add SERIAL=num"
+	@echo "You can also specify key length with KEYLEN=n and expiration in days with DAYS=n"
+	@echo "Any additional options can be passed to openssl req via EXTRA_FLAGS"
+	@echo
+	@echo Examples:
+	@echo "  make server.key"
+	@echo "  make server.csr"
+	@echo "  make server.crt"
+	@echo "  make stunnel.pem"
+	@echo "  make genkey"
+	@echo "  make certreq"
+	@echo "  make testcert"
+	@echo "  make server.crt SERIAL=1"
+	@echo "  make stunnel.pem EXTRA_FLAGS=-sha384"
+	@echo "  make testcert DAYS=600"
+
+%.pem:
+	umask 77 ; \
+	PEM1=`/bin/mktemp /tmp/openssl.XXXXXX` ; \
+	PEM2=`/bin/mktemp /tmp/openssl.XXXXXX` ; \
+	/usr/bin/openssl req $(UTF8) -newkey $(TYPE) -keyout $$PEM1 -nodes -x509 -days $(DAYS) -out $$PEM2 $(EXTRA_FLAGS) ; \
+	cat $$PEM1 >  $@ ; \
+	echo ""    >> $@ ; \
+	cat $$PEM2 >> $@ ; \
+	$(RM) $$PEM1 $$PEM2
+
+%.key:
+	umask 77 ; \
+	/usr/bin/openssl genrsa -aes128 $(KEYLEN) > $@
+
+%.csr: %.key
+	umask 77 ; \
+	/usr/bin/openssl req $(UTF8) -new -key $^ -out $@
+
+%.crt: %.key
+	umask 77 ; \
+	/usr/bin/openssl req $(UTF8) -new -key $^ -x509 -days $(DAYS) -out $@ $(EXTRA_FLAGS)
+
+TLSROOT=/etc/pki/tls
+KEY=$(TLSROOT)/private/localhost.key
+CSR=$(TLSROOT)/certs/localhost.csr
+CRT=$(TLSROOT)/certs/localhost.crt
+
+genkey: $(KEY)
+certreq: $(CSR)
+testcert: $(CRT)
+
+$(CSR): $(KEY)
+	umask 77 ; \
+	/usr/bin/openssl req $(UTF8) -new -key $(KEY) -out $(CSR)
+
+$(CRT): $(KEY)
+	umask 77 ; \
+	/usr/bin/openssl req $(UTF8) -new -key $(KEY) -x509 -days $(DAYS) -out $(CRT) $(EXTRA_FLAGS)

dependency/openssl/README.txt

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
-open source target name ��openssl
-source code repository : product warehouse
-compile dependency: NULL
-upgrade open source package method��
-----|pull command : python $(pwd)../../build/pull_open_source.py "path" "name" "id"
-      |----path : the parent directory name
-      |----name��the package name in product warehouse
-      |----id��pdm version id
-the compile command : python build.py -m all -f openssl-1.1.1g.tar.gz -t "comm|llt"
-To meet the requirements of compiler security options, both comm and llt are required.
-comm is used to build lib and include files, and llt is used to build bin/openssl.
+open source target name ��openssl
+source code repository : product warehouse
+compile dependency: NULL
+upgrade open source package method��
+----|pull command : python $(pwd)../../build/pull_open_source.py "path" "name" "id"
+      |----path : the parent directory name
+      |----name��the package name in product warehouse
+      |----id��pdm version id
+the compile command : python build.py -m all -f openssl-1.1.1g.tar.gz -t "comm|llt"
+To meet the requirements of compiler security options, both comm and llt are required.
+comm is used to build lib and include files, and llt is used to build bin/openssl.
 Patch Info: None

dependency/openssl/Update-expired-SCT-certificates.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+From 73db5d82489b3ec09ccc772dfcee14fef0e8e908 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Date: Wed, 1 Jun 2022 12:47:44 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Update expired SCT certificates
+
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18446)
+---
+ test/certs/embeddedSCTs1-key.pem        | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
+ test/certs/embeddedSCTs1.pem            | 35 +++++++++++++++---------------
+ test/certs/embeddedSCTs1.sct            | 12 +++++------
+ test/certs/embeddedSCTs1_issuer-key.pem | 15 +++++++++++++
+ test/certs/embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem     | 30 +++++++++++++-------------
+ 5 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 test/certs/embeddedSCTs1_issuer-key.pem
+
+diff --git a/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1-key.pem b/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1-key.pem
+index e3e66d5..28dd206 100644
+--- a/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1-key.pem
++++ b/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1-key.pem
+@@ -1,15 +1,27 @@
+ -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+-MIICWwIBAAKBgQC+75jnwmh3rjhfdTJaDB0ym+3xj6r015a/BH634c4VyVui+A7k
+-WL19uG+KSyUhkaeb1wDDjpwDibRc1NyaEgqyHgy0HNDnKAWkEM2cW9tdSSdyba8X
+-EPYBhzd+olsaHjnu0LiBGdwVTcaPfajjDK8VijPmyVCfSgWwFAn/Xdh+tQIDAQAB
+-AoGAK/daG0vt6Fkqy/hdrtSJSKUVRoGRmS2nnba4Qzlwzh1+x2kdbMFuaOu2a37g
+-PvmeQclheKZ3EG1+Jb4yShwLcBCV6pkRJhOKuhvqGnjngr6uBH4gMCjpZVj7GDMf
+-flYHhdJCs3Cz/TY0wKN3o1Fldil2DHR/AEOc1nImeSp5/EUCQQDjKS3W957kYtTU
+-X5BeRjvg03Ug8tJq6IFuhTFvUJ+XQ5bAc0DmxAbQVKqRS7Wje59zTknVvS+MFdeQ
+-pz4dGuV7AkEA1y0X2yarIls+0A/S1uwkvwRTIkfS+QwFJ1zVya8sApRdKAcidIzA
+-b70hkKLilU9+LrXg5iZdFp8l752qJiw9jwJAXjItN/7mfH4fExGto+or2kbVQxxt
+-9LcFNPc2UJp2ExuL37HrL8YJrUnukOF8KJaSwBWuuFsC5GwKP4maUCdfEQJAUwBR
+-83c3DEmmMRvpeH4erpA8gTyzZN3+HvDwhpvLnjMcvBQEdnDUykVqbSBnxrCjO+Fs
+-n1qtDczWFVf8Cj2GgQJAQ14Awx32Cn9sF+3M+sEVtlAf6CqiEbkYeYdSCbsplMmZ
+-1UoaxiwXY3z+B7epsRnnPR3KaceAlAxw2/zQJMFNOQ==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+ -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+diff --git a/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1.pem b/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1.pem
+index d1e8512..d2a111f 100644
+--- a/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1.pem
++++ b/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1.pem
+@@ -1,20 +1,21 @@
+ -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+-MIIDWTCCAsKgAwIBAgIBBzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADBVMQswCQYDVQQGEwJHQjEk
++MIIDeDCCAuGgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBVMQswCQYDVQQGEwJHQjEk
+ MCIGA1UEChMbQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUgVHJhbnNwYXJlbmN5IENBMQ4wDAYDVQQIEwVX
+-YWxlczEQMA4GA1UEBxMHRXJ3IFdlbjAeFw0xMjA2MDEwMDAwMDBaFw0yMjA2MDEw
+-MDAwMDBaMFIxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkdCMSEwHwYDVQQKExhDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBUcmFu
+-c3BhcmVuY3kxDjAMBgNVBAgTBVdhbGVzMRAwDgYDVQQHEwdFcncgV2VuMIGfMA0G
+-CSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC+75jnwmh3rjhfdTJaDB0ym+3xj6r015a/
+-BH634c4VyVui+A7kWL19uG+KSyUhkaeb1wDDjpwDibRc1NyaEgqyHgy0HNDnKAWk
+-EM2cW9tdSSdyba8XEPYBhzd+olsaHjnu0LiBGdwVTcaPfajjDK8VijPmyVCfSgWw
+-FAn/Xdh+tQIDAQABo4IBOjCCATYwHQYDVR0OBBYEFCAxVBryXAX/2GWLaEN5T16Q
+-Nve0MH0GA1UdIwR2MHSAFF+diA3Ic+ZU1PgN2OawwSS0R8NVoVmkVzBVMQswCQYD
+-VQQGEwJHQjEkMCIGA1UEChMbQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUgVHJhbnNwYXJlbmN5IENBMQ4w
+-DAYDVQQIEwVXYWxlczEQMA4GA1UEBxMHRXJ3IFdlboIBADAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMIGK
+-BgorBgEEAdZ5AgQCBHwEegB4AHYA3xwuwRUAlFJHqWFoMl3cXHlZ6PfG04j8AC4L
+-vT9012QAAAE92yffkwAABAMARzBFAiBIL2dRrzXbplQ2vh/WZA89v5pBQpSVkkUw
+-KI+j5eI+BgIhAOTtwNs6xXKx4vXoq2poBlOYfc9BAn3+/6EFUZ2J7b8IMA0GCSqG
+-SIb3DQEBBQUAA4GBAIoMS+8JnUeSea+goo5on5HhxEIb4tJpoupspOghXd7dyhUE
+-oR58h8S3foDw6XkDUmjyfKIOFmgErlVvMWmB+Wo5Srer/T4lWsAERRP+dlcMZ5Wr
+-5HAxM9MD+J86+mu8/FFzGd/ZW5NCQSEfY0A1w9B4MHpoxgdaLiDInza4kQyg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+ -----END CERTIFICATE-----
+diff --git a/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1.sct b/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1.sct
+index 59362dc..35c9eb9 100644
+--- a/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1.sct
++++ b/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1.sct
+@@ -2,11 +2,11 @@ Signed Certificate Timestamp:
+     Version   : v1 (0x0)
+     Log ID    : DF:1C:2E:C1:15:00:94:52:47:A9:61:68:32:5D:DC:5C:
+                 79:59:E8:F7:C6:D3:88:FC:00:2E:0B:BD:3F:74:D7:64
+-    Timestamp : Apr  5 17:04:16.275 2013 GMT
++    Timestamp : Jan  1 00:00:00.000 2020 GMT
+     Extensions: none
+     Signature : ecdsa-with-SHA256
+-                30:45:02:20:48:2F:67:51:AF:35:DB:A6:54:36:BE:1F:
+-                D6:64:0F:3D:BF:9A:41:42:94:95:92:45:30:28:8F:A3:
+-                E5:E2:3E:06:02:21:00:E4:ED:C0:DB:3A:C5:72:B1:E2:
+-                F5:E8:AB:6A:68:06:53:98:7D:CF:41:02:7D:FE:FF:A1:
+-                05:51:9D:89:ED:BF:08
+\ No newline at end of file
++                30:45:02:20:7C:33:E8:F1:10:2B:9B:FB:DC:48:46:7A:
++                D3:C4:35:BB:E5:D0:E7:94:01:BB:AE:D2:64:4B:99:C4:
++                BA:5B:50:CD:02:21:00:D1:B2:07:13:B9:DE:0F:0F:2F:
++                02:82:0F:A5:1D:E0:12:ED:4C:60:48:A0:5B:58:0C:E7:
++                60:EB:A8:AF:03:5E:C3
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1_issuer-key.pem b/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1_issuer-key.pem
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..9326e38
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1_issuer-key.pem
+@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
++-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
++MIICXAIBAAKBgQDVimhTYhCicRmTbneDIRgcKkATxtB7jHbrkVfT0PtLO1FuzsvR
++yY2RxS90P6tjXVUJnNE6uvMa5UFEJFGnTHgW8iQ8+EjPKDHM5nugSlojgZ88ujfm
++JNnDvbKZuDnd/iYx0ss6hPx7srXFL8/BT/9Ab1zURmnLsvfP34b7arnRsQIDAQAB
++AoGAJLR6xEJp+5IXRFlLn7WTkFvO0ddtxJ7bXhiIkTctyruyfqp7LF9Jv1G2m3PK
++QPUtBc73w/GYkfnwIwdfJbOmPHL7XyEGHZYmEXgIgEtw6LXvAv0G5JpUnNwsSBfL
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++r3gjgI6MoGvgYJfPmAtZhxxVbhXQKciFUCAcBiwlQdHIdLWE9j65ctmZRWidKifr
++4O4nz+TBAkEA3djNW/rTQq5fKZy+mCF1WYnIU/3yhJaptzRqLm7AHqe7+hdrGXJw
+++mCtU8T3L/Ms8bH1yFBZhmkp1PbR8gl48QJAQo70YyWThiN5yfxXcQ96cZWrTdIJ
++b3NcLXSHPLQdhDqlBQ1dfvRT3ERpC8IqfZ2d162kBPhwh3MpkVcSPQK0gQJAC/dY
++xGBYKt2a9nSk9zG+0bCT5Kvq++ngh6hFHfINXNnxUsEWns3EeEzkrIMQTj7QqszN
++lBt5aL2dawZRNrv6EQJBAOo4STF9KEwQG0HLC/ryh1FeB0OBA5yIepXze+eJVKei
++T0cCECOQJKfWHEzYJYDJhyEFF/sYp9TXwKSDjOifrsU=
++-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+diff --git a/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem b/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem
+index 1fa449d..6aa9455 100644
+--- a/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem
++++ b/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem
+@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@
+ -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+-MIIC0DCCAjmgAwIBAgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADBVMQswCQYDVQQGEwJHQjEk
++MIIC0jCCAjugAwIBAgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBVMQswCQYDVQQGEwJHQjEk
+ MCIGA1UEChMbQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUgVHJhbnNwYXJlbmN5IENBMQ4wDAYDVQQIEwVX
+-YWxlczEQMA4GA1UEBxMHRXJ3IFdlbjAeFw0xMjA2MDEwMDAwMDBaFw0yMjA2MDEw
+-MDAwMDBaMFUxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkdCMSQwIgYDVQQKExtDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBUcmFu
+-c3BhcmVuY3kgQ0ExDjAMBgNVBAgTBVdhbGVzMRAwDgYDVQQHEwdFcncgV2VuMIGf
+-MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDVimhTYhCicRmTbneDIRgcKkATxtB7
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+-KDHM5nugSlojgZ88ujfmJNnDvbKZuDnd/iYx0ss6hPx7srXFL8/BT/9Ab1zURmnL
+-svfP34b7arnRsQIDAQABo4GvMIGsMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRfnYgNyHPmVNT4DdjmsMEk
+-tEfDVTB9BgNVHSMEdjB0gBRfnYgNyHPmVNT4DdjmsMEktEfDVaFZpFcwVTELMAkG
+-A1UEBhMCR0IxJDAiBgNVBAoTG0NlcnRpZmljYXRlIFRyYW5zcGFyZW5jeSBDQTEO
+-MAwGA1UECBMFV2FsZXMxEDAOBgNVBAcTB0VydyBXZW6CAQAwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB
+-/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOBgQAGCMxKbWTyIF4UbASydvkrDvqUpdryOvw4BmBt
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+-f1HWkLxHqd81TbD26yWVXeGJPE3VICskovPkQNJ0tU4b03YmnKliibduyqQQkOFP
+-OwqULg==
++YWxlczEQMA4GA1UEBxMHRXJ3IFdlbjAgFw0yMjA2MDExMDM4MDJaGA8yMTIyMDUw
++ODEwMzgwMlowVTELMAkGA1UEBhMCR0IxJDAiBgNVBAoTG0NlcnRpZmljYXRlIFRy
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++SM8oMczme6BKWiOBnzy6N+Yk2cO9spm4Od3+JjHSyzqE/HuytcUvz8FP/0BvXNRG
++acuy98/fhvtqudGxAgMBAAGjga8wgawwHQYDVR0OBBYEFF+diA3Ic+ZU1PgN2Oaw
++wSS0R8NVMH0GA1UdIwR2MHSAFF+diA3Ic+ZU1PgN2OawwSS0R8NVoVmkVzBVMQsw
++CQYDVQQGEwJHQjEkMCIGA1UEChMbQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUgVHJhbnNwYXJlbmN5IENB
++MQ4wDAYDVQQIEwVXYWxlczEQMA4GA1UEBxMHRXJ3IFdlboIBADAMBgNVHRMEBTAD
++AQH/MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4GBAD0aYh9OkFYfXV7kBfhrtD0PJG2U47OV/1qq
+++uFpqB0S1WO06eJT0pzYf1ebUcxjBkajbJZm/FHT85VthZ1lFHsky87aFD8XlJCo
++2IOhKOkvvWKPUdFLoO/ZVXqEVKkcsS1eXK1glFvb07eJZya3JVG0KdMhV2YoDg6c
++Doud4XrO
+ -----END CERTIFICATE-----
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+

dependency/openssl/backport-A-null-pointer-dereference-occurs-when-memory-alloca.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From a8da305fa3dd6e34ba5aab3978281f652fd12883 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: yangyangtiantianlonglong <yangtianlong1224@163.com>
+Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2023 07:04:41 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] A null pointer dereference occurs when memory allocation
+ fails
+
+Fixes #21605
+
+Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21606)
+---
+ ssl/ssl_sess.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+index cda6b7cc5b..2a5d21be79 100644
+--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c
++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+@@ -139,8 +139,11 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
+     dest->references = 1;
+ 
+     dest->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+-    if (dest->lock == NULL)
++    if (dest->lock == NULL) {
++        OPENSSL_free(dest);
++        dest = NULL;
+         goto err;
++    }
+ 
+     if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, dest, &dest->ex_data))
+         goto err;
+-- 
+2.27.0
+

dependency/openssl/backport-Add-a-Certificate-Policies-Test.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From 23a4cbeb3ad80da3830f760f624599f24236bc38 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2023 17:07:57 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Add a Certificate Policies Test
+
+Test that a valid certificate policy is accepted and that an invalid
+certificate policy is rejected. Specifically we are checking that a
+leaf certificate with an invalid policy is detected.
+
+Related-to: CVE-2023-0465
+
+Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20588)
+---
+ test/recipes/25-test_verify.t | 13 ++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
+index d254bd8..a8043de 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
++++ b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
+@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ sub verify {
+     run(app([@args]));
+ }
+ 
+-plan tests => 148;
++plan tests => 150;
+ 
+ # Canonical success
+ ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"]),
+@@ -421,3 +421,14 @@ SKIP: {
+              "31323334353637383132333435363738"),
+        "SM2 hex ID test");
+ }
++
++# Certificate Policies
++ok(verify("ee-cert-policies", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-pol-cert"],
++          "-policy_check", "-policy", "1.3.6.1.4.1.16604.998855.1",
++          "-explicit_policy"),
++   "Certificate policy");
++
++ok(!verify("ee-cert-policies-bad", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-pol-cert"],
++           "-policy_check", "-policy", "1.3.6.1.4.1.16604.998855.1",
++           "-explicit_policy"),
++   "Bad certificate policy");
+-- 
+2.36.1
+

dependency/openssl/backport-Add-a-test-for-CVE-2023-3446.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From e9ddae17e302a7e6a0daf00f25efed7c70f114d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 7 Jul 2023 14:39:48 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Add a test for CVE-2023-3446
+
+Confirm that the only errors DH_check() finds with DH parameters with an
+excessively long modulus is that the modulus is too large. We should not
+be performing time consuming checks using that modulus.
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
+Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21452)
+---
+ test/dhtest.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/test/dhtest.c b/test/dhtest.c
+index 9d5609b943..00b3c47101 100644
+--- a/test/dhtest.c
++++ b/test/dhtest.c
+@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ static int dh_test(void)
+         || !TEST_true(DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, q, g)))
+         goto err1;
+ 
+-    if (!DH_check(dh, &i))
++    if (!TEST_true(DH_check(dh, &i)))
+         goto err2;
+     if (!TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME)
+             || !TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME)
+@@ -123,6 +123,17 @@ static int dh_test(void)
+     /* check whether the public key was calculated correctly */
+     TEST_uint_eq(BN_get_word(pub_key2), 3331L);
+ 
++    /* Modulus of size: dh check max modulus bits + 1 */
++    if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 1))
++            || !TEST_true(BN_lshift(p, p, OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)))
++        goto err3;
++
++    /*
++     * We expect no checks at all for an excessively large modulus
++     */
++    if (!TEST_false(DH_check(dh, &i)))
++        goto err3;
++
+     /*
+      * II) key generation
+      */
+@@ -137,7 +148,7 @@ static int dh_test(void)
+         goto err3;
+ 
+     /* ... and check whether it is valid */
+-    if (!DH_check(a, &i))
++    if (!TEST_true(DH_check(a, &i)))
+         goto err3;
+     if (!TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME)
+             || !TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME)
+-- 
+2.36.1
+

dependency/openssl/backport-Add-a-test-for-session-cache-handling.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+From 913ac6975162dde9e6f715c7b12869ea32ab8b70 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2024 13:45:23 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Add a test for session cache handling
+
+Repeatedly create sessions to be added to the cache and ensure we never
+exceed the expected size.
+
+Related to CVE-2024-2511
+
+Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24044)
+
+(cherry picked from commit 5f5b9e1ca1fad0215f623b8bd4955a2e8101f306)
+Signed-off-by: Liu-Ermeng <liuermeng2@huawei.com>
+---
+ test/sslapitest.c | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 91 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/test/sslapitest.c b/test/sslapitest.c
+index 5ee982ab06..2992356fdf 100644
+--- a/test/sslapitest.c
++++ b/test/sslapitest.c
+@@ -7288,6 +7288,97 @@ static int test_inherit_verify_param(void)
+     return testresult;
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * Test multiple resumptions and cache size handling
++ * Test 0: TLSv1.3 (max_early_data set)
++ * Test 1: TLSv1.3 (SSL_OP_NO_TICKET set)
++ * Test 2: TLSv1.3 (max_early_data and SSL_OP_NO_TICKET set)
++ * Test 3: TLSv1.2
++ */
++static int test_multi_resume(int idx)
++{
++    SSL_CTX *sctx = NULL, *cctx = NULL;
++    SSL *serverssl = NULL, *clientssl = NULL;
++    SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
++    int max_version = TLS1_3_VERSION;
++    int i, testresult = 0;
++
++    if (idx == 3)
++        max_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
++
++    if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(TLS_server_method(),
++                                       TLS_client_method(), TLS1_VERSION,
++                                       max_version, &sctx, &cctx, cert,
++                                       privkey)))
++        goto end;
++
++    /*
++     * TLSv1.3 only uses a session cache if either max_early_data > 0 (used for
++     * replay protection), or if SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is in use
++     */
++    if (idx == 0 || idx == 2)  {
++        if (!TEST_true(SSL_CTX_set_max_early_data(sctx, 1024)))
++            goto end;
++    }
++    if (idx == 1 || idx == 2)
++        SSL_CTX_set_options(sctx, SSL_OP_NO_TICKET);
++
++    SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(sctx, 5);
++
++    for (i = 0; i < 30; i++) {
++        if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl,
++                                                NULL, NULL))
++                || !TEST_true(SSL_set_session(clientssl, sess)))
++            goto end;
++
++        /*
++         * Recreate a bug where dynamically changing the max_early_data value
++         * can cause sessions in the session cache which cannot be deleted.
++         */
++        if ((idx == 0 || idx == 2) && (i % 3) == 2)
++            SSL_set_max_early_data(serverssl, 0);
++
++        if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl, SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
++            goto end;
++
++        if (sess == NULL || (idx == 0 && (i % 3) == 2)) {
++            if (!TEST_false(SSL_session_reused(clientssl)))
++                goto end;
++        } else {
++            if (!TEST_true(SSL_session_reused(clientssl)))
++                goto end;
++        }
++        SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
++
++        /* Do a full handshake, followed by two resumptions */
++        if ((i % 3) == 2) {
++            sess = NULL;
++        } else {
++            if (!TEST_ptr((sess = SSL_get1_session(clientssl))))
++                goto end;
++        }
++
++        SSL_shutdown(clientssl);
++        SSL_shutdown(serverssl);
++        SSL_free(serverssl);
++        SSL_free(clientssl);
++        serverssl = clientssl = NULL;
++    }
++
++    /* We should never exceed the session cache size limit */
++    if (!TEST_long_le(SSL_CTX_sess_number(sctx), 5))
++        goto end;
++
++    testresult = 1;
++ end:
++    SSL_free(serverssl);
++    SSL_free(clientssl);
++    SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
++    SSL_CTX_free(cctx);
++    SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
++    return testresult;
++}
++
+ int setup_tests(void)
+ {
+     if (!TEST_ptr(certsdir = test_get_argument(0))
+-- 
+2.33.0
+

dependency/openssl/backport-Add-a-test-for-session-cache-overflow.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+From 1659dc936a8763a243d09c2a6484eb1f25580ef4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2022 13:26:33 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Add a test for session cache overflow
+
+Test sessions behave as we expect even in the case that an overflow
+occurs when adding a new session into the session cache.
+
+Related to CVE-2024-2511
+
+Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24044)
+
+(cherry picked from commit ddead0935d77ba9b771d632ace61b145d7153f18)
+Signed-off-by: Liu-Ermeng <liuermeng2@huawei.com>
+---
+ test/sslapitest.c | 130 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 127 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/test/sslapitest.c b/test/sslapitest.c
+index 472b1224ca..395b1e5457 100644
+--- a/test/sslapitest.c
++++ b/test/sslapitest.c
+@@ -6669,6 +6669,128 @@ static int test_ca_names(int tst)
+     return testresult;
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * Test that a session cache overflow works as expected
++ * Test 0: TLSv1.3, timeout on new session later than old session
++ * Test 1: TLSv1.2, timeout on new session later than old session
++ * Test 2: TLSv1.3, timeout on new session earlier than old session
++ * Test 3: TLSv1.2, timeout on new session earlier than old session
++ */
++#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2)
++static int test_session_cache_overflow(int idx)
++{
++    SSL_CTX *sctx = NULL, *cctx = NULL;
++    SSL *serverssl = NULL, *clientssl = NULL;
++    int testresult = 0;
++    SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
++
++#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
++    /* If no TLSv1.3 available then do nothing in this case */
++    if (idx % 2 == 0)
++        TEST_info("No TLSv1.3 available");
++        return 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
++    /* If no TLSv1.2 available then do nothing in this case */
++    if (idx % 2 == 1)
++        TEST_info("No TLSv1.2 available");
++        return 1;
++#endif
++
++    if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(TLS_server_method(),
++                                       TLS_client_method(), TLS1_VERSION,
++                                       (idx % 2 == 0) ? TLS1_3_VERSION
++                                                      : TLS1_2_VERSION,
++                                       &sctx, &cctx, cert, privkey))
++            || !TEST_true(SSL_CTX_set_options(sctx, SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)))
++        goto end;
++
++    SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(sctx, get_session_cb);
++    get_sess_val = NULL;
++
++    SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(sctx, 1);
++
++    if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl,
++                                      NULL, NULL)))
++        goto end;
++
++    if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl, SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
++        goto end;
++
++    if (idx > 1) {
++        sess = SSL_get_session(serverssl);
++        if (!TEST_ptr(sess))
++            goto end;
++
++        /*
++         * Cause this session to have a longer timeout than the next session to
++         * be added.
++         */
++        if (!TEST_true(SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(sess, LONG_MAX / 2))) {
++            sess = NULL;
++            goto end;
++        }
++        sess = NULL;
++    }
++
++    SSL_shutdown(serverssl);
++    SSL_shutdown(clientssl);
++    SSL_free(serverssl);
++    SSL_free(clientssl);
++    serverssl = clientssl = NULL;
++
++    /*
++     * Session cache size is 1 and we already populated the cache with a session
++     * so the next connection should cause an overflow.
++     */
++
++    if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl,
++                                      NULL, NULL)))
++        goto end;
++
++    if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl, SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
++        goto end;
++
++    /*
++     * The session we just negotiated may have been already removed from the
++     * internal cache - but we will return it anyway from our external cache.
++     */
++    get_sess_val = SSL_get_session(serverssl);
++    if (!TEST_ptr(get_sess_val))
++        goto end;
++    sess = SSL_get1_session(clientssl);
++    if (!TEST_ptr(sess))
++        goto end;
++
++    SSL_shutdown(serverssl);
++    SSL_shutdown(clientssl);
++    SSL_free(serverssl);
++    SSL_free(clientssl);
++    serverssl = clientssl = NULL;
++
++    if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl,
++                                      NULL, NULL)))
++        goto end;
++
++    if (!TEST_true(SSL_set_session(clientssl, sess)))
++        goto end;
++
++    if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl, SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
++        goto end;
++
++    testresult = 1;
++
++ end:
++    SSL_free(serverssl);
++    SSL_free(clientssl);
++    SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
++    SSL_CTX_free(cctx);
++    SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
++
++    return testresult;
++}
++#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2) */
++
+ /*
+  * Test 0: Client sets servername and server acknowledges it (TLSv1.2)
+  * Test 1: Client sets servername and server does not acknowledge it (TLSv1.2)
+@@ -7357,14 +7479,16 @@ static int test_multi_resume(int idx)
+ 
+ #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2)
+     if (idx == 4)
+-        return TEST_skip("TLSv1.2 is disabled in this build");
++        TEST_info("TLSv1.2 is disabled in this build");
++        return 1;
+ #else
+     if (idx == 4)
+         max_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+ #endif
+-#if defined(OSSL_NO_USABLE_TLS1_3)
++#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3)
+     if (idx != 4)
+-        return TEST_skip("No usable TLSv1.3 in this build");
++        TEST_info("No usable TLSv1.3 in this build");
++        return 1;
+ #endif
+ 
+     if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(TLS_server_method(),
+-- 
+2.33.0
+

dependency/openssl/backport-Add-negative-integer-check-when-using-ASN1_BIT_STRIN.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 8ddacec11481a37302c19f4454e23299af399f83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: mlitre <martinlitre@mac.com>
+Date: Mon, 1 May 2023 11:07:21 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Add negative integer check when using ASN1_BIT_STRING
+
+The negative integer check is done to prevent potential overflow.
+Fixes #20719.
+
+CLA: trivial
+
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20862)
+
+(cherry picked from commit 1258a8e4361320cd3cfaf9ede692492ce01034c8)
+
+---
+ crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c b/crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c
+index f462dd1073..31a1e11359 100644
+--- a/crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c
++++ b/crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c
+@@ -148,6 +148,9 @@ int ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, int n, int value)
+     int w, v, iv;
+     unsigned char *c;
+ 
++    if (n < 0)
++        return 0;
++
+     w = n / 8;
+     v = 1 << (7 - (n & 0x07));
+     iv = ~v;
+@@ -182,6 +185,9 @@ int ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(const ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, int n)
+ {
+     int w, v;
+ 
++    if (n < 0)
++        return 0;
++
+     w = n / 8;
+     v = 1 << (7 - (n & 0x07));
+     if ((a == NULL) || (a->length < (w + 1)) || (a->data == NULL))
+-- 
+2.27.0
+

dependency/openssl/backport-Backport-a-missing-bug-fix-from-master.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+From 17519e2595b5ed8211a7763ff6eb2d6cf47c13cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
+Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 15:50:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Backport a missing bug-fix from master
+
+This is a backport of the following commit from master:
+
+commit 61b0fead5e6079ca826594df5b9ca00e65883cb0
+Author: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 19 13:58:21 2020 +0000
+
+    Don't Overflow when printing Thawte Strong Extranet Version
+
+    When printing human readable info on the Thawte Strong Extranet extension
+    the version number could overflow if the version number == LONG_MAX. This
+    is undefined behaviour.
+
+    Issue found by OSSFuzz.
+
+    Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
+    (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13452)
+
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18347)
+---
+ crypto/x509v3/v3_sxnet.c                      |  18 +++++++++++++++---
+ 1 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 fuzz/corpora/crl/4d72381f46c50eb9cabd8aa27f456962bf013b28
+
+diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_sxnet.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_sxnet.c
+index 89cda01be2..0648553ae3 100644
+--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_sxnet.c
++++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_sxnet.c
+@@ -57,12 +57,24 @@ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(SXNET)
+ static int sxnet_i2r(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, SXNET *sx, BIO *out,
+                      int indent)
+ {
+-    long v;
++    int64_t v;
+     char *tmp;
+     SXNETID *id;
+     int i;
+-    v = ASN1_INTEGER_get(sx->version);
+-    BIO_printf(out, "%*sVersion: %ld (0x%lX)", indent, "", v + 1, v);
++
++    /*
++     * Since we add 1 to the version number to display it, we don't support
++     * LONG_MAX since that would cause on overflow.
++     */
++    if (!ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64(&v, sx->version)
++            || v >= LONG_MAX
++            || v < LONG_MIN) {
++        BIO_printf(out, "%*sVersion: <unsupported>", indent, "");
++    } else {
++        long vl = (long)v;
++
++        BIO_printf(out, "%*sVersion: %ld (0x%lX)", indent, "", vl + 1, vl);
++    }
+     for (i = 0; i < sk_SXNETID_num(sx->ids); i++) {
+         id = sk_SXNETID_value(sx->ids, i);
+         tmp = i2s_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, id->zone);
+-- 
+2.38.1.windows.1
+

dependency/openssl/backport-CVE-2022-4304-Fix-Timing-Oracle-in-RSA-decryption.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,464 @@
+From 3f499b24f3bcd66db022074f7e8b4f6ee266a3ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
+Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2023 17:46:41 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Alternative fix for CVE-2022-4304
+
+NOTE: This patch replaces the original patch for 
+CVE-2022-4304 (43d8f88511991533f53680a751e9326999a6a31f).
+
+This is about a timing leak in the topmost limb
+of the internal result of RSA_private_decrypt,
+before the padding check.
+
+There are in fact at least three bugs together that
+caused the timing leak:
+
+First and probably most important is the fact that
+the blinding did not use the constant time code path
+at all when the RSA object was used for a private
+decrypt, due to the fact that the Montgomery context
+rsa->_method_mod_n was not set up early enough in
+rsa_ossl_private_decrypt, when BN_BLINDING_create_param
+needed it, and that was persisted as blinding->m_ctx,
+although the RSA object creates the Montgomery context
+just a bit later.
+
+Then the infamous bn_correct_top was used on the
+secret value right after the blinding was removed.
+
+And finally the function BN_bn2binpad did not use
+the constant-time code path since the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
+was not set on the secret value.
+
+In order to address the first problem, this patch
+makes sure that the rsa->_method_mod_n is initialized
+right before the blinding context.
+
+And to fix the second problem, we add a new utility
+function bn_correct_top_consttime, a const-time
+variant of bn_correct_top.
+
+Together with the fact, that BN_bn2binpad is already
+constant time if the flag BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is set,
+this should eliminate the timing oracle completely.
+
+In addition the no-asm variant may also have
+branches that depend on secret values, because the last
+invocation of bn_sub_words in bn_from_montgomery_word
+had branches when the function is compiled by certain
+gcc compiler versions, due to the clumsy coding style.
+
+So additionally this patch stream-lined the no-asm
+C-code in order to avoid branches where possible and
+improve the resulting code quality.
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20284)
+
+---
+ CHANGES               |  10 ++++
+ crypto/bn/bn_asm.c    | 106 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
+ crypto/bn/bn_blind.c  |   3 +-
+ crypto/bn/bn_lib.c    |  22 +++++++++
+ crypto/bn/bn_local.h  |  26 +++++------
+ crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c |  13 +++---
+ 6 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_asm.c b/crypto/bn/bn_asm.c
+index 4d83a8cf11..177558c647 100644
+--- a/crypto/bn/bn_asm.c
++++ b/crypto/bn/bn_asm.c
+@@ -381,25 +381,33 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT
+     while (n & ~3) {
+         t1 = a[0];
+-        t2 = b[0];
+-        r[0] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2;
+-        if (t1 != t2)
+-            c = (t1 < t2);
++        t2 = (t1 - c) & BN_MASK2;
++        c  = (t2 > t1);
++        t1 = b[0];
++        t1 = (t2 - t1) & BN_MASK2;
++        r[0] = t1;
++        c += (t1 > t2);
+         t1 = a[1];
+-        t2 = b[1];
+-        r[1] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2;
+-        if (t1 != t2)
+-            c = (t1 < t2);
++        t2 = (t1 - c) & BN_MASK2;
++        c  = (t2 > t1);
++        t1 = b[1];
++        t1 = (t2 - t1) & BN_MASK2;
++        r[1] = t1;
++        c += (t1 > t2);
+         t1 = a[2];
+-        t2 = b[2];
+-        r[2] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2;
+-        if (t1 != t2)
+-            c = (t1 < t2);
++        t2 = (t1 - c) & BN_MASK2;
++        c  = (t2 > t1);
++        t1 = b[2];
++        t1 = (t2 - t1) & BN_MASK2;
++        r[2] = t1;
++        c += (t1 > t2);
+         t1 = a[3];
+-        t2 = b[3];
+-        r[3] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2;
+-        if (t1 != t2)
+-            c = (t1 < t2);
++        t2 = (t1 - c) & BN_MASK2;
++        c  = (t2 > t1);
++        t1 = b[3];
++        t1 = (t2 - t1) & BN_MASK2;
++        r[3] = t1;
++        c += (t1 > t2);
+         a += 4;
+         b += 4;
+         r += 4;
+@@ -408,10 +416,12 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
+ #endif
+     while (n) {
+         t1 = a[0];
+-        t2 = b[0];
+-        r[0] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2;
+-        if (t1 != t2)
+-            c = (t1 < t2);
++        t2 = (t1 - c) & BN_MASK2;
++        c  = (t2 > t1);
++        t1 = b[0];
++        t1 = (t2 - t1) & BN_MASK2;
++        r[0] = t1;
++        c += (t1 > t2);
+         a++;
+         b++;
+         r++;
+@@ -446,7 +456,7 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
+         t += c0;                /* no carry */  \
+         c0 = (BN_ULONG)Lw(t);                   \
+         hi = (BN_ULONG)Hw(t);                   \
+-        c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; if (c1<hi) c2++; \
++        c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; c2 += (c1<hi);   \
+         } while(0)
+ 
+ #  define mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2)      do {    \
+@@ -455,11 +465,11 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
+         BN_ULLONG tt = t+c0;    /* no carry */  \
+         c0 = (BN_ULONG)Lw(tt);                  \
+         hi = (BN_ULONG)Hw(tt);                  \
+-        c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; if (c1<hi) c2++; \
++        c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; c2 += (c1<hi);   \
+         t += c0;                /* no carry */  \
+         c0 = (BN_ULONG)Lw(t);                   \
+         hi = (BN_ULONG)Hw(t);                   \
+-        c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; if (c1<hi) c2++; \
++        c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; c2 += (c1<hi);   \
+         } while(0)
+ 
+ #  define sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2)       do {    \
+@@ -468,7 +478,7 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
+         t += c0;                /* no carry */  \
+         c0 = (BN_ULONG)Lw(t);                   \
+         hi = (BN_ULONG)Hw(t);                   \
+-        c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; if (c1<hi) c2++; \
++        c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; c2 += (c1<hi);   \
+         } while(0)
+ 
+ #  define sqr_add_c2(a,i,j,c0,c1,c2) \
+@@ -483,26 +493,26 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
+         BN_ULONG ta = (a), tb = (b);            \
+         BN_ULONG lo, hi;                        \
+         BN_UMULT_LOHI(lo,hi,ta,tb);             \
+-        c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo)?1:0;            \
+-        c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi)?1:0;            \
++        c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo);                \
++        c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi);                \
+         } while(0)
+ 
+ #  define mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2)      do {    \
+         BN_ULONG ta = (a), tb = (b);            \
+         BN_ULONG lo, hi, tt;                    \
+         BN_UMULT_LOHI(lo,hi,ta,tb);             \
+-        c0 += lo; tt = hi+((c0<lo)?1:0);        \
+-        c1 += tt; c2 += (c1<tt)?1:0;            \
+-        c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo)?1:0;            \
+-        c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi)?1:0;            \
++        c0 += lo; tt = hi + (c0<lo);            \
++        c1 += tt; c2 += (c1<tt);                \
++        c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo);                \
++        c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi);                \
+         } while(0)
+ 
+ #  define sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2)       do {    \
+         BN_ULONG ta = (a)[i];                   \
+         BN_ULONG lo, hi;                        \
+         BN_UMULT_LOHI(lo,hi,ta,ta);             \
+-        c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo)?1:0;            \
+-        c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi)?1:0;            \
++        c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo);                \
++        c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi);                \
+         } while(0)
+ 
+ #  define sqr_add_c2(a,i,j,c0,c1,c2)    \
+@@ -517,26 +527,26 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
+         BN_ULONG ta = (a), tb = (b);            \
+         BN_ULONG lo = ta * tb;                  \
+         BN_ULONG hi = BN_UMULT_HIGH(ta,tb);     \
+-        c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo)?1:0;            \
+-        c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi)?1:0;            \
++        c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo);                \
++        c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi);                \
+         } while(0)
+ 
+ #  define mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2)      do {    \
+         BN_ULONG ta = (a), tb = (b), tt;        \
+         BN_ULONG lo = ta * tb;                  \
+         BN_ULONG hi = BN_UMULT_HIGH(ta,tb);     \
+-        c0 += lo; tt = hi + ((c0<lo)?1:0);      \
+-        c1 += tt; c2 += (c1<tt)?1:0;            \
+-        c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo)?1:0;            \
+-        c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi)?1:0;            \
++        c0 += lo; tt = hi + (c0<lo);            \
++        c1 += tt; c2 += (c1<tt);                \
++        c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo);                \
++        c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi);                \
+         } while(0)
+ 
+ #  define sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2)       do {    \
+         BN_ULONG ta = (a)[i];                   \
+         BN_ULONG lo = ta * ta;                  \
+         BN_ULONG hi = BN_UMULT_HIGH(ta,ta);     \
+-        c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo)?1:0;            \
+-        c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi)?1:0;            \
++        c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo);                \
++        c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi);                \
+         } while(0)
+ 
+ #  define sqr_add_c2(a,i,j,c0,c1,c2)      \
+@@ -551,8 +561,8 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
+         BN_ULONG lo = LBITS(a), hi = HBITS(a);  \
+         BN_ULONG bl = LBITS(b), bh = HBITS(b);  \
+         mul64(lo,hi,bl,bh);                     \
+-        c0 = (c0+lo)&BN_MASK2; if (c0<lo) hi++; \
+-        c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; if (c1<hi) c2++; \
++        c0 = (c0+lo)&BN_MASK2; hi += (c0<lo);   \
++        c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; c2 += (c1<hi);   \
+         } while(0)
+ 
+ #  define mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2)      do {    \
+@@ -561,17 +571,17 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
+         BN_ULONG bl = LBITS(b), bh = HBITS(b);  \
+         mul64(lo,hi,bl,bh);                     \
+         tt = hi;                                \
+-        c0 = (c0+lo)&BN_MASK2; if (c0<lo) tt++; \
+-        c1 = (c1+tt)&BN_MASK2; if (c1<tt) c2++; \
+-        c0 = (c0+lo)&BN_MASK2; if (c0<lo) hi++; \
+-        c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; if (c1<hi) c2++; \
++        c0 = (c0+lo)&BN_MASK2; tt += (c0<lo);   \
++        c1 = (c1+tt)&BN_MASK2; c2 += (c1<tt);   \
++        c0 = (c0+lo)&BN_MASK2; hi += (c0<lo);   \
++        c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; c2 += (c1<hi);   \
+         } while(0)
+ 
+ #  define sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2)       do {    \
+         BN_ULONG lo, hi;                        \
+         sqr64(lo,hi,(a)[i]);                    \
+-        c0 = (c0+lo)&BN_MASK2; if (c0<lo) hi++; \
+-        c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; if (c1<hi) c2++; \
++        c0 = (c0+lo)&BN_MASK2; hi += (c0<lo);   \
++        c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; c2 += (c1<hi);   \
+         } while(0)
+ 
+ #  define sqr_add_c2(a,i,j,c0,c1,c2) \
+diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c b/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
+index 15d9e0a544..e76f6107a7 100644
+--- a/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
++++ b/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
+@@ -191,7 +191,8 @@ int BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b,
+             n->top = (int)(rtop & ~mask) | (ntop & mask);
+             n->flags |= (BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP & ~mask);
+         }
+-        ret = BN_mod_mul_montgomery(n, n, r, b->m_ctx, ctx);
++        ret = bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(n, n, r, b->m_ctx, ctx);
++        bn_correct_top_consttime(n);
+     } else {
+         ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, r, b->mod, ctx);
+     }
+diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
+index eb4a31849b..fe6fb0e40f 100644
+--- a/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
++++ b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
+@@ -1001,6 +1001,28 @@ BIGNUM *bn_wexpand(BIGNUM *a, int words)
+     return (words <= a->dmax) ? a : bn_expand2(a, words);
+ }
+ 
++void bn_correct_top_consttime(BIGNUM *a)
++{
++    int j, atop;
++    BN_ULONG limb;
++    unsigned int mask;
++
++    for (j = 0, atop = 0; j < a->dmax; j++) {
++        limb = a->d[j];
++        limb |= 0 - limb;
++        limb >>= BN_BITS2 - 1;
++        limb = 0 - limb;
++        mask = (unsigned int)limb;
++        mask &= constant_time_msb(j - a->top);
++        atop = constant_time_select_int(mask, j + 1, atop);
++    }
++
++    mask = constant_time_eq_int(atop, 0);
++    a->top = atop;
++    a->neg = constant_time_select_int(mask, 0, a->neg);
++    a->flags &= ~BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
++}
++
+ void bn_correct_top(BIGNUM *a)
+ {
+     BN_ULONG *ftl;
+diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_local.h b/crypto/bn/bn_local.h
+index ee6342b60c..818e34348e 100644
+--- a/crypto/bn/bn_local.h
++++ b/crypto/bn/bn_local.h
+@@ -515,10 +515,10 @@ unsigned __int64 _umul128(unsigned __int64 a, unsigned __int64 b,
+         ret =  (r);                     \
+         BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,w,tmp);  \
+         ret += (c);                     \
+-        (c) =  (ret<(c))?1:0;           \
++        (c) =  (ret<(c));               \
+         (c) += high;                    \
+         ret += low;                     \
+-        (c) += (ret<low)?1:0;           \
++        (c) += (ret<low);               \
+         (r) =  ret;                     \
+         }
+ 
+@@ -527,7 +527,7 @@ unsigned __int64 _umul128(unsigned __int64 a, unsigned __int64 b,
+         BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,w,ta);   \
+         ret =  low + (c);               \
+         (c) =  high;                    \
+-        (c) += (ret<low)?1:0;           \
++        (c) += (ret<low);               \
+         (r) =  ret;                     \
+         }
+ 
+@@ -543,10 +543,10 @@ unsigned __int64 _umul128(unsigned __int64 a, unsigned __int64 b,
+         high=  BN_UMULT_HIGH(w,tmp);    \
+         ret += (c);                     \
+         low =  (w) * tmp;               \
+-        (c) =  (ret<(c))?1:0;           \
++        (c) =  (ret<(c));               \
+         (c) += high;                    \
+         ret += low;                     \
+-        (c) += (ret<low)?1:0;           \
++        (c) += (ret<low);               \
+         (r) =  ret;                     \
+         }
+ 
+@@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ unsigned __int64 _umul128(unsigned __int64 a, unsigned __int64 b,
+         high=  BN_UMULT_HIGH(w,ta);     \
+         ret =  low + (c);               \
+         (c) =  high;                    \
+-        (c) += (ret<low)?1:0;           \
++        (c) += (ret<low);               \
+         (r) =  ret;                     \
+         }
+ 
+@@ -589,10 +589,10 @@ unsigned __int64 _umul128(unsigned __int64 a, unsigned __int64 b,
+         lt=(bl)*(lt); \
+         m1=(bl)*(ht); \
+         ht =(bh)*(ht); \
+-        m=(m+m1)&BN_MASK2; if (m < m1) ht+=L2HBITS((BN_ULONG)1); \
++        m=(m+m1)&BN_MASK2; ht += L2HBITS((BN_ULONG)(m < m1)); \
+         ht+=HBITS(m); \
+         m1=L2HBITS(m); \
+-        lt=(lt+m1)&BN_MASK2; if (lt < m1) ht++; \
++        lt=(lt+m1)&BN_MASK2; ht += (lt < m1); \
+         (l)=lt; \
+         (h)=ht; \
+         }
+@@ -609,7 +609,7 @@ unsigned __int64 _umul128(unsigned __int64 a, unsigned __int64 b,
+         h*=h; \
+         h+=(m&BN_MASK2h1)>>(BN_BITS4-1); \
+         m =(m&BN_MASK2l)<<(BN_BITS4+1); \
+-        l=(l+m)&BN_MASK2; if (l < m) h++; \
++        l=(l+m)&BN_MASK2; h += (l < m); \
+         (lo)=l; \
+         (ho)=h; \
+         }
+@@ -623,9 +623,9 @@ unsigned __int64 _umul128(unsigned __int64 a, unsigned __int64 b,
+         mul64(l,h,(bl),(bh)); \
+  \
+         /* non-multiply part */ \
+-        l=(l+(c))&BN_MASK2; if (l < (c)) h++; \
++        l=(l+(c))&BN_MASK2; h += (l < (c)); \
+         (c)=(r); \
+-        l=(l+(c))&BN_MASK2; if (l < (c)) h++; \
++        l=(l+(c))&BN_MASK2; h += (l < (c)); \
+         (c)=h&BN_MASK2; \
+         (r)=l; \
+         }
+@@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ unsigned __int64 _umul128(unsigned __int64 a, unsigned __int64 b,
+         mul64(l,h,(bl),(bh)); \
+  \
+         /* non-multiply part */ \
+-        l+=(c); if ((l&BN_MASK2) < (c)) h++; \
++        l+=(c); h += ((l&BN_MASK2) < (c)); \
+         (c)=h&BN_MASK2; \
+         (r)=l&BN_MASK2; \
+         }
+@@ -669,7 +669,7 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_part_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
+                            int cl, int dl);
+ int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
+                 const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
+-
++void bn_correct_top_consttime(BIGNUM *a);
+ BIGNUM *int_bn_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in,
+                            const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx,
+                            int *noinv);
+diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
+index 53cf2d03c9..cf5a10ab43 100644
+--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
++++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
+@@ -226,6 +226,7 @@ static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
+      * will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING. In both cases it's safe
+      * to access the blinding without a lock.
+      */
++    BN_set_flags(f, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+     return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -412,6 +413,11 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+         goto err;
+     }
+ 
++    if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
++        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock,
++                                    rsa->n, ctx))
++            goto err;
++
+     if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) {
+         blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
+         if (blinding == NULL) {
+@@ -449,13 +455,6 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+             goto err;
+         }
+         BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+-
+-        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+-            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock,
+-                                        rsa->n, ctx)) {
+-                BN_free(d);
+-                goto err;
+-            }
+         if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx,
+                                    rsa->_method_mod_n)) {
+             BN_free(d);
+-- 
+2.27.0
+
+

dependency/openssl/backport-CVE-2022-4450-Avoid-dangling-ptrs-in-header-and-data-params-for-PE.patch

@@ -37,4 +37,5 @@ index d416d939ea..328c30cdbb 100644
      }
      BIO_read(headerB, *header, headerlen);
 -- 
-2.34.1
+2.17.1
+

dependency/openssl/backport-CVE-2023-0215-Check-CMS-failure-during-BIO-setup-with-stream-is-ha.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+From f040f2577891d2bdb7610566c172233844cf673a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2022 17:15:18 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Check CMS failure during BIO setup with -stream is handled
+ correctly
+
+Test for the issue fixed in the previous commit
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+---
+ test/recipes/80-test_cms.t  | 15 +++++++++++++--
+ test/smime-certs/badrsa.pem | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 test/smime-certs/badrsa.pem
+
+diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
+index 5dc6a3aebe..ec11bfc253 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
++++ b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
+@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ use warnings;
+ use POSIX;
+ use File::Spec::Functions qw/catfile/;
+ use File::Compare qw/compare_text/;
+-use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_dir srctop_file/;
++use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_dir srctop_file with/;
+ use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+ 
+ setup("test_cms");
+@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ my $smcont   = srctop_file("test", "smcont.txt");
+ my ($no_des, $no_dh, $no_dsa, $no_ec, $no_ec2m, $no_rc2, $no_zlib)
+     = disabled qw/des dh dsa ec ec2m rc2 zlib/;
+ 
+-plan tests => 6;
++plan tests => 7;
+ 
+ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
+ 
+@@ -584,3 +584,14 @@ sub check_availability {
+ 
+     return "";
+ }
++
++# Check that we get the expected failure return code
++with({ exit_checker => sub { return shift == 6; } },
++    sub {
++        ok(run(app(['openssl', 'cms', '-encrypt',
++                    '-in', srctop_file("test", "smcont.txt"),
++                    '-stream', '-recip',
++                    srctop_file("test/smime-certs", "badrsa.pem"),
++                   ])),
++            "Check failure during BIO setup with -stream is handled correctly");
++    });
+diff --git a/test/smime-certs/badrsa.pem b/test/smime-certs/badrsa.pem
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..f824fc2267
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/smime-certs/badrsa.pem
+@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
++-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
++MIIDbTCCAlWgAwIBAgIToTV4Z0iuK08vZP20oTh//hC8BDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQ0FADAtMSswKQYD
++VfcDEyJTYW1wbGUgTEFNUFMgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUgQXV0aG9yaXR5MCAXDTE5MTEyMDA2NTQxOFoY
++DzIwNTIwOTI3MDY1NDE4WjAZMRcwFQYDVQQDEw5BbGljZSBMb3ZlbGFjZTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcN
++AQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBALT0iehYOBY+TZp/T5K2KNI05Hwr+E3wP6XTvyi6WWyTgBK9LCOw
++I2juwdRrjFBmXkk7pWpjXwsA3A5GOtz0FpfgyC7OxsVcF7q4WHWZWleYXFKlQHJD73nQwXP968+A
++/3rBX7PhO0DBbZnfitOLPgPEwjTtdg0VQQ6Wz+CRQ/YbHPKaw7aRphZO63dKvIKp4cQVtkWQHi6s
++yTjGsgkLcLNau5LZDQUdsGV+SAo3nBdWCRYV+I65x8Kf4hCxqqmjV3d/2NKRu0BXnDe/N+iDz3X0
++zEoj0fqXgq4SWcC0nsG1lyyXt1TL270I6ATKRGJWiQVCCpDtc0NT6vdJ45bCSxgCAwEAAaOBlzCB
++lDAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMB4GA1UdEQQXMBWBE2FsaWNlQHNtaW1lLmV4YW1wbGUwEwYDVR0lBAww
++CgYIKwYBBQUHAwQwDwYDVR0PAQH/BAUDAwfAADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUu/bMsi0dBhIcl64papAQ0yBm
++ZnMwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUeF8OWnjYa+RUcD2z3ez38fL6wEcwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQENBQADggEBABbW
++eonR6TMTckehDKNOabwaCIcekahAIL6l9tTzUX5ew6ufiAPlC6I/zQlmUaU0iSyFDG1NW14kNbFt
++5CAokyLhMtE4ASHBIHbiOp/ZSbUBTVYJZB61ot7w1/ol5QECSs08b8zrxIncf+t2DHGuVEy/Qq1d
++rBz8d4ay8zpqAE1tUyL5Da6ZiKUfWwZQXSI/JlbjQFzYQqTRDnzHWrg1xPeMTO1P2/cplFaseTiv
++yk4cYwOp/W9UAWymOZXF8WcJYCIUXkdcG/nEZxr057KlScrJmFXOoh7Y+8ON4iWYYcAfiNgpUFo/
++j8BAwrKKaFvdlZS9k1Ypb2+UQY75mKJE9Bg=
++-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+-- 
+2.17.1
+

dependency/openssl/backport-CVE-2023-0215-Fix-a-UAF-resulting-from-a-bug-in-BIO_new_NDEF.patch

@@ -102,4 +102,5 @@ index 760e4846a4..f8d4b1b9aa 100644
      OPENSSL_free(ndef_aux);
      return NULL;
 -- 
-2.34.1
+2.17.1
+